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# **The State of Lahore Under Colonialism: A Political Economic Analysis**

**Shahnaz Rouse**

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**Graduate Institute of  
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Lahore School of Economics**



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## **Preface**

This paper by Professor Shahnaz Rouse, Sarah Lawrence College, New York was written when she spent time at the Lahore School of Economics, as a visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, to contribute to its recently started long-term project on the “Economic History of Pakistan since the Mughals 1520-2020”.

As Professor Rouse points out, her study forms part of a larger project on Lahore she is undertaking and this working paper is also work in progress which will be published as a monograph by the Lahore School of Economics during next year.

The paper traces the colonial history of Lahore and within it examines three issues: first, military-geo strategic pre-occupations (divided further into shifting borders and boundaries, (re)making bodies, mobilities, policing and resistance); second, economic aspects with a detailed analysis of the coming of railways, railway workshops and new job opportunities and its socio-economic implications for the city; and third a (re)turn to representation which according to the author “came to rest solely on the surface, on the appearance of things, i.e. their legibility”.

This working paper will be of considerable interest to both more general readers on the development of Lahore under colonial rule but will especially appeal to both economists and economic historians given its detailed and carefully nuanced political economy approach which brings out the economic forces that interacted with the emergence of new classes and which then shaped socio-economic changes in Lahore during this period.

Rashid Amjad  
Series Editor  
Lahore School of Economics



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# The State of Lahore Under Colonialism: A Political Economic Analysis

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

### I. *Conceptual Borders*

This paper examines three different aspects of colonial Lahore's history: geostrategic-cum-military, economic, and representational. Even as I recognize that representational concerns appear throughout Lahore's colonial occupation, I argue that military, economic, and representational considerations attained hegemony at distinct moments in the city's history, both spatially and temporally.<sup>2</sup> In the process, I call into question the conventional primacy accorded to time over space, a conceptualization that is integral to the constitution of linear notions of "progress." A close reading of Lahore's history reveals the contingent dimensions of coloniality, the city's fluctuating contours and boundaries, and divergent colonial emphases throughout Britain's long relationship with the city.<sup>3</sup>

Lahore, then, like other colonial sites, was actively produced through discursive and institutional mechanisms, which were dynamic, relational, and contextual. The very tenuousness of progress and attendant claims

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<sup>1</sup> This working paper is a preliminary version of a monograph that the Lahore School of Economics will be publishing within the next year. As a work in progress, I ask for the reader's indulgence for ideas not yet fully documented and/or worked out. This and the later monograph—for which the Graduate Institute of Development Studies at the Lahore School gave me time and space—are part of a larger project on colonial Lahore made possible by grants from Sarah Lawrence College, the American Institute for Pakistan Studies, and the Fulbright Senior Scholar program.

<sup>2</sup> I use the term "moment" in a structurally contingent rather than a purely chronological sense. Part of my argument is that, while the use of force (military and/or policing) remained a constant throughout the colonial period, the rule of law became a hegemonic device for the maintenance of colonial "order" at a later moment in Lahore's history.

<sup>3</sup> Because of the differences in time and space, colonialism's actuality is often at odds with its representation. Representations, in turn, take different forms at diverse moments in British colonial history, reflecting not only shifting colonial exigencies, but also based on the public(s) to whom they are directed. Further, they are often markedly different in public documents versus those privately communicated, such as private papers and confidential official materials. In other words, the colonial archive is inconsistent, frequently opaque, and at specific points in time its content is so standardized it appears formulaic.

made by its interlocutors jointly engendered what Anne McClintock labels *panoptic time* and *anachronistic space*.<sup>4</sup> Colonial anxiety emerges recurrently in relation to the ostensible objects of colonial power, i.e., its colonial subjects. Despite frequent depictions of the latter as *unruly* and *unpredictable*,<sup>5</sup> the colony (and Lahore) can be understood as a contact zone: both a site of learning *and* a demonstration of colonial will to power.<sup>6</sup> Johanne Fabian argues that European ethnographic knowledge would not have been possible without interaction with local sources, yet from out of this colonial contact local knowledge was subsequently recast as European [British] knowledge.<sup>7</sup> Contact as an idea and practice reverberates throughout my analysis: I trace the manner in which Lahore is acted upon and acted through, recognizing that space itself participates in history-making alongside human agents.<sup>8</sup> In what follows, I draw from political economic theory as well as an indigenous perspective wherein nature and inanimate matter are considered salient, albeit not independent, contributors to the making of history.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Context*, Routledge, 1995. I use the term “engendered” in its double sense, to demonstrate that the idea of “progress” was discursively produced, but also intimately intertwined with constructions of gender and sexuality.

<sup>5</sup> I use these terms self-consciously, since unruliness is another way of representing colonial people’s defiance of imperial ambitions and perceptions. Colonial strategy could not then be produced in advance of the encounter itself, since each encounter produced a new reality and a new set of dynamics.

<sup>6</sup> I borrow the term “contact zone” from Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, Routledge, 1992.

<sup>7</sup> Johanne Fabian, *Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa*, University of California Press, 2000. Although this text is about a different part of the globe, Fabian’s argument applies to the Indian case as well. See also Bernard Cohn, *The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia*, Oxford University Press, 1984; as well as his *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, Princeton University Press, 1996. Both Fabian and Cohn argue that local knowledge is appropriated not only as grounds for colonial knowledge, but is also, in effect, re-formed such that it untethers practices from which this supposedly “new” knowledge draws. This colonial knowledge is re-presented as “scientific” and “modern,” rendering local knowledge increasingly invisible and/or as “backward.” Local knowledge is not only appropriated but also transformed through this process.

<sup>8</sup> Critical scholarship in Feminist theory, Science, Technology and Society (STS), Geography, and Environmental Studies all point to the relationship between animate and inanimate matter, including technology. Feminist scholarship took the lead in this regard, problematizing nature/culture, active/passive dichotomies. For a recent revision of this perspective, see Majed Akhter, Kerri Jean Ormerod, “The Irrigation Technozone: State Power, Expertise and Agrarian Development in the U.S. West and British Punjab, 1880–1920,” *Geoforum* 60, 2015: 123–132.

<sup>9</sup> Donna Haraway’s work is a key and early exemplar of scholarship critiquing and revising human/non-human relations and challenging nature-culture separations. See her *Simians*,

## II. *Re-forming and Re-framing Lahore*

Recognizing the transitory nature of colonial notions and constructions of Lahore “city” destabilizes and challenges conventional conceptualizations of urbanity and urbanization. To look *within* colonial Lahore<sup>10</sup> requires that we recognize the blurriness of its lines, the shifting contours of its spaces, and the relational aspects of its construction. I suggest that rather than being unitary, coherent, or rational, the colonial state/system proceeded in fits and starts: it was incoherent, hesitant, uncertain, and riddled with internal fissures. It was structurally riven with contradictions, this discord being both the life-blood *and* nemesis of the colonial state. Asserting power over Lahore, I argue, required policing and careful guarding of colonial borders and boundaries, both internal and external, physical and human. Drawing on a diversity of sources—colonial documents of a wide variety, including personal papers, newspapers, diaries, oral histories, materials on courts-martial, and secondary sources—I complicate Lahore’s colonial history and argue for its indeterminacy, suggesting that the colonial enterprise was infinitely more heterogeneous and accidental than its own claims allow and/or are made by many of its critics.<sup>11</sup> In telling *this* story, I make no

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Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, Routledge, 1991. Many native people’s perspectives predate such scholarship and insist on the one-ness of being across the nature-culture, human/non-human divide. Although hardly monolithic, such scholarship posits that history-theory as well as ontology and epistemology are inseparable and formed in tandem with each other in a dialectic of being and becoming.

<sup>10</sup> Language itself is a barrier here: to speak of the “inside” and “outside” of a place is already to bracket and cordon it off—a practice central to colonial anthropology and the making of its objects.

<sup>11</sup> Zaib un Nisa Aziz makes a similar argument in her essay, “Anxieties of Empire: Examining Frontier Governance in 19<sup>th</sup> Century British India,” *Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse*, 5(09), 2013. Accessed online at: <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=760>. While her analysis is restricted to the northwestern areas and extends into contemporary times, she disputes “the notion that there was any single governing vision dominating the colonial project,” and goes on to state, “On the contrary, this was a variegated, differentiated and heterogeneous venture which responded to changes both in the colony and the center” (page 2 of online version). My argument, like hers, is that contradiction rather than coherence marked the colonial order and its production. This implies that the unintended consequences of colonial action are often as, if not more significant, than their stated objectives. Manan Ahmed’s *Where the Wild Frontiers Are: Pakistan and the American Imagination* demonstrates the relationship between past and present, explicating how colonial visions of Pakistan’s northwest draw from the colonial imaginary (Just World Books, 2011). In the process, he challenges notions of colonial “rationality” and speaks to the relationship between affect and practice alongside reason and emotion. Robert Nichols ed., *The Frontier Crimes Regulation: A History in Documents*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013 and my current work share some similar ideas. As with Bernard Cohn’s earlier mentioned research, Nichols argues that local knowledge, through interactions with new regimes of classification and codification, produced tradition(s) that never existed previously in a like manner. However, this is only part of the story I

claims to being comprehensive. Instead, my approach resembles Peter van der Veer's who "aims at problematizing oppositions... on which nationalist discourse depends and which the historiography of Britain and India adopts."<sup>12</sup> In my analysis of the first two moments, the railroads serve as the mediating link and undergird the city's growth connecting Lahore's political economy to/through the region's larger social transformations. In the latter regard, I also address in summary fashion Punjab's canal colony formation, the creation of its princely states, and migration to the region.

### III. *Defining Lahore and the Production of Place*

Histories of colonial Lahore are premised on the notion that their unit of analysis is known *in advance*. In early colonial accounts, Lahore as a city is confined to the "walled city."<sup>13</sup> It is discursively cordoned off, enclosed, and objectified.<sup>14</sup> Its intimate relations to what is now rendered as the exterior of the city is thus redefined.<sup>15</sup> While Lahore bore a surface

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present here. My argument is that this *coherence is produced after the fact*: that the series of moments leading up to these legal, administrative, and other schema re-present a process that was riven with difference, ambiguity, and uncertainty. This explains differences between Nichols' analysis, which is based on post-1880s documents; whereas, I start prior to Lahore's annexation in 1849. I also examine colonialism's class, gender and sexual lines of division, fissures that accentuated internal difference.

<sup>12</sup> Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain*, Princeton University Press, 2001: 3. He goes on to state: "...what is often assumed to be opposite is in fact deeply entangled, and that which is seen as unconnected is in fact the product of close encounters." *Ibid.*: 3.

<sup>13</sup> Known variously as the "native" quarters, "*androon*," or "*purana shehr*." Each of these terms suggests a relation between what is supposedly simply being *described* from its "outside," as though the distinction is self-evident. Each term gestures towards a different relation to the city's exteriority or "other." Thus the "native" city suggests a non-native one; "androon" suggests a private, enclosed space versus an open or non-enclosed one; and finally, "purana shehr" can variously be understood in terms of a tradition/modern dichotomy or else point to a historical dynamic, whereby the old and new are co-produced and rely on each other for meaning.

<sup>14</sup> Such objectification of the city relies on the colonial anthropological trope of "the setting" which is the antithesis of how urban life has historically been constituted. Even when such settings are conceptually linked to outside spaces in the colonial anthropological mode, the very idea of a coherent unit produces its geography *a priori*, even as it at times acknowledges changes overtime within the defined space of the city. See Bernard Cohn's work cited previously.

<sup>15</sup> The Imperial and District Gazetteers, kept meticulously by the British, provide evidence of early perceptions of "the city" and its surroundings. The author/compiler of the 1883 Gazetteer acknowledges that the city may have been much larger (both spatially and demographically) than stated at the time of its recording. The gazetteer notes: "In size and population it is far inferior to Lucknow, Delhi, Agra, and even Amritsar. The circuit of the walls does not exceed three miles, and its population at the last Census, was given at about 97,000... That Lahore formerly covered a far larger area than it does at present is at once apparent from the number

resemblance to medieval walled cities of Europe, the presumption of a similarity between them is taken for granted, thus rendering difference as ontological “otherness,” i.e., either in linear terms, or as memetic. Such an apprehension of place *assumes* and *asserts* equivalence across Indo-European space rather than *demonstrating* this as a “fact,” even as such modes of signifying make the latter claim.

British confinement of Lahore<sup>16</sup> to the spaces *inside* the walled and gated city enabled administrators collating “facts” about the city to separate it from its “suburbs” and contiguous areas.<sup>17</sup> The term “suburb” invites comparison between colonial and metropolitan cities. Lahore’s urbanization and its so-called suburbs, however, were not the product of the spatiality of class divisions central to metropolitan cities like Manchester.<sup>18</sup> Such a process of “translation,” to use William Glover’s term, does violence to Lahore’s experiential reality and social relations. Even as the trope of suburban Lahore disrupts its organic<sup>19</sup> relationship to its environs, it enables a reclamation and “development” of *both* spaces, now re-presented as markers of colonial improvement through the production of urban “order,”<sup>20</sup> thus allowing progressive claims to be

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and extent of the ruins which cover the face of the surrounding country.” Gazetteer of the Lahore District, 1883–84, compiled and published under the authority of the Punjab Government: 148.

<sup>16</sup> Part of my argument here is that ideas and concrete practice are intimately and integrally linked to each other. They do not exist in a cause-effect relation but a dialectical one. To suggest otherwise is to overlook the dynamic nature of social change and reduce it to a particular instance, when one or the other is dominant but *only at that point in time*.

<sup>17</sup> Not only gazetteers but also scholarly texts—British and Indian—uncritically replicate this term. This constructs Lahore’s urbanization in an extra-local mold, not merely linguistically but also socially, economically, and symbolically.

<sup>18</sup> Interestingly, much contemporary critical writing on Lahore, including works by William Glover, *Making Lahore Modern: Constructing and Imagining a Colonial City*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008; Anna Suvorova, *Lahore: Topophilia of Space and Place*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011, as well as others continue to deploy the term “suburb” somewhat uncritically. This sets up an unfortunate and erroneous correspondence between modernity and urban development in British cities and those in India, including Lahore. See previous note.

<sup>19</sup> I use this term advisedly since the social is itself constitutive of the historical. Social relations are not only at the heart of any place’s political economy, but also constitute part and parcel of what I label its “spatial ecology.” Seen thus, the term “organic” should not be read as “natural” and/or authentic, but rather as relational and emblematic of shifting urban dynamics through which urban space comes into being.

<sup>20</sup> Reliance on “order” suggests that “chaos” marked Lahore’s precolonial urban space. It is not a coincidence that concerns with sanitation permeate the colonial imaginary since chaos is also associated with “dirt” and the lack of cleanliness. Ironically, recent scholarship points out that the British adopted practices of bathing from upper caste Indians, then re-exported them back to India as part of metropolitan “scientific” knowledge.

made by colonial urban practitioners. Initially and not unsurprisingly, representing Lahore's environs as [*in*] ruins prior to British occupation allowed colonial authorities to claim that they alone were capable of revitalizing Lahore. To quote an Indian official source:

The dreary expanse of crumbling ruins and tottering walls and old mounds, the desolate and barren tracts, strewn for miles around with *debris*, where there stood not a tree to give shelter to a weary traveler, have, through the magic wand of British civilization, been *charmed into a scene of life again*.<sup>21</sup>

Medical notions of germs, disease, and health serve as alibi for intervention in the “old” city and its environs.<sup>22</sup> British spatial practices, its proponents argued, were designed for the “betterment” of both people and place. Questions of the attendant violence and structural relations embedded in colonial relations were either elided or rationalized.

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<sup>21</sup> This passage is taken from Syad Muhammad Latif, “Preface” in *Lahore: History, Architectural Remains, and Antiquities*, Lahore: New Imperial Press, 1892: ix (reprint), suggesting that such visions of “uplift” were shared by (some) members of the aspiring local middle class. Nida Rehman comments critically on such language and writes against its grain in several of her papers. See “Description, Display and Distribution: cultivating a garden identity in nineteenth-century Lahore,” *Studies in the History of Gardens and Landscaped Designs: An International Quarterly*, 2014; and in “Two Rivers of Lahore: Stories of Decay and Reform,” in *Portrait of Lahore: Capital City of the Punjab*, Lahore: Thaap, 2011. At the same time, Latif also seems to be suggesting—albeit subtly—that the city had a grandeur that was lost and regained under the British. It would be worthwhile to look more closely into Latif’s background to scrutinize the extent to which his valorization of the British signifies an acceptance of colonial representations of its “civilizing” mission and/or is a lament on the city’s destruction in recent years. Second set of italics mine.

<sup>22</sup> W. Glover, *Op. Cit.*, 2008: 34-52. See also Hala Bashir Malik, *Enabling and Inhibiting Urban Development: A Case Study of Lahore Improvement Trust as a Late Colonial Institution*, MIT: Master’s thesis in Architecture Studies, 2014. For a review of recent literature critiquing British colonial claims of *improvement*, see Eric Lewis Beverley’s Review Essay “Colonial Urbanism and South Asian Cities,” *Social History*, Vol. 36, No. 4, November 2011, in which he argues that recent scholarship on British India has demonstrated that the “racially partitioned colonial city. . . more a figure of political desire on the part of colonial administrators than an accurate description of urban cultural geography” (p. 482). Glover’s analysis of British colonial bungalows in Lahore also speaks to this chimera of actual physical separation between the colonial master/mistress and their Indian domestics. The work on lock hospitals, orphanages, and asylums within Lahore as well as external to it, suggests the dual city—central to colonial urbanity *and* its critics—was constantly thwarted not only by colonial desire and anxiety, but also by local resistance to such separation and segregation. That this dual city was predominantly a feature of the colonial imaginary does not deny that it, at the same time, animated colonial urban design and planning.

Representational claims aside, the practices through which Lahore's spaces came to be remade clarify how Lahore's "inside" and "outside" were materially produced through an active process involving colonials and locals. Affect/emotion combined with rationality/reason to manage changes, such that even as *civilizational* claims animated colonial urbanization in Lahore,<sup>23</sup> the city existed *in* an exigent spatial history<sup>24</sup> made visible through distinct preoccupations among different fractions within the developing colonial state and the mobility of various actors involved in the process.<sup>25</sup>

Military and geostrategic investments mark initial colonial interest in Lahore; economic concerns emerged late in the aftermath of annexation; representational concerns that initially justified and rationalized colonial occupation, are later riddled with *legacy* concerns.<sup>26</sup> Claims of "progress" and "civilization" occur throughout, but become *dominant* in Lahore in the late colonial period, and in a different register, as an end to colonial rule emerges as a distinct yet still distant possibility. Changes in metropolitan politics and in anti-colonial sentiment in India together contribute to this shift. Analyzing the colonial state and the state of Lahore conjointly helps complicate both without "white washing" colonial violence, both explicit and implicit, across the colonizer/colonized divide.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> For a discussion of some early debates see Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question. A Marxist Approach*, London: Edward Arnold, 1977; for a later revisiting of these debates and Castell's positioning on urbanization and urban studies, see Ida Susser, *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory*, Blackwell, 2002, especially pages 15–33.

<sup>24</sup> I borrow this term from Lewis Mumford's classic text, *The City in History*, Orlando, Florida: Hartcourt Inc. 1961.

<sup>25</sup> The colonial state was spatially dynamic: both physically as its very borders and boundaries shifted as well as through the circulation of its officials and men between colonies, from India (as well as other parts of Asia), the Americas, and Africa. Its contours and *form* remained mobile and in transit, similar to, even if not identical to the "spatial circulation of expertise" that K. Akhter and L. Ormerod discuss (*Op. Cit.*, 2015: 123).

<sup>26</sup> Earlier preoccupations with image were designed for domestic consumption, i.e., for British audiences and authorities, and for a segment of "influential" locals whom the British sought to both impress, coopt, and/or belittle. (See E. M. Collingham, *Imperial Bodies*, London: Polity Press, 2001 for her analysis of British concerns regarding their image in the early years of East India Company rule). As opposition to colonial rule became more pronounced, justifications for colonial rule came to rely on an admixture of symbolic and material grounds that can be seen in the remaking of the Lawrence Gardens in Lahore (now renamed "Bagh-e-Jinnah"), discussed later.

<sup>27</sup> Thus, members of the British army of the lower ranks did not have the same experience(s) as their superiors (something I discuss later); neither did the offspring of mixed parents nor even the partners of these unions themselves. In this sense, despite the racial privilege that may have

My use of the archives—colonial and non-colonial, oral, visual, and written—is promiscuous, and allows me to draw on the internal differences and contradictions *within* the archive.<sup>28</sup> To summarize, I demonstrate and assert that colonial practices in Lahore were mediated spatially and temporally. The recognition of Lahore’s colonial structured and relational urbanity requires attentiveness to particular conjunctures and their modalities of knowing.<sup>29</sup> In other words, representations matter and are material.

## From Private Beginnings to (Colonial) State Formations

### I. *Military/Geostrategic Preoccupations*

#### a. Shifting Borders and Boundaries

Lahore was colonized late,<sup>30</sup> coming under direct control of the British East India Company in 1849. Historically, Lahore was frequently in the path of those seeking to extract wealth and/or control territory in India, since most occupiers came overland entering from the western part of the subcontinent.<sup>31</sup> British occupation of the Punjab violated this pattern. The

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benefitted each of these two groups in one register, their frequent degradation and subjection to abuse in consequence of their own racial or class “otherness” is apparent at another.

<sup>28</sup> The archive here includes both primary *and* secondary sources. The former includes printed colonial records, personal papers, diaries, oral histories, maps, commercial archives, photos, i.e., both public and private materials, that include oral, written, visual material and *immaterial* sources. I consider certain secondary sources—especially from colonial times—as part of the historical archive since they both inform our sense of history and serve as a form of memory production.

<sup>29</sup> Janet Abu-Lughod’s essay, “On the Re-making of History: How to Reinvent the Past” in Barbara Kruger and Phil Mariani eds., *Re-making History: Discussions in Contemporary Culture* (# 4, Seattle: Bay Press, 1998: 113–130,) is relevant here. Following her caution regarding historical periodization, I argue against a mechanistic structuralist reading that denies the possibility of (an)other history. Abu-Lughod starts from the premise that history is written from the point of view of the victor. Deploying an alternative spatio-temporal frame, prior to Europe’s ascent, she calls into question European claims of exceptionalism. I combine her insights regarding the ideological writing of history with a feminist methodology that insists public and private domains be seen together, and not independently of each other. Abu-Lughod’s method is further explicated in *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

<sup>30</sup> Precisely because of the late colonization of the Punjab, British policies in Punjab and in Lahore relied on a combination of earlier practices tried elsewhere in India, but also indulged in previously untried experimentation. Land tenure systems set up in the Punjab, including the canal colony experiment, were economically significant and had long-term impacts.

<sup>31</sup> Muhammad bin Qasim and his armies also came by water. Later incursions by water were mainly for trade or for purposes of cultural and religious exchange, not for military conquest.



British, similar to other Europeans who came by sea, first established themselves near ports, and in time made Bengal and Calcutta their main base.<sup>32</sup> A British Indian Civil Service (ICS) member writing about World War I comments on the impact of this spatial difference on early European interest in the Punjab:

The same position that had exposed the Punjab to invasion by land, had kept it aloof from the great Powers which came to India by sea. So the British left the Punjab alone, except when called upon to protect their Allies and dependents from aggression, or if deliberately challenged to ordeal by battle. In 1809 they had, at request of the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, made a treaty with Ranjit Singh, which put an end to his designs of conquest towards the east and south; but it took no less than two direct challenges by the Khalsa Army to drive them into annexing the territories of the Sikh Maharaja. The King of Delhi was maintained upon his throne, until he made himself impossible by his treachery during the Mutiny. ... It is a notable fact that in the Mutiny the victor's staunchest comrades-in-arms were those who had fought so hard against them in the Sikh Wars.<sup>33</sup>

The British are transformed into unwilling conquerors and ethical colonizers, a "truth" supposedly recognized even by their adversaries, and are represented as exemplary figures among colonizers of India and the Punjab. Such representations normalize coloniality on moral grounds, excising violent, material aspects of its lived history.

Having pacified and consolidated their base in the east, the British turned their sights westward. They chipped away at local power centers, combined coercive and reward-based strategies, established agents among rivals in the territories, and produced and preyed upon internal fissures before formally defeating fractionalized Sikh groups, which enabled the final annexation of Lahore. Destabilization in the region after Ranjit Singh's death served as an alibi for British military intervention,

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My emphasis on the northwest, however, does not deny contacts and mobilities on the colonial state's eastern parameters, in the areas that constitute Assam, Bangladesh, Nepal and areas further east.

<sup>32</sup> As the British Empire expanded, Bombay, too, rose in significance.

<sup>33</sup> M. S. Leigh [compiled by], *The Punjab and the War*, Lahore: Government Printing 1922: B2. My emphases.

which was justified as restoring calm and [again] producing “normality.” Leigh, the ICS officer quoted previously writes:

The immediate effect of the establishment of British Rule was the substitution of law and order for insecurity and anarchy. Within three years from the appointment of the Board of Administration, it was reported that no province in India was more free from crime.<sup>34</sup>

Once again, the British emerge as saviors and benefactors rather than interlopers, and in their own right, producers of chaos.

The process by which Sikh territories were militarily seized is later portrayed not as hesitation stemming from strategic incoherence or indecision, but is instead discursively produced as a marker of British benign intent. Hostilities on the Sikh empire’s southern flank preceded Lahore’s annexation and led to the British takeover of Sindh in 1843, which effectively helped secure the Punjab for later seizure. This series of events is re-presented not as clumsy colonial opportunism, but as a sign of British magnanimity. That the British did not immediately annex Lahore and Punjab, even after defeating it militarily, is pointed to as proof of British good intentions. Although (some) reports from this period represent British hesitation as based on deliberation and rational decision-making, by rereading the archive we can posit an alternative premise and the potentiality of a different outcome. Instead of accounting for the final annexation of Lahore and defeat of various Sikh territories in terms of the latter’s intransigence and insincerity, such vacillation can justifiably be ascribed to differences within the British establishment and the divergent structural interests to which different colonial actors were attached.<sup>35</sup> The affective, dramaturgical, and representational aspects of British annexation of the Punjab emerge from some of Henry Hardinge’s private correspondence. In a letter dated March 7, 1845 to his [step]son, Walter, he writes:

I have been attending the annual examinations of all the colleges, distributing prizes & making short speeches, which are very indifferently & very *differently* reported... [later in the same letter:]

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.: B2.

<sup>35</sup> The colonial archive is replete with accounts of clashes between different Governor-Generals in India and the diminished power of the Company at home. The British involved in various campaigns did not succeed due to particular foresight or carefully planned strategy. Clarity of military vision was ascribed to them later rather than preceding or during their military endeavors.

I wish you could see us on the frontier! I shall have 500 elephants for great guns, stores, tents and baggage! When collected, what a pity not to use them agt. an armed mass of the greatest ruffians in the world!<sup>36</sup>

Indication that the colonial state's interests shifted over time is provided by Hardinge's letters.<sup>37</sup> Singh points out and Hardinge's private letters confirm the close watch the latter kept on politics in England, which finally led to Peel's defeat at home in 1846.<sup>38</sup> These shifts in the British domestic balance of power and political climate resulted in policy change in India.

The borders of Punjab remained porous in this period, since the Sikh empire under Ranjit Singh retained Kashmir and Peshawar in the north and northwest.<sup>39</sup> It also remained unclear whether the Court of Directors favored further annexation, including of the Punjab.<sup>40</sup> Hardinge, in 1846 indicated a preference for a Sikh state abutting Afghanistan to serve as a buffer between British India and Afghanistan.<sup>41</sup> Other British administrators prior and subsequent to Hardinge remained preoccupied with India's northwestern borders and viewed Lahore and the Punjab through the lens of their Afghan policy, even as their solutions to this "problem" frequently diverged and fluctuated. While British conquest can be read as colonial ambition, the annexation of Lahore and the Punjab were perceived and represented by colonial authorities as a means to secure British India's northwestern borders, not as further land grab. Furthermore, it was only after parts of the Punjab were wrested away from the Sikhs, and the Durand Line Agreement forged with Afghanistan in 1896 and modified as the

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<sup>36</sup> Bawa Satinder Singh ed., *The Letters of the First Viscount Hardinge of Lahore to Lady Hardinge and Sir Walter and Lady James 1844-1847*, London: Office of the Royal Historical Society, 1986: 55-57. Letter sent from Calcutta on March 7, 1845.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*: 11.

<sup>39</sup> This was to hold until Ranjit Singh's death in 1839.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* The desire to subdue the Sikh empire was not necessarily the same as the desire to annex the Punjab. Instead, it can be argued that fear of Russia animated British inroads into the northwest, and the defeat of British forces in that region at the end of 1841 led to differences in military policy between Lord Ellenborough and the Court of Directors, who subsequently appointed Sir Henry Hardinge to replace Ellenborough.

<sup>41</sup> 19 March 1846, Peel Papers, Add. MSS. 40475.

Anglo-Afghan Treaty in 1919,<sup>42</sup> that the map of the Punjab territories took shape as the Punjab Province, a form that lasted until 1947.

The archives are replete with evidence that the British authorities represented and saw Russia as a threat, both before and after the Bolshevik revolution, and despite Soviet representations to the contrary.<sup>43</sup> Intra-European *national* struggles and expansionary moves to thwart European rivals—militarily, economically and politically—were thus *both* a preoccupation *and* an alibi for British interventions in Sindh, Punjab, and what was later constituted as the North-West Frontier Province.<sup>44</sup> Personal papers and diaries of British agents and military generals, including those belonging to Mortimer Durand, underscore this vision.<sup>45</sup> These concerns of empire manifested in three wars the British fought against Afghanistan.<sup>46</sup> Significantly, all three struggles for territorial control straddled the period of the Company and Crown interregnum.

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<sup>42</sup> The 1919 Anglo-Afghan Treaty was signed subsequent to the emergence of the newly constituted USSR. The actual contours of the relationship between the two states fluctuated based on the exigencies of the moment and the shifting balance of power between the two imperial rivals. See “The Durand Line: History, Consequences, and Future,” Report of a Conference Organized by AIAS and the Hollings Center, Istanbul, July 2007. It is worth noting the initial agreement was a rather dubious document that did little to quell border tensions. Nor did the later versions of the agreement have the same import for those on the two sides of the line.

<sup>43</sup> This also has contemporary analogies, both discernible in British attempts to thwart reform in Afghanistan during the reign of Amanullah at the beginning of the twentieth century, as well as in the US’s destabilization of the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I would argue there is a historical family resemblance in using “fears” surrounding Russian and the Soviet territorial ambitions to justify aggressive military interventions into Afghanistan, despite little actual evidence to justify this panic. The Durand Papers (SOAS archives) reveal a fixation with the suspicion that Russia was trying to extend its sphere of influence beyond central Asia into India. British attempts to draw a *line of control* between British India and Russia were based on the widespread fear that failure to secure this area might open up British territories to Russian expansionary designs. In a similar vein, US Cold War policymakers perceived the reformist regime of President Taraki as inimical to its interests in the region. This threat was heightened by the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, a close U.S. ally. (See Rose Louise Greaves, “British Policy in Persia, 1892–1903 –II” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1965, for further parallels).

<sup>44</sup> These intra-European conflicts spilt over into other parts of Asia and Africa, especially during the Second World War.

<sup>45</sup> Although Durand repeatedly refers to the imminence of a Russian threat he never offers any evidence to support this assertion. My point is not to ascertain whether there was in fact a real threat, but to highlight that this notion was so *naturalized* Durand did not see any need to provide evidence.

<sup>46</sup> First Afghan war: 1839–1842; the second: 1878–1880; and the third in 1919. The Durand Line itself was first initiated in embryonic form in 1893. It was subsequently followed up by a demarcating survey and finally established as political and cartographic “reality” in 1896. It was

These geostrategic gyrations had important implications for Lahore. The city initially held far less economic significance for the Company and Crown than in later years, *after* the Afghan “question” was “resolved.”<sup>47</sup> While the desire to create a “buffer” on its western border in part explains British wars in the region, the areas that would constitute this buffer were by no means agreed upon from the start of hostilities. Furthermore, colonial “external” policy had an “internal” dimension, albeit one that emerged through a process of trial and error and marked by tensions in the metropole. Pointing to the haphazardness of the policy, Durand wrote in February 1887:

The state of the Afghan boundary question, and the atmosphere of the Indian office and Foreign Office, were disheartening. No one either knew or cared anything about it.<sup>48</sup>

Alongside inconsistent and contradictory colonial policies toward the Punjab and northwestern areas, the creation of alliances with locals and the wars fought in its terrain proved to be more fraught and complex than earlier colonial activities in Bengal and Delhi<sup>49</sup>. One thing, however, is clear: British interest in the Punjab cannot be read off as systematically and uniformly driven by an inexorable economic logic post-annexation. Nor can British interests in the city be ascribed to Lahore’s cultural and political significance, and its (later-day) representation as one of India’s most significant cities and as one of Britain’s “jewels in the crown.” The latter, too, is an *after-the-fact* construction.

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subsequently modified in 1919, and Pakistan remains the inheritor of this line, which neither Afghanistan nor those living on both sides of the border necessarily accept.

<sup>47</sup> The papers of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) located in the Rhodes Library at Oxford are especially instructive in this regard. They constantly refer to the Lahore mission as a military/garrison mission and not a civil/administrative one. This sense its primary mission being military in nature, helps explain why the earliest Protestant missionaries who worked among locals in Lahore (beside the Catholics who had a longer history in the region), were the American Presbyterians and not British Protestants or Scottish Presbyterians.

<sup>48</sup> Durand’s Diary, PP MS 55, Box 4.

<sup>49</sup> See The Hardinge Letters, Royal Historical Society Camden, Fourth and Fifth Series, now available online; see also Durand Family Papers (Archives and Special Collections, SOAS Library). It is worth noting here that 1839 marks Ranjit Singh’s death, which raised concerns regarding Afghanistan, which Ranjit Singh’s forces had effectively policed and managed. In 1818, Peshawar was captured from the Afghans and locals by Ranjit Singh but was not formally annexed until 1834. The parallels between the latter’s Afghan policy and the British policy towards Punjab and its Afghan policy, are worth considering.

British conquest of the Punjab, while at times inchoate, nonetheless relied on earlier colonial practices, such as the maintenance and/or creation of “prince states” whose rulers served under the supervision of British political agents. Their presence impacted Lahore physically and also socially, politically, and economically (issues I will turn to later). However, when the first Afghan war was initiated in 1839, Lahore was not in British hands, and the Sikhs were not adversaries.<sup>50</sup> The regions of the Punjab and areas to its north were not clearly demarcated politically, administratively, or geographically.<sup>51</sup> After India became a direct colony of the Crown and following the second and third Anglo-Afghan wars, which were fought after the annexation of the Punjab and Lahore, colonial practices in Lahore underwent change.<sup>52</sup> Colonial *interests* in Lahore were thus inextricably tied to developments *outside* the city, both in proximate and distant parts as well as regionally and transnationally.

1857 is a decisive moment in British policy vis-à-vis Lahore and the Punjab. In addition to rendering India a direct colony of the Crown, and marking the final defeat of the Mughals, it also led to British privileging of Punjabi soldiers over Bengalis and others from Central India (frequently labeled “Hindustani” in colonial usage) especially in the armed forces.<sup>53</sup> Subsequent to 1857, at which time Punjabis made up 44 per cent of the

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<sup>50</sup> The Treaty of Amritsar between Ranjit Singh and the East India Company helped the former consolidate his hold over the Punjab and parts of the northwest. From being adversaries, the two became allies, allowing both to consolidate their respective territories and police their frontiers.

<sup>51</sup> The borders and boundaries of the Punjab were products of history and not given in advance. Local concerns and practices thus do not necessarily refer to the same socio-spatial reality. Earlier, when the Sikhs controlled Lahore, Delhi and various other parts of the Punjab were administered as part of North West Provinces. Only later were the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (the North-West Frontier Province under the British) created as two separate regions.

<sup>52</sup> Suffice it to say that the local (what I label “internal” factors) combined with “external” considerations vis a vis Afghanistan to produce in the Punjab and colonial India’s northwestern regions, what some scholars have labelled the “garrison state.” See Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State: Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849–1947*, Sage Publications, 2005; Douglas M Peers, *Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in India 1819–1835*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1995. These developments prompted forging of further alliances with locals who collaborated with the British, and bestowal of “jagirs” to those who supported the latter in their efforts to subdue Sikh resistance to British rule, creating a new class of Punjabis who contributed to the British war effort against the Afghans.

<sup>53</sup> The use of such naming is significant: East of the Punjab is frequently called Hindustan, and its population and language, Hindustani; Lahore and the Punjab are by inference something else, not part of that entity. This term later came to be used by Pakistanis of the post-partition generation to “name” India.

Bengal Army and the Frontier Force,<sup>54</sup> by mid 1858, of the total of 80,000 local (i.e., non-British) troops in the Bengal army, “75,000 were Punjabis.”<sup>55</sup> Punjabi representation in the army continued to grow, even after the creation of the North-West Frontier Province and its separation from the administrative unit of Punjab province. By “1929, 62% of the whole Indian Army was Punjabi. [Now,] conscription was such that, in Bengal, there were 7117 combatant recruits out of a population of 45 million; whereas Punjab offered 349,689 out of a total population of 20 million.”<sup>56</sup> Aside from the escalation in Punjabi recruitment, this shift in the regional makeup of the army is dramatic and noteworthy. The myth of the martial races is directly traceable to this transformation in the regional makeup of military bodies, to which I turn next.

#### b. (Re)Making Bodies: Mobilities, Intersections, Policing, Resistance

This historical account and figures detailed above underscore how Punjabis came to be valorized and produced as the *martial races*. Such representations made virtue out of necessity, as prior military recruits from further east (who previously had been integral to the East India Company’s armies), came to be discursively re-rendered as antagonistic, unreliable, and effeminate.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, the “reorganization” and “renaming” of the provinces (e.g., Punjab “territories” renamed the Punjab “province”), the remaking of the North-West Province (not to be confused with the North-West Frontier Province), and its separation from the Punjab, were all based on military considerations.<sup>58</sup> These spatial re-constructions,

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<sup>54</sup> There were three British armies up until this time, recruited by each of the three “Presidencies”—Bengal, Bombay, and Madras.

<sup>55</sup> Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, “‘Punjabisation’ in the British Indian Army 1857–1947 and the Advent of Military Rule in Pakistan,” *Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies*, No. 24 (2010) provides details on the shifting contours of Indian recruitment into the British Indian army: 12. See also T. Yong, *Op. Cit.* 2005.

<sup>56</sup> S. Soherwordi, *Op. Cit.*, 2010: 12.

<sup>57</sup> It is worth noting that resistance by segments of Indian troops in the army came to be represented in ethnic and racialized terms. In many ways, this construction continued to circulate long after the British departed, such that at the time of the uprising in what was then East Pakistan, there was a resolute inability among many in West Pakistan to see the Bengalis as anything other than “effeminate” men, incapable of resisting the resolute, manly Punjabis and Pathans. See Darshan Singh Tatla, “Sikh Free and Military Migration During the Colonial Period,” in Robin Cohen ed., *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

<sup>58</sup> Delhi, as part of Delhi District, was initially absorbed within the Punjab province (which itself remained under the control of the Bengal Presidency), but in 1911 the city of Delhi and the district of which it was part were initially “remodeled” and then “placed under a separate local

buttressed by colonial practices of mapmaking, enumeration and classification, impacted inhabitants of these areas and led to their differentiation in a substantively new manner. The earlier fluidity of identities grounded in local relations was replaced by their hardening, produced through a dialectical relation between discourse, institutional practices, and lived material reality.

The events of 1857 thus contributed to several major changes in Lahore including, as already mentioned, the accelerated recruitment of so-called “martial” Punjabis into the army.<sup>59</sup> Migration, especially from Bengal and central India to Lahore, was another significant development. This mass movement was precipitated by Punjab’s pacification and its initial administrative absorption into Bengal Presidency.<sup>60</sup> As well, in the wake of the 1857 uprising, some members of the Mughal court—especially its dependent *shurafa*—migrated to Lahore in search of jobs and new beginnings.<sup>61</sup> So too did certain colonial hangers-on, who sought to find

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government as a separate province in the following year.” Census of India, 1921, Volume XV, Punjab and Delhi, Part I, Report by I. Middleton and S. M. Jacob, Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1923: 2. This change alongside others discussed in note 49 underscore the arbitrariness of the physical boundaries created by the British, which were largely the outcome of administrative and political considerations, having little to do with any “natural” cohesion or identification of their constituent people and places.

<sup>59</sup> The naming of “Punjabis” as different from “Hindustanis” was not an inconsequential linguistic phenomenon: it had significant social and political implications (including those of identity formation). I do not mean to ascribe any particular *intent* to the British in constructing this separation; nonetheless, the very production of difference (in space and people) impacted notions of self/other(s). Through processes of naming, new bodies with divergent identities emerged. Over time these socially constructed identity markers underwent a process of naturalization. On the significance of debates and contradictions relating to the language question see Bernard Cohn, *Op Cit.*, 1996.

<sup>60</sup> While some authors cite Punjab’s inclusion in the Bengal Presidency as nominal, it is nonetheless significant because it encouraged movement across parts of the Presidency for purposes of bureaucratic and military service, which proved consequential in educational matters. Punjab University examinations, for example, were sent out from Bengal. These administrative links were consequential for multiple reasons; one being that these institutional and demographic circuits allowed for an altered spatial sensibility and knowledge of “India” as a unified entity. There are parallels here with Benedict Anderson’s theorization of “imagined communities” in the Latin American context. See *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1991.

<sup>61</sup> This migration contributed to Lahore’s cultural prominence as an intellectual and literary center within *colonial India*. I emphasize colonial India, since Lahore had been renowned culturally in the precolonial context under Ranjit Singh. Since this was not the first time Lahore had gained this status, it can hardly be attributable to British munificence as is often claimed. It is important to note that Orientalism, or neo-Orientalism, achieved a revival in Lahore. This needs to be understood in terms of the impact of 1857 on Lahore, including the emergence of organizations



further opportunities for advancement. Other significant changes included the remaking of urban space and its re-habitation, altered class structures and relations, the privatization of land, and the transformation of agrarian markets alongside new contours of political and administrative power. These changes, alongside the colonial establishment's revamped biases with respect to different communities, had important practical consequences. Furthermore, the late annexation of Lahore (and the Punjab itself) meant colonial administrators imported practices already whetted elsewhere, yet were also willing to experiment. This willingness to experiment played out in respect to the question of local language instruction,<sup>62</sup> land tenure arrangements (such as in the canal colonies), and changes in customary law regarding Muslim inheritance.<sup>63</sup>

As argued previously, class distinctions and fissures *within* the colonial establishment were, until recently, insufficiently addressed by scholars of colonial history. An exemplar of this relatively new genre of scholarship is Kenneth Ballhatchet's 1980 study, which probes the sexual practices of British soldiers and the disciplinary practices designed to *contain* them.<sup>64</sup> More recent studies examine the production of moral "panics" and

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like the *Anjuman-i-Punjab*, and subsequent British attempts to coopt and appease [certain] members of the *shurafa*. For more on these developments see: Jeffrey Diamond, "Narratives of Reform and Displacement in Colonial Lahore: The *Intikaal* of Muhammad Hussain Azad," *Journal of Punjab Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Sept. 2009: 159–177; by same author, "The Orientalist-Literati Relationship in the Northwest: G. W. Leitner, Muhammad Hussain Azad and the rhetoric of neo-orientalism in colonial Lahore," *South Asia Research*, Vol. 31, No. 1: 25–32. For a further examination of Orientalism's revival in Lahore, see Masood Akhtar Zahid, "Orientalism's last battle in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Punjab," *Pakistan Vision*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009: 27–48.

<sup>62</sup> The neo-Orientalism that Leitner and the *Anjuman-e-Punjab* pursued is one of these features. It is noteworthy that Leitner and the then-Director of the Punjab Department of Public Instruction were frequently at loggerheads with each other. Nonetheless the late annexation of Lahore and the Punjab allowed for experiments that had been quashed elsewhere, and created a space for neo-Orientalists such as Leitner. Furthermore, both Leitner and the *Anjuman* members had divergent interests at stake in their mutual accommodation. For a more detailed examination of their relations, there are a number of secondary sources including Tim Allender, "Bad Language in the Raj: the "frightful encumbrance" of Gottlieb Leitner, 1865–1888," *Paedagogica Historica*, Vol. 43, No. 3, June 2007: 383–403. Reports of the Punjab Department of Public Instruction are also a useful source.

<sup>63</sup> Customary law in the Punjab denied Muslim women their inheritance rights. Though the British changed aspects of customary law that negatively impacted colonial control and revenues, they left customary inheritance practices that discriminated against women untouched, thus, affirming patriarchal relations. In so doing, they could claim *respect* for local practices, while buttressing and (re)producing gender inequality.

<sup>64</sup> See Kenneth Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex, and Class Under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Policies and their Critics, 1793–1905*, St Martin's Press, 1980.

attendant anxieties stemming from perceived differences *among* British bodies as well as *between* the British and Indians.<sup>65</sup> Erica Wald argues that military officials considered sexual desire as an unavoidable aspect of “manly” urges, which needed to be controlled but not denied, fearing that curbing such desires might render enlisted men “unfit” soldiers. Some military and medical authorities were actively complicit in creating spaces for such practices even as they sought to manage and discipline sexual practices, especially through the subjugation of the bodies of Indian women involved.<sup>66</sup>

Disquietude is reflected in the lock hospital system and cantonment regulations, which sought to control the Indians who surrounded the European soldiery, rather than regulating the soldiers themselves.

Wald argues the creation of such spaces reflected

anxieties how best to harness the strength of the men from the “lower orders” and shape them into efficient soldiers, combined with the uncertainties over the political and military position of the Company in India to dictate approaches to its soldiery.<sup>67</sup>

Ballhatchet, too, addresses colonial anxiety regarding masculine desire, intimacy between the races, and concerns over disease(d) bodies.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Erica Wald, *Vice in the Barracks: Medicine, the Military and the Making of Colonial India, 1780–1868*, Palgrave, 2014. See also Douglas Peers, “Imperial Vice: Sex, Drink and the Health of British troops in North Indian cantonments, 1800–1858,” in David Killingray and David Omissi, eds., *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c.1700–1964*, Manchester University Press, 1999: 25–52; and Douglas Peers, *Op. Cit.*, 1995.

<sup>66</sup> E. Wald, *E., Op. Cit.*: 9.

<sup>67</sup> E. Wald, *E., Op. Cit.*: 9.

<sup>68</sup> Anxieties regarding race took on different forms at different moments, and was tied in with questions of class. William Dalrymple’s *White Mughals: Love and Betrayal in Eighteenth-Century India*, (Viking Penguin, 2003) addresses an earlier moment in intimate relations between local women and British men; wherein, the former were frequently of powerful classes. In later years, concern over such relations became more pronounced once intimate relationships between British privates and less privileged Indian women occurred more frequently. Despite the differences and class biases they reflected, concern had less to do with relations between the two communities, but rather was stemmed from considerations regarding the identity and identifications of their interracial children. This issue remained unsettled throughout the colonial period, and was subject to contestations and differences of opinion between various actors including: metropolitan groups, the colonial state, civil and military ranks, missionaries, and different classes of both Europeans and resident Indians.

Writing about Mian Mir's military cantonment in 1859 (situated on the then-outskirts of Lahore), he writes:

Lahore, the capital of the Punjab... had proved of great strategic value during the Mutiny... a healthy army seemed especially necessary there. A lock hospital was opened; prostitutes were registered; they were inspected weekly, and they were issued with tickets. ... Soon encouraging statistics were reported: VD admissions fell... in 1860. But the city of Lahore itself was not touched in spite of the protests of military authorities."<sup>69</sup>

This system began to change, however, as the chorus of voices against sexual relations between Indians and grew:<sup>70</sup>

After 1888, the Lock Hospitals and the Lal Bazaars were closed... many regiments continued the system off the books... A similar disarray was revealed at Mian Mir [after the Lal Bazaar was formally shut down]. The Station Commander admitted that prostitutes lived in the regimental bazaars and accompanied troops on the march. This was then denied by the commanding officers of the regiments concerned... It was *becoming strangely difficult to establish precisely what was happening at any particular time and place.*

Fissures and confusion are thus evident *across* and *within* the military establishment both between its rank and file soldiers, as well as the military and colonial civil administration.<sup>71</sup> In examining concerns over masculinity, health, and the British army's lower-ranked European

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<sup>69</sup> K. Ballhatchet, *Op. Cit.*, 1980: 36.

<sup>70</sup> K. Ballhatchet, *Op. Cit.*, 1980: 72. This statement suggests a lack of coherence and/or clarity in the colonial regime, which belies the oft-asserted claims of their "strategic" thinking by admirers and detractors alike. My emphasis.

<sup>71</sup> The regional composition of the lower ranks of the British in the Indian army has yet to be systematically studied: studies on dissent within British military ranks come closest. See Peter Stanley, *White Mutiny: British Military Culture in India*, NYU Press, 1998. However, there is ample evidence that military and civil administrations were deeply enmeshed even after the bureaucratization of the civil service. Thus, civil administration positions, including education, were frequently staffed by military officers, as were other departments. In Lahore in particular, this took the form of a deep dispute between Colonel Holroyd, Director of Public Instruction, a strict believer in English education and Leitner, a prominent Jewish educationalist in the Punjab, who was also a proponent of Orientalist education. Despite their differences, however, both saw British know-how and methods as superior to local forms of knowledge production and learning.

soldiers, this scholarship exposes dissension within the army between officers and non-commissioned soldiers, and schisms between different segments of the official colonial hierarchy, i.e., *within* and *across* specific army ranks, as well as *outside* it. Sexual interactions between local women and British as well as Indian soldiers continued with the active knowledge of at least some military officers. The prevalence of these officially forbidden activities suggests a degree of ambivalence and resistance to colonial disciplining.<sup>72</sup> Not unlike other parts of colonial India, such debates and contestations impacted Lahore as an important military hub. They also lay bare the opacity within colonial discourse and the colonial archive itself, calling into question yet again the veracity of empirical “factual” claims, discussed in the note below.<sup>73</sup>

Race emerges as an unsettled category not only with respect to sexual relations, but also vis-a-vis the progeny of interracial unions, including those born of normative and non-normative sexual relations. This problem extended beyond the army, as Valerie Anderson notes:<sup>74</sup>

The Colonial British administrations, Company and later crown, kept meticulous records and carried out extensive exercises in categorization so it should be easy to find out about this Eurasian category. In fact, it has always been problematic. In a House of Commons debate in 1925, the Under Secretary for India, when asked to clarify the status of Eurasians (by then termed Anglo-Indians) answered thus: For purposes of employment under government and inclusion in schemes of Indianisation members of the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled-European community are statutory Natives of India; for purposes of education and internal

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<sup>72</sup> This ambivalence is demonstrated not only by the sexual practices of enlisted non-commissioned army members, but also by some of their officers, as quoted sources suggest.

<sup>73</sup> Naming and categorization of the children of such sexual relations is an instance in which the social construction of knowledge becomes crystal clear, and racial identities and categories are rendered visible as historical schema. Valerie Anderson deliberately adopts the term Eurasian for such offspring, “because it was the identifier used by British India from the late 1820s until 1911”: “Anglo-Indians and Eurasians in Nineteenth Century India,” Talk based on extracts from chapter on “Religion and Race: Eurasians in Colonial India,” Ezra Rashkow, Sanjukta Ghosh and Upal Chakrabarti eds., *Memory, Identity and the Colonial Encounter in India: Essays in Honor of Peter Robb*, London: Routledge, 2018, Available online at: <https://valanderson.weebly.com/paper.html>. n.p. Accessed December 12, 2018.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, n.p.

security, so far as it admits of definition, approximates to that of European British Subjects.

In part, this explains why distinctions between domiciled British children and children born of mixed parentage produced anxiety and ambivalence, and were subjected to different legal interpretations and everyday understandings dependent on the different contexts within which each was constituted as a “problem.” Anderson’s work affirms my initial contention that reading the colonial archive is an interpretative exercise, not a demonstration of reality claims such as positivists and “bare empiricists” would have us believe.<sup>75</sup> If one reads against the grain of the colonial archive, sites and acts of resistance within and across the color barrier come into view.

David Arnold’s work, which focuses specifically on stratification *within* the British body in India<sup>76</sup> but can be extended to Lahore, critiques normative historiography for reproducing homogenizing colonial frames, and cites Mary Wilkie’s work as an example:<sup>77</sup>

The illusion of European colonial society as a relatively homogeneous elite or ruling class has not been confined to the pages of popular imperial history. Mary E. Wilkie... confidently asserts that there was a “perfect coincidence in the colonial system between race and class.”

He cites her analytical limitations, blind spots and oversight even in those instances where Wilkie recognizes colonial difference,<sup>78</sup>

in her analysis, conflict among the “Colonials” is confined to the sometimes opposing interests of administrators, businessmen and other sections of the colonial ruling group.

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<sup>75</sup> I borrow this term from C. Wright Mills who in his *Sociological Imagination*, Oxford, 1959, critiques both empiricism and abstract grand theorization. Instead, he points out that connecting biography to history as essential to understanding both our macro and everyday worlds.

<sup>76</sup> The question of who is/was British, as pointed out previously, was fungible. Thus, the term *Anglo-Indian* at one time signified a British resident in India, and distinguished the latter from British bodies resident in the metropole; the same term later came to signify those earlier labeled *Eurasians*.

<sup>77</sup> David Arnold, “European Orphans and Vagrants in Indian in the Nineteenth Century” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 1979: 104.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*: 104.

In opposition to such historiography wherein conflict and confrontation is confined to upper echelons of the colonial establishment, Arnold emphasizes racial discrimination and prejudices across and within the colonial race-class divide. Depending on colonial exigencies, these factors negatively impacted offspring of interracial unions. In later work<sup>79</sup> he further destabilizes any fixed notion of what it meant to be white and British. He examines British fear, not only of “*unruly*” *Indians*, but also of *its own “unruly” underclass*—a fear and prejudice borne by those he labels as British India’s “middling” groups.<sup>80</sup> Tracing the debates over white settlement in South Africa versus the colonization of India, he argues their respective debates over whiteness were structured differently. In the absence of a large British and/or European community in India, Arnold argues that, especially in the earlier years of the East India Company, prejudice against working class and/or “vagrant” British was pronounced and markedly racialized. The Irish, who were overrepresented in the lower echelons of the colonial British hierarchy, were considered unfit to serve except under tightly regulated conditions. Representations of the Irish as a racialized “other” in conjunction with laws pertaining to vagrants and European orphans alert us to divergent colonial positionalities. This forces the recognition that race is a relation, not a “thing.” Difference *within* British bodies and *between* the latter and Indians reappears as historically constituted.<sup>81</sup> Without denying that race matters and was constitutive of the colonial order, its objects at times included (some) working class Europeans as well as the threshold figure of the Anglo-Indian. Seen thus, neither white nor Indian bodies remain static nor indelibly stained: their racial constitution and meaning remained in flux across time and space.<sup>82</sup>

Recent studies have focused on dissent *among* Europeans in colonial armies, pointing to the occurrence of courts martial and mutiny. With a

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<sup>79</sup> David Arnold, “White Colonization and Labour in Nineteenth-Century India,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 11, Issue 2, January 1983: 133–158. For an extensive bibliography Anglo-Indians, see Val Anderson’s online site at: <https://valanderson.weebly.com/bibliography.html>.

<sup>80</sup> Given Lahore and the Punjab’s relatively late annexation, these groups occupied a different social location unlike earlier in Company rule on the coast and later in Bengal.

<sup>81</sup> Anne McClintock, (Op. Cit., 1995) alerts us to how race travels internally and externally. Arnold’s work also demonstrates a similar sensibility and sensitivity to racial divisions within and across colonial boundaries.

<sup>82</sup> Clearly, certain bodies constitute the threshold figure that Victor Turner so significantly addressed in his work. I will return to such liminal figures and the question of class and of miscegenation in the next section on Lahore’s economy and the railways.

few recent exceptions, military historians have primarily conducted these studies.<sup>83</sup> Such analyses—not unlike studies on gender, race, and sex across the color line—speak to resistance to colonial hierarchies and order among the different ranks of British and Indian soldiers garrisoned in Lahore. This is a critical investigative area rich with possibilities.<sup>84</sup> In a memorandum, written when he was still a colonel in the British army, Durand acknowledges glimpses of discontent within the ranks of the British Indian Army. In the memo, he hints that the British Indian Army was not necessarily confident of achieving success during the 1857 uprising. His lack of confidence calls into question later claims regarding the military prowess and superiority of British officers and enlisted men.<sup>85</sup> He also writes that British soldiers sought to leave army service in large numbers, stating that, by mid-1859, “12,000 men preferred taking their discharge to continuing with the corps in which they had achieved signal, and (at one time) *little hoped* for, successes.”<sup>86</sup> Durand ascribes this

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<sup>83</sup> See E. Wald, *Op. Cit.*, 2014; P. Stanley, *Op. Cit.*, 1998.

<sup>84</sup> See Shalini Sharma, *Radical Politics in Colonial Punjab: Government and Sedition*, Routledge, (London: Routledge, 2010) in which she primarily discusses dissent including in the military, by Indians. Erica Wald (*Op. Cit.*, 2014) In her examination of mutiny within the colonial army, provides only two examples, both outside Lahore. This is a measure of the difficulty in tracking down courts martial of British soldiers in India, and is not necessarily indicative of absence of dissent by Europeans within the army. Stanley’s work, which focuses on military culture among the British, provides far greater detail than does Wald.

<sup>85</sup> While colonial records acknowledge problems within the European Indian army, the bulk of the writing focuses on the barbarity of the so-called “mutineers,” who are represented in sub-human terms. The fissures within the British army become most evident after 1857, which in part explains why the amalgamation of the two armies took years to effectuate, and was accompanied by an extended period of name calling and laying of blame.

<sup>86</sup> Durand Papers, *Op. Cit.*, SOAS archives. My emphasis. Durand’s argument is that this was part of the fallout from the attempted merger of the Royal British army with that of the East India Company and its European troops. While this was undoubtedly part of the name and blame game mentioned in the prior note, it does not go far enough in teasing out the rivalry and conflict between those troops who enlisted with the East Indian Company’s European armies and those who were deployed in India but were enlisted in the Royal Army prior to the mutiny. Peter Stanley, *Op. Cit.*, (1998) speaks to these differences and traces the conflict between these two groups in what he terms “White Mutiny.” Unlike Durand, Stanley provides a much more nuanced and complex picture regarding motivations for enlisting to serve with the British army in India. He writes, “The decision to enter the Company’s service appears to have been, more often than for Queen’s recruits, a considered choice. That virtually every draft sent to India included men who had purchased their discharge from the Queen’s service testifies to the contrast.” P. Stanley, *Op. Cit.*, (1998): 15-16. In at least one instance noted by Stanley, troops passing through Lahore rose up in opposition to proposed changes in the army. These dissenting members of the British army impacted Lahore. However, since these men mutinied after they had left the Punjab and in some cases, India: spatially how/where does one locate them? Is this part of Lahore’s history or only that of the army? Is one to assume that they came to their dissent only once they boarded a ship (which is where their Mutiny took place)? Is it plausible to argue they carried these grievances with them,

discontent among British soldiers in the Indian Army to their unwillingness to serve under the Royal British Army rather than the East India Company's European Army contingent.<sup>87</sup> This memo provides evidence that, at a minimum, all was not smooth sailing within the British Indian Army.

That there was dissent *within* both the Company and the Royal Army is beyond contention, but its underpinnings were not necessarily similar. As noted earlier, officers and enlisted men did not necessarily share the same interests in either of the two armies, nor were they materially in the same position with similar assets to make their claims. Stanley tells us that officers in the Company's army resorted to "memorials" to express dissent and dissatisfaction, dissent which, according to Stanley, was frequently economically motivated. Dissenting officers actively, and in most instances openly, expressed their discontent to their superiors. Ordinary soldiers did not have the same power or recourse: they were often charged with "mutiny" for minor infractions, such as sleeping while on night duty. It is noteworthy that what was cited as mutinous behavior was arbitrary, and evidences internal colonial fissures. As with the policing of "vice," it was a form of disciplinary power differentially exerted on different British bodies, targeting enlisted men especially. Disaggregating discontent and differences in the content and practices of resistance (occasionally cast as "insubordination" by army superiors) of enlisted men as opposed to officers, as well as charges levied at those of lower ranks—especially in individual cases—is no easy task. This is why little

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and once on board finding safety in numbers as well as from fear of immediate repercussions, made their discontent explicit in that space rather than when billeted in Lahore? Can one then say their dissent *occurred* in Lahore and was only *made manifest* on board ship?

<sup>87</sup> There is some indication in Durand's records that enlisted men felt they had more latitude under the Company's army than they would under the Crown. Stanley gives us additional insight into this matter. Through close examination of their reasons for recruitment, he argues that socioeconomic hierarchies in the British army and lack of adequate provisioning for officers in their later years was another part of the dissent within the army post-1857. He also stresses the collective sense among the Company's officer class that they were looked down on by officers within the Queen's army. While the evidence Stanley provides might suggest the moral superiority of the latter—serving a "higher" cause versus the mercenary/pecuniary impulses of the former—the class difference between their respective officer corps clearly also comes into play as do the changes in class structure in Britain over this long period. (P. Stanley, *Op. Cit.*, 1998: 2-35.)



historiographic work exists regarding individual acts of mutiny among the British in Indian Army ranks.<sup>88</sup> Stanley writes:

Differences in systems of reporting and the imperfect evidence available impede comparisons between the two forces, but there seems no reason to doubt that the Queen's troops were less prone to commit serious offences, and every reason to believe that the Company's discipline was as "lax" as a Queen's officer claimed to be a "matter of remark" among royal officers.<sup>89</sup>

As with fears of "contagion" regarding sexual relations among Europeans and Indians, officers in the Royal Army, in particular, shared a similar anxiety with respect to other forms of indiscipline. Stanley points to the institutional army culture within these two armies and cautions against taking explanations of even known cases of insubordination at face value:

[E]xplaining relationships between ranks within the force necessitates an awareness of the informal and formal relationships between officers and men, and the mores of the barrack-room. Company's officers appear to have tolerated conduct which in the Queen's Army would have been regarded as insubordinate or even mutinous, and viewing the relationship from [the latter's] perspective obscures rather than clarifies, as a discussion of contemporary explanations for its state of discipline suggests.<sup>90</sup>

Following the takeover by the Crown from the Company (with the long-drawn-out amalgamation of the two armies and a dramatic increase in

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<sup>88</sup> Especially for non-military historians, ferreting out this information is a complex task with no shortcut. Given academic demands for publication in a short time frame, it is not a coincidence that scholarship on such cases of military sanction and disciplining through courts martial is sorely lacking. When I began my search, I discovered that even the librarians at the National Archives in London, the British Library, and the Imperial War Museum could not point me to any fast or direct way to arrive at this information. The scholars with whom I spoke, who work on the British military, could also not add much. Since time and money are both at a premium in contemporary academic work, such difficulties in conducting research reveal reasons for some of hollow spaces in scholarship. Another feature of courts martial is the arbitrary and nebulous grounds for courts martial—such as sleeping while on duty or taking even a short leave without permission. In short, the very construction of the basis for courts martial was ever changing and unpredictable and entirely up to the whims of the authorities in charge of particular cases.

<sup>89</sup> P. Stanley, *Op. Cit.*: 1998: 71.

<sup>90</sup> P. Stanley, *Op. Cit.*, 1998: 72.

European recruits), dissent continued within army ranks between officers and soldiers. This friction was reflective of changes in Britain itself, with the maturation of a new class divide and political order.<sup>91</sup> Stanley makes the case that fresh working class recruits, when dissatisfied with their situation, responded as they would to working conditions in the factory: with a combination of foot dragging and abandonment of their posts. He quotes one such soldier saying that he was “tired of soldiering for a soldier has too many masters to please.”<sup>92</sup> Protests by soldiers, including those posted at Mian Mir, adopted a language of rights; implicit therein was a critique of their officers and superiors.<sup>93</sup> Such protests did not necessarily translate into sympathy for local Indians, but demonstrated a refusal to “soldier for the Queen.”<sup>94</sup> Upon discharge or after refusing to serve, particularly in the absence of an ability to find transport back, one might surmise—and Arnold documents similar cases—that some of these men joined bands of drifting vagabonds that mingled with locals until such time as they were able to return home.<sup>95</sup>

Just as one needs to heed Stanley’s admonition to exercise caution when examining the nature and causes of insubordination offered by different colonial authorities and scholars with an ideological stake in establishing a particular interpretation of mutinous behavior, similarly the paucity of public accounts of mutiny should not be read as their absence. Silence and/or lack of acknowledgement of such cases does not necessarily signify either that they did not exist or represent complicity with the dominant colonial order, but instead can be seen as part of the *production* of that very order, established and reaffirmed through the act of writing history itself.<sup>96</sup>

Given the bureaucratic procedures involved in charging, recording, and adjudicating courts martial as well as the blurriness of what actions were actionable as such,<sup>97</sup> a quicker way to ferret out these and other instances

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<sup>91</sup> P. Stanley, *Op. Cit.*, 1998: 151–165.

<sup>92</sup> P. Stanley, *Op. Cit.*, 1998: 151.

<sup>93</sup> P. Stanley, *Op. Cit.*, 1998: 56–7.

<sup>94</sup> P. Stanley, *Op. Cit.*, 1998: 157.

<sup>95</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.*, 1979; 1983.

<sup>96</sup> Disciplinary specializations in the academy also help produce such silences and their affect.

<sup>97</sup> For details on the laws governing courts martial see Charles M. Clode, *The Military Forces of the Crown; Their Administration and Government*, London: John Murray Albemarle St., 1869, 2 volumes. Clode’s text contains details of laws and regulations governing courts martial, which clearly points to the very arbitrary and deeply subjective determination of what was

of dissent—in addition to other acts that deviated from the established gender, class, and racial colonial order—is to track them through the colonial press, either in Lahore or in Britain.<sup>98</sup> Interestingly, the *Lahore Chronicle* reports cases of discord within British households and reports instances where British women were charged in civil court with desertion by their husbands whom they had abandoned, or were accused by the latter of adultery.<sup>99</sup> Oral histories conducted with officers and enlisted men also record instances of extramarital relations in the army (presumably in the officer corps).<sup>100</sup> These historical accounts, sketchy as they are, reveal the embodied British body as both compliant with and resistant to disciplining, as heterogeneous and not homogeneous, similar to but not identical with Indian bodies.<sup>101</sup> Neither was monolithic.

Like 1857, 1919 is another significant moment of local resistance to British rule in which Lahore was an under-acknowledged and important site.<sup>102</sup> Both official and conventional accounts of this time seek to contain this disaffect by ascribing it to disaffect following active Punjabi participation in the war effort during World War I. Closer scrutiny reveals deeper sources of discontent. A financial downturn just prior to World War I led to shortages. The subsequent rise in the price of food commodities, including sugar, created hardship and unrest in Lahore (and elsewhere in the Punjab). Colonial writers understate the depth of misery this produced. Instead, they emphasize a rise in labor demand, almost entirely in the military, as a positive outcome. According to one source, while the conditions of ordinary folk deteriorated, “a few enterprising Punjabis made fortunes out of army contracts [and] Government showed

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prosecutable, which was left up to the officers in charge. Like the blasphemy laws, also introduced by the British, this left enormous scope for both punishing and disciplining soldiers at the whim of those in charge.

<sup>98</sup> This is a task I hope to undertake in preparing this working paper for publication in monograph form in the future.

<sup>99</sup> One case that took up considerable space in the *Lahore Chronicle* pertained to prosecution of a divorce case in which the petitioner was the son of Sir James Weir Hogg, who went out to India in 1857. En route, his son met and married the daughter of a general in the British Indian Army. The grounds for the divorce were adultery, which both accused parties denied.

<sup>100</sup> See oral history transcripts and recordings held at Imperial War Museum, Elephant and Castle.

<sup>101</sup> See E. M. Collingham (Op. Cit., 2001), for more on this.

<sup>102</sup> A systematic study of the various censuses conducted by the British speaks to both the vagaries of time/space and their transformation into “fact.” This supports Cohen’s work cited earlier. See for example, *Census of India, 1921, Volume XV, Punjab and Delhi. Part I. Report by L Middleton, I.C.S., and S. M. Jacob, I.C.S. Superintendents of Census Operations, Punjab, Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1923.*

great generosity in the matter of rewards for War service."<sup>103</sup> The same source ascribes labor mobility to demographic causes, including congestion in parts of Lahore,<sup>104</sup> and portrays this migration in psychological and utilitarian terms: "a number of its [i.e., Punjab's] inhabitants, especially Sikhs, have gone abroad in search of fortune and found it."<sup>105</sup> Describing some of these migrants as "honest working men," the writer emphasizes that their ranks included others who left "with the deliberate intention of developing a school of Anarchists."<sup>106</sup> Militant Indian reaction in 1910, which followed after the Canadian state placed strictures on immigration both at home and abroad, is reduced to an *a priori will to sedition* on the part of *disreputable, troublesome* Indians.<sup>107</sup> This was the dominant form of messaging regarding the Ghadr by the British establishment and its apologists. Contra such representations, a recent study points out that the Colonization Bill of 1906, which sought to "get rid of common law courts in the Punjab canal colonies" in order to standardize agrarian practices and to alter "the inheritance structure for canal land in the newly settled region," also contributed to discontent at the time.<sup>108</sup>

Depending on the archive one reads, the basis of the 1919 agitation takes on vastly different contours, explanations, and readings based on its framing. Leading up to the 1919 uprising in Lahore, the Defense of India Act of 1915 sought to contain the multiple and diverse sources of discontent circulating at the time under the *sign* of the war effort. The Act implied it was designed to prevent *chaos* in the Punjab, which ostensibly gave solace to the "enemy," and was thus *represented* as directed at external forces (aided and abetted by misguided/delinquent locals).<sup>109</sup> The deeply unpopular Rowlatt Act passed in 1919 was an extension of the 1915 Act: it further curtailed political agitation and was deeply resented. Together, these various policies and practices contributed to the events at

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<sup>103</sup> M. S. Leigh, *Op. Cit.*, 1922: 12–15.

<sup>104</sup> That such growth in numbers was itself related to colonial policy is nowhere addressed.

<sup>105</sup> M. S. Leigh, *Op. Cit.*, 1922: 17.

<sup>106</sup> M. S. Leigh, *Op. Cit.*, 1922: 17. In other words, setting up a dichotomy between "good" vs. "bad" migrants, thereby automatically denigrating the latter, and providing no explanation for their discontent beyond a moral and "law and order" one.

<sup>107</sup> M. S. Leigh, *Op. Cit.*, 1922: 17. My emphasis.

<sup>108</sup> M. Akhter and K. J. Ormerod, *Op. Cit.* 2015: 127.

<sup>109</sup> In so doing, the repressive practices of the colonial state were justified, and attention was diverted from legitimate grievances and anti-colonial struggles.

Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, which is the subject of considerable scholarship and nationalist critique.<sup>110</sup>

The uprising and imposition of martial law in Lahore soon after the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar requires further critical scrutiny. Martial law in Lahore was imposed as disturbances extended into its walled city. Civil and military authorities were fused together to tackle the uprising, and the use of force against popular protest was rationalized on grounds of civic and civil considerations. This use of force and the imposition of martial law resulted in an enquiry. Members of the committee conducting the enquiry (also known as the Hunter Commission) called numerous witnesses, the first being the British officer in charge of the Lahore Civil Area (which included the Central Telegraph Office and the Mughalpura Works), Lt Col. Frank Johnson.<sup>111</sup> When asked what he considered vital areas to protect, Col. Johnson's mention of the Gymkhana Club "where there were a number of European ladies" is revealing. In his responses to later questions, Johnson objectifies and dehumanizes the protestors (who, according to him, numbered roughly 6,000), and labels them a "mob." When asked about support for the ground troops with air power, Johnson responded:

I made arrangements with the Officer Commanding the four aeroplanes... before we went in, that two of them should fly as low as they possibly could and watch for a signal which I would give by firing... If two shots were fired he was to drop bombs 200 yards ahead of the troops.<sup>112</sup>

This event reveals the foundations of colonial rule in power and violence even though ostensibly economic and other factors, including its "image," began to gain primacy over military considerations.<sup>113</sup> It is a reminder that force matters, that the colonial regime, despite its civilizing self-claims, was

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<sup>110</sup> Precisely because this episode has been addressed so widely, I do not elaborate on it here. A simple google search produces over 200,000 links.

<sup>111</sup> Johnson was a decorated Distinguished Service Order (DSO) officer in the Royal Sussex Regiment, based in Lahore at the time.

<sup>112</sup> Unless noted otherwise, references to this incident are taken from The Disorders Enquiry Committee, Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Committee, Volume IV: Lahore and Kasur.

<sup>113</sup> This event is clearly an extra-local and transnational one since 1919 represented both the mobilities attendant upon economic developments in India in general and their expression within Lahore and Amritsar. There existed two joint strands within this "transnational" sensibility: one local, the other international. The event was local in terms of its actors, but transnational in its connectivity with radical political movements elsewhere including in the USSR.

undergirded by the desire for and production of “order”—its form contingent on the particularities of the moment, thus not predictable in advance.

1919 and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre demonstrates the connectivity between colonial Lahore and adjacent cities. The rapid spread of unrest from Amritsar to Lahore and the cooperation among members of different religious communities, despite British attempts to “divide and rule,” is instructive in this regard. This active resistance to the colonial order and its enactment of the Rowlatt Act highlights the relationality between colonial urbanity and the bodies inhabiting its spaces.<sup>114</sup> The significance of this protest was not lost on the colonial authorities. The report into the disturbances frames it thus:

It was difficult, probably unsafe, for authorities not to assume that the outbreak was the result of a defensive organization. Apart from the existence of any deeply laid scheme to overthrow the British government, *a movement which had started in rioting and become a rebellion might have rapidly developed into a revolution.*<sup>115</sup>

This speaks to the core rule of coloniality:<sup>116</sup> Protest is equal to sedition, which in turn is equated with potential threats to colonial order. Such protests function as panics that routinize colonial violence and give permission to inflict bodily harm on protesters.

In response to queries regarding the use of flogging as a punishment, including quasi-public flogging, Roberts categorically states, “I cannot imagine that type of punishment... has a very serious effect.” Moments later when asked whether “in administering law under martial law

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<sup>114</sup> For details see, The Disorders Enquiry Committee, Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Committee, Volume IV: Lahore and Kasur. IOR V/26/262/6. Also known as the Hunter Commission Report. See also Army. Disturbances in the Punjab, statement by R. E. H. Dyer, [Brig-Gen] Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, London: HM’s Stationery Office, 1920. L/MIL/17/12/43.

<sup>115</sup> Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab etc. Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty, London, 1920. L/17/12/42. My emphasis.

<sup>116</sup> The fact of an enquiry is, at the same time, to reaffirm the very rule of law that the martial law violates. This is precisely the logic of the “state of exception” of which Agamben speaks in his work. On a different note, it is worth tracing the similarity and differences between panics over potential revolution in British colonies and unrest at home. The directionality of subsequent policing practices also merits a closer scrutiny. McClintock’s *Imperial Leather* (Op. Cit., 1995) provides a methodology for such transnational analyses.

conditions that the right to inflict punishment by flogging is a valuable right for an officer to possess?" Roberts responds affirmatively:

I think it [i.e., flogging] is absolutely essential. I think it is the *kindest* method of punishment because it is the *greatest deterrent* that you can possibly get; for mere imprisonment and mere fines do not act, they do not deter the people.<sup>117</sup>

The enquiry simultaneously asserts the rule of law even as it allows for its violation. This allows the state (in the form of the enquiry committee) to proclaim its consideration for its colonial subjects even as other members of the state apparatus (in the form of those managing the martial law) subject them to its disciplinary power. Through this event, Lahore emerges as a divided city. Lahore is separated between the cantonment on one end, the civil lines in between, and the inner city at the other end, a division revelatory of colonial socio-spatial anxiety regarding particular sites-subjects.<sup>118</sup> The colonial state also emerges as fractured and not whole.

## II. *The Economic Interregnum: Lahore from the Outside In*

### a. Border Settlements

Despite the anxiety exhibited by the British during the disturbances discussed above, by 1919 the British had established more systematic contours of colonial rule in Punjab's occupied spaces.<sup>119</sup> The Durand Line was a done deal. Colonial India's western borders were now more clearly marked than before.<sup>120</sup> As the colonial state "tamed" its frontiers, Lahore and the Punjab increasingly became a crucial vehicle to secure this

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<sup>117</sup> Lt. Col. Frank Roberts testifying before the Disorders Committee. See The Disorders Enquiry Committee. Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee, Volume IV, Lahore and Kasur, 1920, Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1920. My emphasis.

<sup>118</sup> See Ibid. for further details on this.

<sup>119</sup> As mentioned earlier, the production of panic itself served to rationalize certain colonial practices as "lawful", i.e., as justified. Both Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben address this logic of policing in their respective analyses of disciplinary practices and liberal politics (Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1977; Giorgio Agamben, *The State of Exception*, University of Chicago Press, 2005.) While Agamben is specifically referring to the liberal state (in the classical sense of the word), his analysis has relevance in the colonial context where it is constituted/justified on racial grounds, something Agamben does not fully acknowledge in his work. The rule of law in the colony is both patriarchal and paternalistic, but on a racialized concept of "bare life".

<sup>120</sup> See section I. a., where this is examined at greater length.

ambition. Lahore's location was pivotal. Situated between Delhi and areas separating British India from its *troublesome* northwest, Lahore also connects to Karachi port in the south—allowing for the transit of men and goods to/from overseas.

In colonial administrative and political formations in Lahore and the Punjab, military and economic considerations intertwined. The British created and made concessions to certain “notables,” individuals who had politically and militarily cooperated with the British. These so-called “notables” were provided *jagirs* in return for supporting the British during the Anglo-Sikh and, to a lesser extent, the Afghan wars.<sup>121</sup> Lastly, the British created the canal colonies and set up administrative structures soon after the Punjab's annexation and the takeover from the Company by the Crown—with Lahore as its center. Despite the events of 1919 and the overwhelming use of military force that accompanied them, the end of the Afghan wars enabled a shift from predominantly military concerns to economic considerations in colonial policy and practice. Lahore's significance post-annexation cannot be understood in the absence of these conjoint considerations, which severally *and* together produced and undergirded the transition from military to economic hegemony. As the events of 1919 illustrate, however, the break between military and economic considerations was never absolute and is a distinction primarily in form and emphasis.

## b. Railroads as a Military-Economic Socio-Spatial Threshold

The coming of the railroads to Lahore evidences the conjoined military and economic dimensions of the colonial state.<sup>122</sup> Neither the railroads' extension to Lahore nor their design is comprehensible in absence of this recognition, nor is the advent of the railroads ascribable solely to *either* its military *or* economic dimensions. The railroads, a key contributor to Lahore's growth, were pivotal in the economic turn in colonial policy and practice, with a significance that extended well beyond the quantitative aspects of Lahore's political economy. They helped transform socio-

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<sup>121</sup> This in itself is evidence of Lahore and the Punjab's pivotal position in the (re)structuring of colonial space and power.

<sup>122</sup> See Ian J Kerr, *Bombay and Lahore. Colonial Railways and Colonial Cities, Some Urban Consequences of the Development and Operation of Railways in India, c. 1850–c.1947*. Pdf available online at: <http://www.docutren.com/HistoriaFerroviaria/Aranjuez2001/pdf/07.pdf>. Accessed: June 25, 2018.



spatial relations in the city between colonized and colonizing bodies through a series of intersections and ruptures in prior patterns of sociability. Europeans (mostly British), Anglo-Indians as well as other<sup>123</sup> Indians were all employed by the railroads as a major place of work: their interrelations, actions, and perceptions provide a lens on affect, cognition, and action. Prior to a closer examination of the railroads in these various regards, I will first address other features of Lahore's political economy that impacted the city materially and are related to the coming of the railroads—to which I will subsequently (re)turn.

### c. The City and the Country: Altered Contours of Class and Power

Much has been made of the “richness” of Punjab's soil. The development of the canal colonies is seen as a key factor in Punjab's development with Lahore as a transit hub. Imran Ali's The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885–1947, is the classic text<sup>124</sup> tracing the canal colony formation and is widely cited. More recently, the publication of Fareeha Zafar's dissertation adds further insights into class formation in the Punjab during the colonial period.<sup>125</sup> Despite their different emphases, conjointly their scholarship points to the radical transformation wrought in Punjab's class structure and its social-cum-physical topography post-annexation.

Since the canal colony came later, clearly developments in post-annexation Lahore's colonial urbanization cannot be solely seen through, or in relation to, their formation. Lahore was definitively impacted by the formation of powerful landed interests (at the political scale), and the creation of small-scale peasant proprietors (at the middling level of the economic spectrum). The creation of agrarian markets by virtue of changes in the class structure, modes of settlement, revenue collection, and the reclamation of land for agrarian purposes jointly altered the physical and social topography of Lahore as well as the region overall.

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<sup>123</sup> The insertion of “other” here is deliberate, both because of the shifting ascription of the label “Anglo-Indian” and to avoid homogenizing Indians as a singular entity.

<sup>124</sup> Imran Ali, *The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989.

<sup>125</sup> Fareeha Zafar, *Canals, Colonies and Class: British Policy in the Punjab 1880–1940*, Lahore: Lahore School of Economics, GIDS, 2017; Shahnaz Rouse, *Agrarian Transformation in a Punjabi Village: Structural Change and Its Consequences*, PhD dissertation: University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1988, provides an ethnographic and structural analysis of some of this history, albeit its focus is mostly on the post partition period and is limited to one village.

The displacement of the pastoral nomads who previously occupied vast swathes of the canal colony spaces was made comprehensible and justified through their naming. Labeling them “janglies”,<sup>126</sup> a moniker used by British and local colonizers alike, rationalized this colonization. This expropriation of their customary pastoral grounds produced a radical change in both bodies and spaces, including Lahore’s environs.<sup>127</sup> New market (*mandi*) towns crept up, and were in many instances created deliberately at specific railway stops. This created a direct relation between trains and urban space and produced a dynamic yet peripheral/dependent agrarian capitalism in Lahore and its environs.<sup>128</sup>

While the canal colonies were productive of a new class of middle-level landed proprietors, focus on this phenomenon has often occluded other forms of land tenure extant in the province post-colonization; the latter impacted Lahore as well. British land policy in the Punjab consisted of a multiplicity of land tenure types that ranged between large landlords, peasant proprietors, and share-croppers. Colonial interest in privatizing land was not always based on an economic logic, nor did land policy necessarily produce loyalty to the colonial state—even among those who were its beneficiaries.<sup>129</sup> In addition to lands allotted to those who served

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<sup>126</sup> The term literally means “wild” or “untamed.” Interestingly it reflects the prejudices of settled peoples against nomadic communities and is at the core of the Punjabi folk epic poem *Heer Ranjha*. In the poem Heer is from a settled household and Ranjha a pastoralist. That their love is doomed reflects the long tension between settled and nomadic peoples. It is instructive that this memory lingers in Punjab’s rural areas where this epic poem has been passed down through the generations. While this tension has precolonial roots, the settled-pastoralist divide takes a more drastic turn with the colonial colonization of their lands and the latter’s transformation into private property. In other words, the structural logic on which the settled-pastoralist divide was previously grounded undergoes a radical shift with land now being converted into private property. For an analysis of this shift in theoretical terms see Karl Marx, *Pre-capitalist Economic Formations*, New York; International Publishers, 1965.

<sup>127</sup> It is worth mentioning that the canal colonies were formed starting in 1885, *after* the arrival of the railroads, and can be seen as spatially constituted in relation to the latter. This adds credence to my assertion that the railways’ impact on Lahore, while of significance to the city’s demographic and economic growth, needs to be understood in terms of the political economy of the colonial state overall. It cannot be reduced to a singular explanation, either military or economic.

<sup>128</sup> To date, little scholarship exists tracing how decisions were made regarding railroad stops. Given their significance in reconstituting life both where the trains stopped, but also places they by-passed merits further study.

<sup>129</sup> See I. Ali, *Op. Cit.*, 1988. Ali points to the various contradictions emergent from the process of land privatization set in motion by the British. Its beneficiaries, while beholden to the British, were not necessarily always in sync with them and occasionally acted against the interests of the colonial state. See also M. Akhter and K. Ormerod, *Op. Cit.* 2015 for a more recent study incorporating a different analytical lens on technological change.

in the British military during the war and/or supported it against the Sikhs, lands were granted in exchange for raising horses for the British army: these were known as horse tenures.<sup>130</sup> Each of these types of tenure directly linked British military and economic interests. In the instance of lands bestowed in return for supplying mounts to the military, the primary economic concern was to reduce the colonial state's military expenditure rather than to positively impact agrarian productivity.<sup>131</sup> The generic claim of an agrarian miracle in productivity is clearly exaggerated. In this matter, as with the railroads (as we will shortly see), Lahore and especially the Punjab were sites for experimentation and the building of expertise.

Together, regardless of colonial expediency, objectives, and representations, these changes led to private property in land and to radically altered rural-urban relations. Some absentee members of the large landlord class sought residence in Lahore. In doing so, these landlords created a close relation between the city and its surrounding countryside and helped produce a more dynamic urban land market.<sup>132</sup> So too did some members of the Punjab princely states. These members set up homes in the city of Lahore to maintain closer contact with colonial institutions on whose patronage and continued support many of them relied.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> I. Ali, *Op. Cit.*, 110–151.

<sup>131</sup> Both types of tenures and arrangements occurred in villages near Sargodha. Several recipients of large landed estates were those who supported the British in the Sikh wars and were granted jagirs as political allies of the British. Horse farms, with a middling class of proprietors, lay in close proximity to these estates. In other areas such as near Okara a different model, also with an overall military objective, was established: here the state remained the owner and land was leased out. See Marvi Sirmed, "Pakistan, Military Farms and the Colonial Legacy: Okara, the Little Palestine?" July 15, 2014, *Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières*, online at: <https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article32532>.

<sup>132</sup> Other factors that contributed to an urban land market arose from its designation as Punjab's administrative center and significantly, the establishment of private educational institutions. The American Presbyterians were among those most active in this latter regard initially, joined over time by the Salvation Army and other missionaries. As colonial Lahore took shape, locals both contributed and were drawn into this land market.

<sup>133</sup> This is not to suggest that the relations between members of the princely states and the British were always smooth or without friction. District Gazetteers for Punjab and Lahore list "men of influence and property in the Lahore District" and, one might add, in the city proper. Many of those listed assisted the British in their occupation/pacification of the province, so their ascension to the status of "notables" can be attributed, in some instances, to the assistance they provided to the British. Beyond such "notables", commercial changes also drew migrants to the city post- annexation. One such case is that of Durga Preshad who migrated from Delhi to Lahore to set up shop as a cloth merchant in Anarkali for a firm named Chota Lal (*Gazetteer of*

#### d. Lahore's Built Structure and its Political and Administrative Thresholds

As mentioned earlier, numerous princely states, some already in existence during the era of Company rule and others that emerged after the 1857 rebellion, dotted the region's landscape and impacted Lahore's topography and urban sociality. Lavish buildings, such as the Bahawalpur and Kapurthala houses, not only symbolized the wealth and status of some of these states,<sup>134</sup> but also created a distinctive synthetic architecture—a new form that emerged at this time. Cooperation with the British by such individuals and their families significantly impacted the city's urban morphology and created urban social relations resembling semi-feudal tendencies with the colonial state as overlord.<sup>135</sup> The imposing houses of the nawabs of Bahawalpur symbolized the combined British and local elites' contribution to Lahore's colonial urbanization as material signs of their economic privilege and power. Additionally, they served as an urban sediment linking emergent social relations to prior social forms.

Another formative aspect of Lahore's post-1849 topography is the development of colonial administrative structures in the province with Lahore at their core.<sup>136</sup> This built dimension was (and remains) visible in the architecture of public buildings, including the Lahore High Court,<sup>137</sup>

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the Lahore District 1883-4). On "notables: see Lepel H. Griffin's *The Punjab Chiefs: Historical and Biographical Notices of the Principal Families in the Lahore and Rawalpindi Divisions of the Punjab*, Vols. I and II, Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1890. Frequently cited, it illustrates the inter-textual aspect of colonial knowledge production. One family that has remained prominent in Lahore is that of the Fakir family who retain a residence in the old city.

<sup>134</sup>The 1921 Census of India lists the following States within the Punjab Indo-Gangetic Plain: Loharu, Dujanu, Pataudi, Kapurthala, Maler Kotla, Faridkot, Patiala, Jind, and Nabha. The number that came under the Punjab States Agency in British India at the time of decolonization in 1947 is larger and includes Kalsia, Faridkot, Mandi among others.

<sup>135</sup> The resemblance lay in the patron-client relations between the large landlords and their tenants, and between the landlords and the colonial state. The horse farms came the closest to feudal relations; however, the underlying logic of these relations was never analogous to European feudalism. In that sense, the term is itself misleading.

<sup>136</sup> Lahore's prominence post-annexation cannot be dissociated from its emergence, alongside consolidation and pacification of regions to its northwest, as a bureaucratic space. Nor can the story of Lahore be understood without an awareness of its intimate connection to, and division of labor with Amritsar. See Ian Talbot, *Divided Cities: Partition and its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947-1957*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007.

<sup>137</sup> Initially called the Punjab Chief Court, which was created in 1865 close to ten years after annexation, work on a court building did not begin until 1881, and it was in 1919 that the Chief

the Town Hall, and educational institutions such as the Punjab University and Aitchison College.<sup>138</sup> It is noteworthy that none of these buildings were completed until almost twenty years after annexation. The location of these buildings also merits attention. The Town Hall is located closest to the walled city and is adjacent to the Punjab University campus<sup>139</sup> as well as to several other educational institutions. The High Court building is situated next to the Lahore Cathedral, which is an imposing structure with an attached school for boys and girls. It is also midway between the Town Hall and the main Assembly building, not built until 1935, i.e., long after the city's annexation, at what used to be called "Charing Cross."<sup>140</sup> Aitchison College's location is particularly noteworthy. Situated in proximity to the Government House and designed to train sons of Punjab's so-called notables, its primacy as an instrument of colonial cooptation is visible in its location and the opulence of its buildings and immense acreage. The presence of mosque, *mandir*, and *gurdwara* within its premises served to emphasize religious difference among members of the three communities resident in the school and to portray the colonial government as a tolerant and benevolent ruler. Private commercial institutions, both Indian and European, contributed to Lahore's altered urban landscape: missionary societies and educational institutions, in addition to the colonial establishment and "notables", were also a visible part of

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Court was elevated to the status of a High Court. It is noteworthy that that year also marked serious anti-colonial disturbances in Lahore, discussed earlier. Construction on what was initially named the Victoria Jubilee Town Hall was begun in February 1867 but its opening did not take place until 1890. Aitchison College, one of several Chief's Colleges in colonial India (a misnomer since all these institutions only went through the high school level), later named "Aitchison College", had its foundation stone laid in late 1886 but its residential and teaching buildings were not completed until several years later.

<sup>138</sup> I am currently working on another paper which looks explicitly at educational institutions in Lahore that emerged in post-annexation colonial Lahore. It goes into much greater depth regarding these institutions' contributions to altering space and sociality in Lahore.

<sup>139</sup> A new campus was built under Ayub Khan's military regime with a view to removing students, seen as a source of political trouble, from their proximity to the bazaars of Anarkali and the walled city. Its foundation stone was laid in 1905 and its location in addition to those just described was in close proximity to several other educational institutions established earlier in Lahore—including Lahore Government College (1863) and the Oriental College (1865).

<sup>140</sup> Without unduly lengthening this study, it is worth mentioning that these buildings' presence and spatial aesthetic together produced a radically altered urban topography. Their European architectural design combined with a neo-Orientalist façade, suggested the colonial order was a benign and creative synthesis of local and British cultures, thus spatially making invisible the violence accompanying colonial re-ordering of space and place.

Lahore's altered cartography and crucial to the production of a land market in Lahore.<sup>141</sup>

The reputation of Lahore as the cultural heartland of the province stems both from its produced distinctiveness from Amritsar, which flourished as a trading center, and also from British reliance on Lahore's past role as the center of political power in the region. Despite continuity in the latter regard, colonial rule contributed to a rupture with the past. In some respects, the *appearance* of social relations similar to those prior to colonial annexation is often mistaken as visible evidence of the continuation of *prior* socioeconomic relations. This obfuscates underlying structural dynamics in a radically altered socioeconomic spatial and political landscape.<sup>142</sup>

These colonial buildings not only produced a new and distinctive aesthetic, one unified by a grand artery—the Mall—connecting the various parts of official Lahore, but they also established a direct contrast with the walled city, which had narrow streets and dense spaces. Architecture thus served to “Make Lahore Modern” to use Glover's title. The contrast between the Mall as a boulevard and the dense streets of the old city could not be more different.

At the same time as this visual topography accentuated colonial difference and marked it as modern, this urbanization was made possible by the presence of a new professional class. This class of architects and town planners, European and later Indian, were intimately involved in this transformation. They both profited from and helped establish an altered socio-spatial sensibility, not unlike those who introduced particular railroad technologies, which I turn to in the section immediately following. All these elements combined to produce a city informed by its past, yet transformed and subject to a distinctive set of imperatives, both local and global.<sup>143</sup> I have remarked earlier that British preoccupation with

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<sup>141</sup> This market in urban land combined public-private interests is evident in the manner in which missionary institutions in particular expanded their properties. Records of the Salvation Army, Kinnaird College and Forman Christian College are especially instructive in this regard.

<sup>142</sup> Marx calls this the difference between a formal versus a real subsumption of labor under capital. Peripheral capital, as many analysts have remarked (especially in capitalism's earlier moments), tends towards the former. It is this that has led to the misguided notion, dealt with at length in some of my other writings, that the Punjab and Pakistan remains a feudal society.

<sup>143</sup> This is not to imply earlier empires colonizing Lahore were local and/or spatially contained. While mindful of Abu-Lughod's admonition that Mughals had far flung connections well

spaces external to Lahore impacted its spatial vision and planning; this is starkly evident not only in the architects and engineers who helped *fabricate and forge* its cityscapes, but equally it is evident in Lahore's rise to prominence as a hub for the railroads—to which I now turn.

e. Lahore's Railways and/as Masks of Conquest<sup>144</sup> and Change

i. *History of Lahore's railroads*

A great deal of pen, ink, and print has been expended on descriptions and analyses of Indian railways, including those in Lahore, and there is no dearth of writing attempting to prove or disprove their economic benefit to India. Rather than rehash this material, I discuss the process by which the railways came to India, whom they benefitted, and what changes they wrought. As in the prior section on Lahore's annexation and signification for British imperial and colonial ambitions, here it is also impossible to separate their longer history from railway presence in Lahore and its implications for the city. I start with the bigger picture, approaching the railway's meaning to Lahore through a wide-angle lens.

The coming to and building of railways in India had a long period of gestation; however, their centrality to Lahore was not an a priori given.<sup>145</sup> Initially, the Court of Directors of the East India Company in Britain

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beyond Central Asia, a story just beginning to be adequately examined, my interest here is in the radically different logic of the (proto)capitalist colonial order. (See also J. Abu-Lughod, *Op. Cit.*, 1998.)

<sup>144</sup> With apologies to Gauri Viswanathan from whose book title I borrowed this phrase.

<sup>145</sup> To cite a few sources: P. D. A. Berridge, *Couplings to the Khyber: The Story of the Northwestern Railway*, David and Charles: Newton Abbot, 1969; sections in Ian Kerr, *The Punjab Province and the Lahore District 1849–1872: A Case Study of British Colonial Rule and Social Change in India*, PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1975. Volumes I and II; by the same author, "Bombay and Lahore. Colonial Railways and Colonial Cities: Some urban consequences of the development and operation of railways in India, c. 1850–c.1947," *Op. Cit.*, n.d. Accessed June 19, 2018; Daniel Thorner, "Capital Movement and Transportation: Great Britain and the Development of India's Railways," *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1951: 389–402; Daniel Thorner, "The Pattern of Railway Development in India," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Feb. 1955: 201–216; Amit K. Sharma, "'Fire-Carriages' of the Raj: The Indian Railway and its Rapid Development in British India," *Essays in History*, Vol. 44, 2010, accessed online at: <http://www.essaysinhistory.com/fire-carriages-of-the-raj-the-indian-railway-and-its-rapid-development-in-british-india/>. In addition, there are numerous pertinent railway records and reports and Parliamentary debates. See especially East India (Railways) Administration Reports on the Railways in India printed on a regular basis. For this study, I used the two volumes for 1905.

preferred to build up the road system rather than expend funds on the railways.<sup>146</sup> The push for railroad construction came from companies in Britain that hoped to make handsome profits from railway ventures in India. In order to secure support at home and in India, they asserted that railroads were a military necessity. In their separate works, Amit Sharma and Ian Kerr argue that such concerns over time came to be shared by British authorities in India who “were aware that military supplies and manpower could have been mobilized far more efficiently if a railway connecting Calcutta to the North-West Provinces existed. Unsurprisingly, Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General during the Anglo-Sikh conflict, was in favor of railway development.”<sup>147</sup> Shrewdly, these companies also pointed out that the railroads would positively benefit Manchester mills by facilitating the more rapid transport of cotton to the ports for shipment.<sup>148</sup> Sharma points out that the development over time of strong support at home and in India led the Court of Directors to eventually come around—albeit not necessarily enthusiastically.<sup>149</sup> According to Sharma,

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<sup>146</sup> While my focus is on the railroads, the story of the refurbished Grand Trunk Road is part of the story of shifts in modes of transportation. Colonial writing on roadways distinguishes between earlier roads and those constructed during the colonial period. See K. M. Sarkar, *The Grand Trunk Road in the Punjab*, Monograph No. 1, Punjab Government Record Office Publications, n.d. The author speaks to the colonial spatial imaginary: “The Punjab is the gateway of India, and the Grand Trunk Road has a special significance here, linking up as it does all its important military stations. ... along with the Telegraph, it can claim to have saved India for the British.” (Preface, no page numbers). Later, “The writer of the *Imperial Gazetteer* claims that, before the advent of the British in India roadways, in the modern sense of the word, were practically unknown. ... in pre-British days... the roads were little better than “mere fair weather tracks, level with the country, and marked with lines of trees, with tall minars dotted through the jungle to indicate the way from stage to stage and to mark the distance.” *Ibid.*: 2. Furthermore, “At the time of the British, of course, the roads must have been in a chaotic condition, for Governors of the Provinces were busy carving out fortunes for themselves, and could hardly afford to think about the condition of the roads or the security and comfort of travelers.” *Ibid.*: 3. Roads, like the railroads, are represented as part of the civilizing and rationalizing drive of colonialism. However, the same text and others remark on the military and economic significance of roads. Sarkar remarks, “The chief object of...roads...was to facilitate the export of surplus production.” *Ibid.*: 5.

<sup>147</sup> A. K. Sharma, *Op. Cit.*, 2010: 6.

<sup>148</sup> Lord Dalhousie was partial to both arguments, i.e. the military and economic, and was the first to move away from experimental lines to a policy of building lines connecting the three presidencies. Railroads started in Britain in 1825 and their arrival in urban areas created further impetus to “modernize” India as well. British companies, engineers, builders, and other specialists were part of those lobbying for this new technology and its extension to India. See sources cited in note 144.

<sup>149</sup> A. K. Sharma. *Op. Cit.*, 2010: 7.



Major John P. Kennedy, an engineer advising the Indian government, in an 1852 memorandum,

envisioned a railroad network that intricately connected all of the major urban centers in colonial India together, and... should be immediately constructed [According to Kennedy, this line would enable the] “concentration of troops at any required point” in a way that would dramatically increase the military power of the government. ... the... line would hypothetically reduce the mobilization time to a matter of days [from an earlier 3–4 months].<sup>150</sup>

However, it was only after 1857 when “rebels intentionally targeted existing railway sites” that “the opinion that railways could ensure the internal security of colonial India gained substantial support in Westminster.”<sup>151</sup>

Numerous sources, both primary and secondary, suggest that fears of rebellion and Russian ambition<sup>152</sup> animated early official Government of India (GOI) support for railway construction. This led to Lahore station’s prominence as a junction for trains headed north towards Peshawar and east to Delhi [and onto Calcutta]. Subsequent railroad expansion in the Punjab and its environs were also instigated by fears of a supposed invasion from the northwest.<sup>153</sup> Lord Curzon represented Russia as a “serious menace” and justified the railways as a means to “render any hostile intention futile.”<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> A. K. Sharma. Op. Cit., 2010: 7.

<sup>151</sup> A. K. Sharma. Op. Cit., 2010: 9.

<sup>152</sup> A. K. Sharma. Op. Cit., 2010. An oversight in Sharma’s argument regarding the Russian “threat” is the unquestioning reliance on British official sources and their representations. While a case could be made that Russia was extending its borders, Russia as a *threat* was itself *actively constructed, repeatedly asserted and discursively (re)produced*: this allowed the British in India *and* at home to justify their actions and garner support for military actions, expenditures and occupations. It also allowed the railroad promoters to garner support for their proposed rail system.

<sup>153</sup> The Sindh, Punjab and Delhi Railway Company linked Lahore to Amritsar in 1862, Lahore to Multan in late 1864, and Lahore to Karachi in 1878 by the Indus Valley State Railway. The Punjab Northern State Railway linked Lahore and Peshawar cantonments in 1883. By 1886 Punjab Northern State Railway came to be owned and operated by the government and renamed the North Western Railway. See Ian J Kerr, Op. Cit., 2012 for details. See also P. D. A. Berridge, Op. Cit., 1969.

<sup>154</sup> I. J. Kerr, Op. Cit., 2012.

Curzon was not alone in such representations. Lipsett, writing a hagiography of Curzon, applauds him for his anti-Russian position while acknowledging that the Russian threat may be a fiction:

It is of course possible that Russia has no desire or intention of invading India at any time, and that all these precautions to preserve buffer States and avoid railway connection are unnecessary. ...But we cannot reckon upon any such indifference. Whatever else is uncertain, this is certain, that whether Russia desired India or not, she would always demonstrate against it as a lever to aid her schemes in China, Persia or elsewhere. *We must depend, not on Russia's forbearance, but on our own strength or inaccessibility.*<sup>155</sup>

This underscores my contention earlier that Russia was a ruse to militarize colonial India, and that policy was guided by colonial transnational considerations. Such claims and the policies that emanated from them produced facts on the ground, which then rationalized such tautological logic.

Subsequent to Jallianwala Bagh and martial law in Lahore, there is further evidence of the nexus between railroads and the colonial state's security apparatuses. Worries over railroad disruption led to the prolongation of martial law in Lahore subsequent to its enactment in 1919:

Sir Havelock Hudson... explained the advisability and necessity of adopting this course from a military point of view... In particular, by reference to several maps which he produced, he indicated how maintenance of the Punjab railways was vital for the position on the frontier, particularly when mobilization occurred in consequence of the war with Afghanistan.<sup>156</sup>

In the Disorder Committee enquiry, the prolongation of the martial law was also justified on similar grounds:

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<sup>155</sup> H. Caldwell Lipsett in his book, *Lord Curzon in India, 1898–1903* (Messrs. Everett and Co., 1903). My emphasis.

<sup>156</sup> Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab etc., Op. Cit., 1920, n.p.

On account of the trouble on the frontier it was necessary to continue to have Martial law on the Railways because the Railways were very vital points of communication with the frontier, and the Railways came through Lahore.<sup>157</sup>

British preoccupation with Lahore's western, northern and British India's external borders is repeatedly in evidence, alongside a dearth of evidence that any Russian threat was imminent or even real. Nonetheless this language of *threats* to British interests served to legitimize the military administrators contention that there was a direct connection between the securing of Lahore city's and even the Punjab's boundaries, in order to protect British Indian space and its railroad lines.<sup>158</sup> In short, the fear of Russian intervention through Afghanistan served as *an alibi* for both Lahore's annexation and the railroads centrality within/to Lahore; opposition to the British was always invariably posited as imminent necessitating British action.

## ii. *The Political Economy of the Railroads*

Despite a consensus among the British that "railways were clearly a good thing for India,"<sup>159</sup> the sentiment at the Court of Directors in Britain regarding their construction indicated a lack of unanimity on their urgency:

From the outset, the Court of Directors of the Honorable East India Company, shared with the Directors... the view that the benefit to be derived by India from the introduction of a railroad system was

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<sup>157</sup> Lt. Col. Frank Roberts, testifying before the Disorders Committee, Op. Cit., 1920.

<sup>158</sup>The same document reveals that a record of these events in Lahore was kept in books labelled "War Diary." This designation is significant and has symbolic meaning, the latter recognized by key British figures involved at the time. Thus, Michael O'Dwyer, the main architect of the repression in Lahore, stated that "he did not know that such diaries were kept, and said he would certainly not have approved of the title." The report goes on to state that "In any event, it shows to some extent how some of those surrounding Sir Michael O'Dwyer looked at the matter." Such an acknowledgment of the power of words and their meaning shows increasing British concerns vis-a-vis Indian "publics"; it is not a coincidence then that the hearing took place, given a context when mass demonstrations were an increasing recurrence, and anti-colonial sentiment on the rise. This early attempt to placate Indian opinion foreshadows the concerns that became central to the third and final moment discussed in this study when representational practices come to dominate over both military and economic considerations. (Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab etc. Op. Cit., 1920, n.p.)

<sup>159</sup> Ian J. Kerr, *Building the Railways of the Raj, 1850–1900*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995: 16.

beyond question, but circumstances in the political and monetary state of India were constantly changing, while there was no certainty of the London share market. Very great caution was therefore needed in conducting the preliminary negotiations for the construction of so great a national work, involving so large a capital outlay, in a country so distant and at the time so little known.<sup>160</sup>

Similarly, not all parties involved were in agreement with respect to details regarding ownership and/or control of the railroads, or even the technology to be deployed. These details were a source of tension, struggle, and contestation. The debates in Britain reflected jockeying among different interested parties, especially the private companies who stood to be the main beneficiaries:

The advocates, the polemicists, the promoters, the visionaries, the would-be speculators—often one and the same—produced a steady barrage of printed material touting their particular schemes and extolling the benefits that Indian railways in general or specific lines in particular would bring to investors, to the Indo-British commercial connection, to the security of British rule and to the people of India. Promoters scorned the schemes of their rivals and lobbied intensively in public and private for the right to build particular lines.<sup>161</sup>

The first, more extensive steps were delayed until 1849, the same year that Lahore was occupied by the British. At that time,

in March 1849, the same month in which major British expansion by force of arms on the Indian subcontinent was completed with the annexation of the Punjab—the East India Company agreed on terms with the Great Indian Peninsula Railways... and the East Indian Railway... whereby the two companies would build and operate their respective lines with a guaranteed five per cent return on their stockholders' investment, assured by the revenues of the Government of India.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> G Huddleston, *History of the East Indian Railway*, Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co. 1906: 3.

<sup>161</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1995: 16.

<sup>162</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1995: 17.

This arrangement gave the GOI control over matters of the military purpose and use of the railroads, while promising the private companies assured profits (not unlike some “public-private partnerships” today, such as New York City’s subway system). Guaranteed a return, the private companies’ interest in conservation of costs was nil. The public-private relation impacted not only the cost, but also the construction, management, and administration of the railroads. It is worth quoting from Kerr at length in this regard:

Well run... was not an adjective that could be applied to the management of the Sind, Punjab, and Delhi Railway (thereafter the SP&DR). Mistakes, mismanagement, and outright malfeasance characterized the pioneering decades of this line whose territory extended from Lahore southwest to Multan and then southward down the valley of the... Indus... to... Karachi, and southeast from Lahore to Delhi. Built and initially operated as two railroads, in Punjab and Sind respectively, each with its own agent and chief engineer, the SP&DR had one Board of Directors in London chaired by Sir William Andrews (1807–1887). The aggressive, freewheeling Andrew and his subordinates frequently tested, and sometimes stepped over, the limits to their authority set forth in the contracts with the GOI.<sup>163</sup>

The lines of the SP&DR were built in discontinuous lengths: ... sections of Amritsar-Lahore-Multan route begun in 1859 (the Amritsar-Lahore section opened in April 1862)...

On the Punjab section the agent, Logan White Raeburn, and the chief engineer soon butted heads... [such that] relationships between the two senior officials of the Punjab railway became severely strained...Raeburn, the brother-in-law of the SP&DR chairman, W. P. Andrew appeared to have been prickly, impetuous, and overly willing to depend on contractual authority and, no doubt thanks to the position of his brother-in-law, to refer to the SP&DR Board of Directors in London to carry the day when a less confrontational style toward Brunton and others in Punjab might have been more effective.

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<sup>163</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1995: I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1995: 28–30.

Such evidence makes clear that the manner in which the railroads were not only conceived, but also built and managed, was less than stellar: it reads like one continuous muddle. As its problems became more obvious, later debates would focus on the merit of expenditure on railways relative to other infrastructural projects (e.g., irrigation schemes), demonstrating yet again the haphazard and unsystematic mode of colonial policy formation in an instance of the “tail wagging the dog.”<sup>164</sup>

Railroad technology itself was hotly debated among concerned governmental bodies (the GOI, Board of Directors, Parliament, the India Office) and private parties (including manufacturing companies, engineers and railroad specialists) in both India and Britain. These debates ranged from the gauge to be used, to the sourcing and production of materials. At all levels—from cost, to technologies, to ownership and control—opinions differed and changed over time.<sup>165</sup> The resulting decisions showed little concern regarding efficiency and cost. When it came to railroad technology, India served as a lab, the site of various experiments to test different technologies. The so-called “Battle of the Gauges” bears this out and reaffirms the subjective nature of colonial railroad policy formation: decisions were made based on power politics and lobbying by different individuals and parties, *not* on their viability and practicality.<sup>166</sup> The gauge question was part of the larger struggle by British companies to exploit technology for their own gain. Technocrats lent credence to these arguments by offering “proof”—in actuality, different manufacturers each had their own “experts” testifying on their behalf.<sup>167</sup> Often, economic interests were masked by geostrategic claims, since the wider gauge helped faster delivery of heavy military equipment for transport to the northern areas from Karachi port with passage through Lahore.<sup>168</sup> These debates on gauges were also debates about expertise,

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<sup>164</sup> These debates were led by irrigation and agrarian specialists with investments in their respective technologies, and were a part of their professionalization.

<sup>165</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Engines of Change: The Railroads that Made India*, Westport: Praeger, 2007.

<sup>166</sup> Hugh Hughes two volumes, *Indian Locomotives, Part 1 – Broad Gauge 1851–1940*, Continental Railway Circle, 1990, and *Indian Locomotives, Part 2 – Metre Gauge 1872–1940*, Continental Railway Circle, 1992 addresses this in detail from an engineering and internal perspective, albeit one with an assessment arrived at after the fact.

<sup>167</sup> Ultimately the GOI took the route of least resistance, which is why Indian railroads ended up using a mix of broad gauge and meter gauge, sometimes on the same line!

<sup>168</sup> This was the primary argument for use of this technology, but beneath the surface of this argument lay the economic interests of the manufacturers of these gauges, as well as the iron manufacturers who stood to also make a neat profit.

especially in mechanical engineering,<sup>169</sup> a field itself in the process of formation. Lahore, with a major railroad line utilizing the wider gauge, was a guinea pig of sorts.<sup>170</sup> Moreover, Lahore's location lent plausibility to utilization of this technology and its institutionalization, as opposed to Calcutta, for instance, which is far from the northwestern borders.

The main beneficiaries, then, were British companies with pecuniary interest in railroad construction; specialists with stakes in railroad ventures; and military and security interests within the Government of India that were desirous of control over territories, borders and people. This last concern led the GOI to take over control of what came to be known as the Northwestern Railway, which connected Lahore to the northern areas. A similar decision was made with respect to its connection to the Sindh, Punjab and Delhi railroad, since that way unimpeded rail transport was retained by the colonial state.<sup>171</sup> The cost was, in both instances, borne by the Indian people by way of revenue extraction and by the British taxpayer in the form of public debt. And while these decisions were deeply subjective in their constitution, they were by no means idiosyncratic but rather reflected structurally contingent interests. This process, ironically, ultimately *produced the very disorder* for which the British chided the Indians. And it was one reason that the Northwestern Railway, which was connected through Lahore, came to be a state-owned and state-run railroad earlier than some others.<sup>172</sup>

Not only the railways but also transportation and communications in India (insofar as they were tied to military concerns) were not subjected to cost calculations or subjected solely or even primarily to civil administrative considerations. Thus, the principal roads built under colonial rule "were under Military Boards... without any extensive or even sufficient powers either financial or administrative."<sup>173</sup> Unsurprisingly, it was only

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<sup>169</sup> In addition to H. Hughes (Op. Cit., 1990, and 1999) for details on their technological merits, see also I. J. Kerr on this debate (Op. Cit., 2007).

<sup>170</sup> For analytical rather than engineering perspectives on technology see Thomas P. Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems" in W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes and T. Pinch, eds., *The Social Construction of Technological Systems. New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987: 51–82; also, Langdon Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" *Daedalus*, Vol. 109, No. 1, 1980: 121–136. P. S. A. Berridge's work (Op. Cit., 1969) examines both issues, being a social history of the railroads in Lahore and its environs.

<sup>171</sup> For details on this history see P. D. A. Berridge, Op. Cit., 1969.

<sup>172</sup> P. D. A. Berridge, Op. Cit., 1969.

<sup>173</sup> K. M. Sarkar, Op. Cit., n.d.: 4. Later, on the same page, Sarkar cites the Administration Report 1852–53 quoting, "[the Grand Military Road] project has the special approval of the...

subsequent to the annexation of Lahore, the defeat of the Sikhs, the pacification of the northwestern border, the colonialization of pastoral land and the expulsion of Punjab's nomadic peoples and its re-habitation by migrants, that the commercial and export-oriented trade facilitated by the railroads (which had been considerably slower when dependent on road transportation) became an increasing concern in this part of the country. It is with the pacification of especially the northwestern areas that the railroads come to assume a greater economic significance (beyond their profitability for the companies involved in their construction), and facilitated a dependent form of colonial capitalism favoring the metropole's development, as they did in other parts of India as well.<sup>174</sup>

Lahore was not only prominent as a railroad stop, but railway workshops were also pivotal to the city for military and socioeconomic reasons. Together, they contributed to Lahore's constitution as a crucial hub in trafficking of military men and equipment, laborers, commercial goods and agricultural commodities—all streaming in and out of the city. The establishment of the railway workshops in Lahore first at Naulakha, and later at Mughalpur, enhanced Lahore's attractiveness for migrant labor from near and afar, at all socioeconomic levels. While Ranjit Singh's court was known for the diverse array of peoples present (both Indians and others from elsewhere, including Europe), post-annexation Lahore's migratory patterns were based on an economic logic marked by the primacy of private markets (and not primarily individual interest), buttressed and re-enforced by the needs of the colonial administrative-garrison state. The differences between the military and the economic impulses and their respective migratory patterns alert us to the entanglement between technology, social relations, and institutional structures as a historically constituted matrix. Technological change, including that involving the railroads, thus cannot be reduced to a

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Governor General (Dalhousie). From a political and military point of view its consequence can hardly be over-stated in terms of binding together all our important Northern Cantonments and maintaining communication with Peshawar, our greatest frontier station. In this respect it is of the greatest strategic importance to the Punjab and to India. But in the Punjab it confers another great benefit by forming a great highway, passing through the upper districts and the chief cities... It thus constitutes a great artery from which numerous branches separate off in various directions. Lastly, it's the great outlet and channel for the import and export trade between India, Central Asia and the West."<sup>174</sup>

<sup>174</sup> As some scholars have remarked, the railroads produced a distinct spatial cartography, a development I elaborate on later.



dependent variable; rather it needs to be understood relationally and holistically within a dialectical complex.<sup>175</sup>

### iii. Economic Interests, Achievements and Representations

The *railroads* and their extension in/through Lahore undeniably allowed the colonial state to move men and materials faster, in greater bulk and more effectively than was previously possible. They were vital to colonial Lahore's socio-spatial formation and had a lasting impact on the city.<sup>176</sup> Similar to but much more drastically than roads, the railroads initially connected cantonment to cantonment for ease of military mobility. Not only did they make it possible to expedite the movement of bodies and armaments to battle zones in the northern areas, but they also connected Lahore to Karachi, combining military and economic imperatives.

Like military justifications for the railroads—to prevent Russian aggression rather than to extend the borders of colonial India—economic claims made on behalf of the railroads, tend[ed] to be exaggerated as well, and were designed to valorize the colonial order. I will return to their implications for the city of Lahore.<sup>177</sup> Here, I focus on the claims made regarding railroad construction and representations of their *achievement(s)*.<sup>178</sup> Daniel Thorner and Sharma both argue that railroads in India did not *advance* and/or

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<sup>175</sup> M. Akhter and K. Ormerod state: “We understand the technozone not as an accomplished fact, but as a tendency toward standardization that is continuously interrupted... we adopt the concept... because it is a process driven by its internal contradictions. ... concept... is useful for understanding [technology] because of its key geographical feature: technozones do not necessarily correspond to political boundaries... they provide a way to consider spatiality of scientific expertise without making any assumptions about the nature of those relationships such as proximity, contiguity, or core-periphery.” *Op. Cit.* 2015: 124.

<sup>176</sup> While some studies emphasize the canal colonies as a leading cause of migration to the Punjab, migration to Lahore *preceded* the canal colonies' formation, and the railroads and annexation itself were by most accounts, key factors not only in the city's growth but in its diversity bringing people from as far away as Bengal to Lahore. most accounts key factors not only in the city's demographic growth but in the diversity of those who migrated to it. The first rail line in Lahore opened in 1861 and was reconstituted as a larger network in 1870. The canal colonies, as pointed out previously, were settled more than 20 years later. They cannot, then, be cited as the initial or the sole reason for the railroads in *this* part of the country.

<sup>177</sup> Beyond addressing this later in this paper, these implications will be teased out more fully in the expanded monograph version of this working paper.

<sup>178</sup> This term is used in a neutral sense, i.e., to suggest what the railroads facilitated rather than on value claims made on behalf of what they accomplished.

develop India economically, citing reasons detailed previously.<sup>179</sup> Both emphasize that they facilitated surplus extraction above all.<sup>180</sup> Furthermore, as already mentioned, given their lack of incentive to economize, private manufacturing companies often used the most expensive technology.<sup>181</sup> Taken together, the institutional and economic structure of the railroads meant they came to facilitate economic control over India. Lehmann asserts that the railroads had the *potential* to develop India by transforming labor relations and undertaking locomotive production internally, but ultimately he too arrives at a conclusion similar to Thorner and Sharma.<sup>182</sup> However, unlike Thorner who focuses solely on the Indo-British connection and argues that Indian railroads were designed to “intermesh the economies of the two countries,”<sup>183</sup> Lehmann notes that the railroads extended capitalist circuits much further: not only did they aid the development of British industry, they also supported developments elsewhere through purchases from other parts of the settler colonial world including the US and Europe, e.g., Germany.<sup>184</sup> Furthermore, while there is evidence that the railroads boosted the economies of spaces they connected, their primary economic contribution was in commerce and export production, hence, solely within a “trickle-down” economic logic. Sharma and Kerr point out that the railways selectively passed through some areas and bypassed others.<sup>185</sup> As a result, they helped transform certain areas into backways and replaced them with those cities-spaces served by the railroads. In this sense, too, the

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<sup>179</sup> D. Thorner, *Op. Cit.*, 1951. A. Sharma, *Op. Cit.*, 2010. Thus, they point out that sale of locomotive technologies to India economically benefitted British (and other colonial firms) that produced the technologies, those that financed them, and the British cotton industry.

<sup>180</sup> Part of the debate, of course, is how one defines “development” itself.

<sup>181</sup> That is, in India.

<sup>182</sup> Frederick Lehmann, “Great Britain and the Supply of Railway Locomotives of India: A Case Study of ‘Economic Imperialism’”, *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. II, No. 4, October 1965: 302–304. See also Darshan Singh Tatla, “Sikh Free and Military Migration During the Colonial Period”, in Robin Cohen, *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, 1995: 69–73. Tatla suggests that irrigation schemes under the British made possible a different spatial horizon for Lahore and Punjab’s inhabitants in particular, and were the impetus for long distance migration. While such technological shifts may have been a contributor, they do not tell the larger story of structural changes wrought in/through the overall technological matrix in conjunction with their cost-sharing schema and altered land use patterns.

<sup>183</sup> That is India and Great Britain. D. Thorner, *Op. Cit.*, 1955: 215.

<sup>184</sup> D. Thorner, *Op. Cit.*, 1955. Lehmann also points out that colonialists in the U.S. early on started to develop their own railroad manufacturing technology, something that did not happen at the same pace and to the same extent in India. This points to the difference between settler colonial economic production, on the one hand, and places such as India where race mediated the relation between the state and its so-called subjects, on the other.

<sup>185</sup> A. Sharma, *Op. Cit.*, 2010; D. Thorner, *Op. Cit.*, 1955. For a fuller discussion see also I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1995.

railroads remade the cartography of Lahore, Punjab and India. They *literally (re)produced* economic centers and peripheries within the spaces of an India, an India that the railroads helped nationalize.<sup>186</sup>

Long before Sharma and Thorner, William Digby, a British critic of its empire writing in the early 1900s, addresses the claims made by the GOI and its representatives regarding British contributions to Indian “development.” He quotes John Lawrence, who as the viceroy in 1867, stated:

The masses of the people are incontestably more prosperous and... far more happy in British territory than they are under native rulers.<sup>187</sup>

Refuting this claim, Digby points out that just a few years later,

[A]n instructed India... was crying out against the rack renting which especially marked that part of northern India which John Lawrence had “settled.”<sup>188</sup>

The “improvement” the British wrought, Digby argues, occurred through the colonization of lands previously not settled, i.e., by extending territory, and to a lesser degree through improvements in irrigation. He criticizes the GOI’s railroad capital expenditure, providing evidence from official sources that its cost was borne by the Indian public through revenue extraction and through other more direct means such as ridership. As someone who was not averse to empire, Digby argues that India “developed” Britain, and not the other way around, in sectors ranging from cotton to mining and manufacturing. He emphatically argues:

The connection between the beginning of the drain of Indian wealth to England and to the swift uprising in British industries was *not casual: it was causal*.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Kerr writes about Karachi, a “much smaller colonial port [than Madras, Bombay and Calcutta once having established] an uninterrupted railway connection to the Punjab and onwards to Delhi by 1889. . . . became an important port for export of grain.” *Op. Cit.*, n.d.:10.

<sup>187</sup> William Digby, “Prosperous” British India: A Revelation from Official Records, T. Fisher Unwin, 1901: 4. The remainder of the book then presents evidence—taken from official colonial sources—to back up this claim.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*: 4.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*: 31. My emphasis.

The other economic benefits of the railroads—beyond those accruing to British companies and manufacturers, and to those cities and towns where the trains stopped—went to companies and individuals that exported and imported goods in and out of India. In turn, their multiplier effect was limited to spaces where such exchanges passed through, or where railroads produced an upswing in numbers because of labor migration. Lahore was an example of both. Even so, the bulk of local economic beneficiaries of the railroads were middle men. Europeans were noticeably present in Lahore’s commercial ventures. Advertisements in Lahore newspapers and magazines provide evidence of owners of different commercial concerns operating in Lahore.<sup>190</sup> Commerce was not restricted to material goods; it extended also to experts and personnel in areas other than the railroads, such as architects, building contractors and engineers, bankers, and real estate merchants. Such “experts” contributed to an altered socio-spatial landscape *within* Lahore city, one that impacted social relations among its various publics in significant ways, with economic and cultural implications.<sup>191</sup> Several firms and banks established branches in more than one city, creating professional circuits that were extra-local. The footprint of modern-day globalization and of a new socioeconomic order was sped up and facilitated by Lahore’s railroads. These same structural factors contained contradictory mobilities and identifications that were catalysts for new forms of political sentiment and affect.

#### iv. *Physical and Social Contours of Lahore’s Railroad Network*

While factors external to Lahore impacted its railroad history (as well as that of the Punjab overall, and even Sindh), the significance of the railroads to Lahore’s spatial political economy is clear; they constituted an important element in the colonial social engineering that was to dramatically transform the cityscape. Lahore’s urban design is, at one level, exemplary of the British colonial city pattern, with the inner city (or *native city* in colonial parlance) at one end, the civil lines adjacent to it,

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<sup>190</sup> The Lahore Chronicle and later The Civil and Military Gazette, both newspapers published locally, carried advertisements not only of firms based in Lahore but also in other Indian urban centers, and in Britain.

<sup>191</sup> Evidence of these commercial interests and firms is readily available in the District Gazetteers in addition to British and local newspapers and magazines mentioned above.

and the cantonment at the outer end.<sup>192</sup> However, one aspect of this urban morphology is worth underscoring: this classic “divided” city design emerged over time in Lahore. To repeat: initially the colonial city sat directly adjacent to the older walled city, even colonizing many of its existing sites. Immediately after annexation in 1849, the cantonment was situated at Anarkali, directly abutting and essentially an extension of the walled city. Existing buildings were used both for colonial administrative offices and for the housing and garrisoning of troops.

Citing health considerations as the ostensible reason, British authorities under the Lawrence brothers’ guidance and Charles Napier as Commander in Chief, moved the cantonment to an area distant from the inner city, Mian Mir.<sup>193</sup> Ironically, while rationalized on grounds of medical necessity and improved sanitation, this move quickly came to be considered just as *unhealthy* as the initial encampment circa the old city. Despite representations which sought to establish a *cordon sanitaire* between colonials and locals through a segregation of space, such attempts were never entirely successful in practice, as the earlier discussion on lock hospitals indicated: even as the colonial state sought to separate the city’s various publics, segments from both communities nonetheless came into intimate and at times vexed contact with each other.<sup>194</sup> At one moment, even the name of Mian Mir was changed to “Lahore Station East,” a sort of magical belief in the power of naming. This too failed to have the desired effect and did not come into popular usage.

In contradistinction to attempts at socio-sexual separation between British members of the Indian army and the locals, the railway colony

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<sup>192</sup> The earlier “messy”, often disordered, multi-use, of spaces underscores the importance of historical periodization to any adequate understanding of representational claims by the British. Urban “order” and spatial forms operated in a co-constitutive dialectic of value production.

<sup>193</sup> The name “Mian Mir” comes from the name of a venerated sufi pir buried in the area.

<sup>194</sup> In a paper on the Lahore Cantonment written in 2001, M. Omer Sheikh cites from Aijazuddin’s work on Lahore, and records that Reginald Bosworth Smith, Lawrence’s biographer cites the choice of the Mian Mir site as an odd and unplanned happenstance. Sheikh challenges this as an *ex post facto* re-presentation by the biographer. My reading is that, the objectives of Lawrence’s decision notwithstanding, what is different about Mian Mir is precisely what Sheikh argues: it allowed military engineers to lay out a standardized, planned, and segregated cantonment design both as reward for their accomplishments in the Punjab and northern areas, and to further colonial modes of socio-spatial disciplining. See [http://www.oocities.org/momers\\_termpapers/ss153LahoreCantonment.htm](http://www.oocities.org/momers_termpapers/ss153LahoreCantonment.htm). Accessed 7/4/18. See also Lahore Cantonment Map, SOAS Archives and Special Collections, MAP D 32–30 [Lahore] 1852–53.

near Mughalpura reproduced race and class hierarchies but also brought the British, Anglo-Indians and other Indians into everyday contact in novel circumstances within a new set of social and labor relations (more on this later).

That the railway complex connected the various parts of the city physically was mentioned earlier, where I also noted that the main Lahore station, built soon after the 1857 uprising, was located in close proximity to the inner city and offices of the civil administration. Mian Mir station, in contrast, was situated *outside* the city limits, and later incorporated into Lahore city.<sup>195</sup> In subsequent commentary on the two sites, it is the Empress Road (main) station that is systematically emphasized by commentators on Lahore. Latif specifically mentions the fortified design of the main Lahore Railway Station,<sup>196</sup> making little direct mention of Mian Mir station:

The [Lahore] Railway Station resembles in appearance, one of the forts of the country, and is, in fact, a fortified position, provided with the means of defence in case of emergency. All the stations on the line, where it approaches the frontier, have been built more or less in the same style.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Mian Mir station and cantonment developed its own complex socio-spatial design, (re)producing colonial hierarchies while serving as a contact zone. O. Sheikh, *Op. Cit.*, (2001) provides the following details: “[military engineers] designed its roads and fences, parade ground, rifle range, polo and cricket grounds, the British and Native infantry barracks, officers’ quarters, slaughter house, cavalry lines, Royal Artillery Lines and Native bazaars; they laid out the sites for a Roman Catholic Chapel, post office, the British and Native hospitals and—in a neoclassical flourish—the oval shaped park at Mian Mir’s center, where the Anglican Church formed one focal point and the tennis grounds the other. Once laid out, the major north–south streets were adorned with the names of stalwarts of the empire (Elgin Street, Wellington Mall, Sir Hugh Rose Street, etc.) and the minor east-west streets were named after the Indian cities in the new Province. (Amritsar Street, Gujrat Street, Rawalpindi Street, Murree Street). Senior officers lived near the center of the cantonment, and subordinate personnel were placed outward from the center in order of decreasing rank. Native and European troops occupied separate quarters, and each group was housed according to their rank in identical barracks grouped together in blocks of parallel lines. In this way, military engineers arranged for the flow of goods and people in carefully measured amounts within the cantonment, using standardized spatial relationships and architectural devices that were meant to produce a predictable relation between a person’s social position and their positions in abstract space.”

<sup>196</sup> The foundation stone for the main railway station was laid in 1859 by John Lawrence. It was completed in 1862.

<sup>197</sup> S. M. Latif, *Op. Cit.*, 1892: 286.

This can partially be attributed to Mian Mir station's location, *outside* the administrative lines of the city when first built.<sup>198</sup> Initially built to move troops in and out of the city (therefore built in close proximity to the cantonment), its *purpose* was itself a sign of British might. Unlike Mian Mir, the much remarked upon and striking façade and style of the main Empress Road station and its architectural embellishment, constituted a visual sign, iconic of British power and "progress."<sup>199</sup> Meant to serve a general public, it was designed for mass consumption, to serve as a spectacle.<sup>200</sup> Similar to the railroads as a technology of power, architectural meaning extended beyond the physical transformation of space and served as a marker of modernity. The two stations served as physical connectors between the military and economic dimensions of colonial power and desire, but they were also *active signs* and attendant technologies of power, physical and representational.<sup>201</sup>

Like the railroad system itself, the railway complex in Lahore that served to connect the city externally and internally, grew over time. Lahore railway workshops grew along with the routes and mileage covered by the system, necessitated by physical, strategic (military-economic) and human/labor power considerations. According to Kerr, the lines, workshops and station—situated near the old city—covered roughly 126 acres. Latif writes that, by 1886, 2,000 men were part of the regularly employed railway force, with sources indicating that the number may have doubled in just four years.<sup>202</sup> The system's expansion led to an increase in area: an additional 1,000 acres was added in 1910 in the adjacent neighborhood of Mughalpura, and was accompanied by an

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<sup>198</sup> M. Horace Hayes, *Indian Racing Reminiscences*, London: W. Thacker & Co. 1883: 5.

<sup>199</sup> Their respective names are worthy of note: the main station's association with *Empress Road* directly connects it with British authority. Mian Mir—and even the name *Lahore Station East*—the first of local significance, the second drawing from a new geographical sense of direction, articulate and emphasize different forms of association and meaning.

<sup>200</sup> For a lengthier discussion on Indian railways and (their) representation see Ian J. Kerr, "Representation and Representations of the Railways of Colonial and Post-Colonial South Asia," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 37, no. 2, May 2003: 287–326. Kerr ascribes the Lahore station design to security concerns, which in my estimation, lent itself to a dual reading, one visual and the other material.

<sup>201</sup> In I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.* (1995) we are alerted to the incremental manner in which railroad development proceeded. By 1886, in Lahore this entire system of different companies was taken over by the government owned North Western State Railway (later renamed North Western Railway) that unified the bulk of railways that served the area of what is today's Pakistan. This network, Kerr points out, covered nearly 2000 miles by the time of decolonization.

<sup>202</sup> S. M. Latif, *Op. Cit.* 1892: 287.

increase in laboring bodies employed in the Lahore railway complex.<sup>203</sup> Sharma points out:

[While] Indian workshops began to emerge... British manufacturers remained the primary suppliers of [needed] industrial goods. Between 1850 and 1940, more than 14,000 British locomotives were sold to colonial India compared to slightly more than 700 that were manufactured indigenously. Indian workshops such as those established at Lahore focused on repair and assembly work for the duration of this period.<sup>204</sup>

In contradistinction to their external economic impact, Kerr notes their contribution to Lahore's altered spatiality. He remarks, "physically the railway and its workshops had a major influence on land use patterns in the colonial Lahore that grew up around the old, walled city." Kerr also points out:

The railway was both a magnet and a divider: the tracks divided while the station and workshops at Naulakha and later the workshops at Moghulpura were strong magnets that attracted not only railway workers and their families—many of whom, especially Europeans and Eurasians, lived in railway colonies adjacent to the lines and the workshops—but also some small businesses whose customers included the railway company, railway travelers and railway workers.<sup>205</sup>

While Lahore's Civil Lines constituted a spatial buffer between the old town and the Lahore Cantonment, the railways formed a parallel and more direct link connecting Mian Mir cantonment to the railway station and the inner city. The scale and impact of this expansion was more consequential as a more complex space of local-colonial interactions. The railway complex brought into *direct* and *everyday* contact workers from near and far, middle-tier employees (initially Anglo-Indians and British)

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<sup>203</sup> Ian J. Kerr, "Bombay and Lahore. Colonial Railways and Colonial Cities: Some Urban Consequences of the Development and Operation of Railways in India, c. 1850–c. 1947," pdf. Op. Cit., n.d.

<sup>204</sup> A. Sharma, Op. Cit., 2010: 4.

<sup>205</sup> I. J. Kerr, Op. Cit., n.d.



and British officers and specialists, alike.<sup>206</sup> In many ways, its hierarchies were messier and not as clear-cut as Lahore's civil lines.<sup>207</sup>

The tripartite racial divide—European/British, Anglo-Indian, Indian—was most pronounced in the stones and mortar of the railway complex and in its labor hierarchies. Before I return to this dimension, I take on next the socio-perceptual transformation wrought by the railroads, a development that goes beyond the practice and intent of policymakers, engineers and contractors, but is contained within the technology itself.

*v. Railroad Technology, Perception, and Time-space Compression*

Sharma writes about the dramatic shift produced by the railroads in colonial India:

The expansion of railroad lines in British India had effectively reduced the subcontinent to a twentieth of its former size. Places that had been 400 miles apart by non-rail forms of transport were now (in terms of journey time) only 20 miles away thanks to the speed of the locomotive.<sup>208</sup>

While Sharma acknowledges this seismic shift, he does not pursue its implications further. Yet, it is precisely this remaking of time-space that marks the railroads as a technology distinct from earlier forms of transportation. The time-space compression this new technology engendered was of lasting import in communities and spaces impacted by it, including Lahore, joining humans to machines in fundamentally altered ways. This had far-reaching cultural implications beyond questions of functionality and/or economic and military gain. Not only did those cities that were bypassed by the railroads lose their earlier

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<sup>206</sup> According to Kerr, the expansion of the NWR and its workshops created the possibility for upgrading the workshops and building a more up-to-date physical plant, "capable of constructing and repairing rolling stock and other equipment of a ... system which exceeded 4000 miles in 1905: a system with 756 engines, 2399 coaches, 11,622 good vehicles and more than 63,000 employees. [Additional land and was] acquired on the eastern edge of Lahore NNW of [the]cantonment between Shalimar Road and the main railway line to Delhi via Amritsar. At this Mughalpurā site new carriage and wagon shops were opened in 1910... By 1929 the locomotive shops had 14 acres of covered accommodation and the carriage and wagon shops 27 acres." Op. Cit. n.d., 12.

<sup>207</sup> The exception to this was Mayo Gardens, the railway "colony" closer to the canal.

<sup>208</sup> A. Sharma, Op. Cit., 2010: 1.

significance,<sup>209</sup> but also the system helped forge a new relation between space, time, and perception. Perception was increasingly grounded in the language of numbers and magnitude rather than sensuous experience.<sup>210</sup> These altered technoscapes<sup>211</sup> were not only made possible by the speed of the railroad relative to prior forms of transport, but also by its standardization of time, a feature central to railroads' functioning. With the coming of the railroad, even though the inhabitants of Lahore continued to maintain a relation to the countryside, neither remained the same.<sup>212</sup> The railways not only changed the spaces of Lahore, but they also changed its life-world and that of its inhabitants.<sup>213</sup>

Thus, while the distance between Lahore and the spaces around it remained the same, the perception of this distance underwent a radical shift, stripping from it its earlier meaning and alienating travel from situated everyday life and perception. In this sense, form and essence departed from each other and came to be reconstituted structurally and perceptually. Standard time was introduced on July 1, 1905, with Lahore's time being fixed as exactly 5.5 hours in advance of Greenwich Mean Time, and nine minutes in advance of Madras time.<sup>214</sup> Prasad writes that such standardization

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<sup>209</sup> I. J. Kerr, comparing Bombay and Lahore railways writes, "major cities came to exhibit the impress of railroads on their morphologies and cityscapes. Smaller urban spaces bypassed...[were] adversely affected." *Op. Cit.*, n.d.: 10.

<sup>210</sup> Wolfgang Schivelbusch's "Railroad Space and Railroad Time," (*New German Critique*, No. 14, Spring 1978: 31-40), provides a brilliant exposition of railroad time space compression that scholarship in the 1990s frequently and erroneously ascribes to digital technologies.

<sup>211</sup> This term, used earlier in this paper as well, is borrowed from M. Akhter and K. Ormerod, *Op. Cit.*, 2015.

<sup>212</sup> This is not to imply the relation between the country and city was ever static, but rather to suggest a qualitative shift.

<sup>213</sup> To talk of this shift through attribution of a value—as a sign of "progress"—is to overlook the fundamental ways in which railroads changed sensibilities regardless of whether one approved or disapproved of the railroads. Such attribution of value then distracts from our comprehension of the seismic shift that accompanied the coming of the railroads. That this shift was not universal and complete goes without saying. Even for those traveling on the trains, the sights of people and land become rendered abstract and distant, objects of "the gaze" rather than a close encounter, positive or not.

<sup>214</sup> Ritika Prasad, *Tracks of Change: Railways and Everyday Life in Colonial India*, (Cambridge University Press, 2015) discusses this standardization question at length in her chapter on "Railway Time: Speed, Synchronization, and "Time-Sense," where she traces this shift and its implications. Earlier she writes, "... in the half century between 1854 and 1905 the time of a single meridian was standardized as supra-local railway time, synchronized with the time of the

was spawned by the needs of coordinating safe interchange between multiple, intersecting railway networks spread across India's... breadth. However, the fact that railway time was gradually mandated as civil (and national) time meant that it existed in negotiation between those people touched by it, and the technology that permeates their lives.<sup>215</sup>

Not only did standardization allow for the production of "national" time, but such a punctuation of time led to an undermining, if not destruction, of space-time perceptions grounded in the rhythms of everyday life. In a different relation to both nature and culture, life now came to be constituted through what Walter Benjamin labels "empty, homogeneous time," and disciplined into conformity.<sup>216</sup> Socio-spatial identity and difference are thus produced through a vexed interplay of human and technological factors. The railroads emerge as complex technologies of power,<sup>217</sup> a virtual form of sight and vision unknown before.

While critiquing British civilizational claims to "developing" the Indian economy, Sharma argues that scholars critiquing British civilization and developmental claims overlook the "paradox between, on the one hand, their claims about limited technological change and, on the other hand, the vast as well as rapid expansion of advanced railroad technology."<sup>218</sup> Sharma's response to this conundrum is to focus on the "link between" technology transfer from Britain to India, and "their metropolitan-periphery relationship." Emphasizing intent rather than process, Sharma focuses on how railroad construction,

besides having a military purpose... served to justify ideologically the existence of colonial India. For British policymakers, the

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Greenwich meridian in England, and then deemed civil time (continuing as India's national time)": 9.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*: 9.

<sup>216</sup> Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," *Illuminations*, Random House, 1999: 245–255. Reprint of 1955 publication.

<sup>217</sup> See M. Akhter and K. Ormerod (Op. Cit., 2015) on technology's relation to politics and persons. On the radical change in perception wrought by the railways see Wolfgang Schivelbusch (Op. Cit. 1978) for his theorization of the perceptual changes wrought by new communication and transportation technologies. See also Langdon Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" (*Daedalus*, Vol. 109, No. 1, 1977), that shares some ideas with the two articles cited just above. Finally, see Dorothy Smith, *The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology*, (Northeast series in Sociology, 1989) for yet another perspective.

<sup>218</sup> A. Sharma, Op. Cit., 2010: 2.

railways physically embodied the civilizing mission, an ideology that sustained the assumption that they had the right to govern, arbitrate disputes, and insist upon deference. Dalhousie was convinced the railroads would lead to a “similar progress in social improvement that has marked... various kingdoms of the Western world”.... Curzon insisted that railroad development had always been a “blessing.”... Contemporary commentators agreed that railroad development... was elevating the Indian masses from ignorance and poverty.”<sup>219</sup>

Despite critiques of colonial claims vis-à-vis the railroads, in the same text, Sharma asserts that belief in British superiority was shared by “the” Indian populace, in part because of the railroads. As evidence, Sharma points out that a railway engineer convinced the Nawab of Bahawalpur to allow the British entry into his lands to survey them, which ensued in British control over the Nawab *and* his territories, however short-lived.<sup>220</sup> Railroads here serve as a fetish object, mythical carriers of modernity, in an ideological claim that was not, in Sharma’s reading, confined to colonial representatives, but also shared by locals.<sup>221</sup> While railroads clearly did serve—as I alluded to earlier—as a technology of power, Sharma does not go far enough in examining the techno-politics manifest in the interstices of the technology in relation to concrete institutional settings, in a matrix of symbolic, perceptual, and material-object relations.

Sharma ascribes the heightened use of the trains and their valorization by Indians partially to their “consumer appeal,”<sup>222</sup> and observes that demand for railroad transportation “was unanticipated by railroad advocates and became an additional source of profit.”<sup>223</sup> Undoubtedly, Indians took to the trains in large numbers. However, representation of railroad travel on the grounds of “consumer appeal” overlooks and renders invisible socio-spatial relations, including altered class and labor relations, and *their* contribution

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<sup>219</sup> A. Sharma, *Op. Cit.*, 2010: 12.

<sup>220</sup> A. Sharma, *Op. Cit.*, 2010: 17.

<sup>221</sup> Some of these claims have been cited previously with respect to putting down unrest, “modernizing” infrastructure etc.

<sup>222</sup> Prasad offers a much more complex reading of railroads in relation to consumerism. She also breaks down the meaning of the railroads to Indians by the social location of different Indians, i.e., she disaggregates Indian-ness itself (*Op. Cit.*, 2015).

<sup>223</sup> A. Sharma, *Op. Cit.*, 2010: 21.

to railroad traffic.<sup>224</sup> Sharma reduces the perceptual aspect of this profound shift primarily to marketized desire: the multiple impulses driving Indian mobility and migration to Lahore (and elsewhere) are framed through *the market's* conventional and laudatory self-presentation. The life worlds of many were changing, especially those closest to centers of colonial disciplinary practices—political, economic, military and social. In such a context, to attribute railroad travel and migration to “consumer appeal” and human psychology—rather than a physiological alteration in the nature-culture relation wrought by technological change—undermines Sharma’s own critique of the colonial state and its technological apparatuses. With the deepening of the colonial order, marketization, and the emergence of new social relations, riding the trains was essential to laboring bodies and their prospects in cities like Lahore. These same workers, especially those working for the railroads, would become a key source of opposition to the colonial state at a later stage in Lahore’s history.<sup>225</sup> The numbers of Indians who flocked to ride the trains do not constitute evidence of their “consumerist” reasons for doing so.

*vi. Lahore as National Space*

All the available figures underscore the contribution of the railways to Lahore’s growth. In 1891, Lahore was India’s tenth largest city, with a population of 176,854.<sup>226</sup> By 1921, that figure had climbed to 281,781, making it the fifth largest city in India. By 1941, its numbers had more than doubled, giving it a population of 671,659. While the railroads cannot be regarded as the sole reason for Lahore’s expansion, indicators point to them as a crucial contributor. In addition to facilitating its demographic growth and changes in its inhabitants, the railroads connected Lahore to other parts of the country in a nodal fashion, and facilitated an emergent sense of India as a unity; a singular space, albeit limited to those within its circuit.<sup>227</sup> The railroads, then, were vital to an

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<sup>224</sup> A. Sharma, *Op. Cit.* 2010: 21. The East India (Railways) Administration Report on the Railways in India for the Calendar Year 1905 also remarks on this as a positive unexpected development, adding to the coffers of the GOI.

<sup>225</sup> I return to the labor question at the close of this section.

<sup>226</sup> This and subsequent figures are taken from I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, n.d.: 11.

<sup>227</sup> W. Schivelbusch (*Op. Cit.*, 1978) traces this process in a fine-tuned fashion. Such unity—of both colonial India and its supposed other, Indian nationalism—emerges as one when seen in relation to the loss of the local in those spaces colonized by the railroads. In a different register, it would also make for an interesting study to examine the relation between those spaces served by the railways and the anti-colonial movement versus those by-passed.

altered spatial sensibility, beyond the perceptual shift they wrought, which was discussed earlier.

Railroads created the potential for a national formation, an idea that was not on local mental horizons previously. In other words, the railroads helped generate the conditions of possibility for an *Indian* nation(al) formation. It is not a coincidence that, as nationalist ferment developed, politicians frequently travelled by train. Railroad stations were the first site of mobilization upon approaching a city, including Lahore. We have here two simultaneous mobilizations, both national, albeit frequently working to different purposes and with divergent objectives. In the first, politicians representing the newly forged notional “nation” travel to local sites to drum up national anti-colonial sentiment. Alongside this, a second movement basing itself on grievances emanating from local work conditions and labor relations, give rise to labor unions and labor unrest. Lahore’s railway complex served as a fulcrum of both tendencies: standardized (railway) time connected Lahore to other spaces in the forging of an “Indian” time creating unity across space, while at the same time, the conditions of labor help articulate dissatisfaction with the structural hierarchies that stood in their way.

While Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities* argues that print capitalism is the national glue,<sup>228</sup> the Indian context contains no settler colonial shared national aspirations, nor a shared language across the national-space (particularly across class lines); instead railroad technology served both as a vital connector *and* divider, both intimate and abstract.

*vii. From the Global and National to the Local: Race, Gender, and Reproduction in Lahore’s Railroad Space*

So far, I have argued that the railways in Lahore, as in other major transport hubs, contributed to an altered socio-spatial urban topography and morphology, and altered in dramatic ways the perceptual horizons of its inhabitants. In conjunction with the institutional matrix of which they were an integral part, the railways also produced a heightened racial, class, and gender differentiation, not simply between the British and Indians but *across* and *within* each group. It is to this development that I now turn. In concluding this discussion of the economy, I foreground the

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<sup>228</sup> B. Anderson, *Op. Cit.*, 1991.

socio-sexual differentiations that made the railways a key site both for labor absorption and labor organizing in Lahore.

Kerr provides figures for labor employed in Lahore's railway workshops from 1870 to 1929.<sup>229</sup> These numbers show an increase from 1,000 in 1870 to 12,200 in 1929. The numbers in subsequent years, as well as those employed in the system as a whole, were of course much larger. While these figures matter, it is important to recognize that this growth was not a consequence of biological reproduction but rather of in-migration to the city. A further aspect of this in-migration is that it was predominantly male, and had implications for the imbalance between men and women living in the city.<sup>230</sup> Indeed, it would be interesting to track whether the practice of male migration to the city—leaving women and children behind in either rural areas or smaller towns and especially when economic conditions are harsh—is traceable back to this period. Additionally, migrants increasingly came from further away: post-annexation Lahore initially remained tied to Bengal for numerous reasons, such as Bengal's greater supply of English-speaking labor given its longer history of colonization, and also the fact that, administratively, Lahore was initially part of Bengal Presidency.<sup>231</sup> Both the prior history of colonization, as well as earlier colonial administrative settlement, impacted Lahore in the early post-annexation years. Previously not a major presence in the city, Bengalis came to Lahore and were employed in numerous fields ranging from the railways, the press, and education, especially industrial education. Even though the Punjab and Punjabis were linguistically separated from "Hindustan" and areas to the east of the Punjab at this time, the immediate post-annexation period also witnessed closer ties between the two regions and their peoples. As noted previously, railroads were undoubtedly a significant contributor to Lahore's growth—both within its own techno-zone but also through the connectivity and mobilities the railroads facilitated. Furthermore, since the railroads were the primary form of large-scale industrial employment in the city, it should come as no surprise that they were also one of the first sites in which

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<sup>229</sup> Kerr's figures show a dramatic increase between 1929 to 1960, but omits interim years: *Op. Cit.*, n.d.: 14. His figures are culled from various sources including Parliamentary Papers from the House of Commons, Lahore district gazetteers of 1883–84, 1893–94, Lahore District Statistical Tables for 1916 and others.

<sup>230</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.* n.d.: 15.

<sup>231</sup> Even when Punjab was separated into a state province, it remained tied to Bengal such that for a considerable period, educationally local examinations were both sent from, but also marked by, Bengalis. It is noteworthy that while Punjabis supplanted Bengalis in the army, this did not initially happen in administrative circles.

labor unions were formed. Not only these unions but the railway station itself as a site of labor resistance would have a lasting impact on Lahore's labor organizing into the post-independence period.<sup>232</sup>

The railroads not only led to in-migration to Lahore by Bengalis and those from other parts of Punjab, they exacerbated class bias and racial difference and at the same time, created cross-group contact. According to one source, among the British community the privilege accorded to European specialists working in Lahore's railroad sector supposedly resulted in

a significant leavening of Britons whom one could label the technologists of Empire; men who came to India to create and to manage the new kind of work force which operated the transplanted railway technology. [Furthermore] Eurasians and Parsis also came to have a noticeable presence in Lahore since the railway soon found them to be useful surrogates and equally loyal to the colonial enterprise.... A Lahore city directory [for the year 1916] testifies to the extent to which Europeans retained their supervisory presence in the workshops.<sup>233</sup>

While the railroads did not produce this affect singlehandedly,<sup>234</sup> what is distinctive about the Lahore railroad complex is that work and lived spaces were constructed proximate to each other (except for the non-domiciled Europeans), quite unlike the Civil Lines, where residential areas were cordoned off, and clearly separated from administrative offices.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> Labor unions were not limited to railroad workers, especially later. There were also unions among service sector employees such as tonga drivers. Other forms of organizing in Lahore occurred at universities and among different groups organizing along communal lines. But in terms of left-wing politics in the city, the railway works were certainly important.

<sup>233</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*: 15.

<sup>234</sup> These changes correspond to the further specialization and division of labor, including specializations in different areas aided by academic divisions aided by standardization and distinctive methodologies attached to different fields, each undergirded by emergent notions of science as objective and real, as opposed to earlier understandings of science as historically contingent and limited in its explanatory power. Part of the mystique Sharma addresses—i.e., the railroads' ideological effect, the consequence of a process of fetishization where the product, and its appearance—come to represent and stand in for their underlying "reality," which is historically structured and necessarily contingent. "Contingent," of course, should not be read as idiosyncratic or individuated.

<sup>235</sup> Domestic spaces of course penetrated the inner domestic spaces of British homes, *chaprasis* were indispensable to the civil officials, and batmen to military officers. In other words, spatial segregation was never totally successful much to the dismay and discomfort of some colonials.



The industrial dimensions of the work itself and the linkages the railways produced, distinguished this part of Lahore from the colonial city's other spaces of work and residence. Labor hierarchies within the railways produced a dynamism not necessarily visible in other parts of the city in quite the same manner.<sup>236</sup> In a curious way, the railway complex resembled the walled city more than it did the Civil Lines or the administrative colonial areas. Unlike the latter, its spaces—especially of the Lahore railway station but also the larger Mughalpura complex—combined indigenous and imported styles and modes of commerce and association that prevented any clear separation between space, sociality, and association.

This dynamic—the presence of regulation alongside resistance to its totalization—was further accentuated by the traffic of people in and out of the central railway station, which served as a hub connecting Lahore's various parts as well as linking it externally to spaces beyond the city. In this latter sense, time-space compression and the more orderly production of the colonial city's spaces could not successfully obliterate the denser forms of connectivity and interpersonal relations that preceded colonial presence in Lahore. The disciplining practices of modernity here ran up against resistance to such (re)ordering of time-space in a transgressive, yet not "traditional," manner.

It should also be pointed out that the emergence of a new genre of colonial actors—engineers and technocrats—were the product of technological shifts not only in the setting up of railways in Lahore, but also larger changes in colonial India and in Britain itself. The former involved new modes of learning and education, and an intensification not only in the division of labor, but also in specialization and changes in knowledge production. Within Lahore, the consolidation of British rule—

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Furthermore, in the cantonment, despite separation between residential quarters for British and Indian artillery, there was constant co-mingling. The railway complex bore a greater similarity to the latter.

<sup>236</sup> The mall, another key connector in the city, while it connected physically non-contiguous areas, did not connect them organically. Thus, the mall held mostly shopping and commercial areas, with administrative, political and educational offices at one end, and the cantonment at the other, with the residential areas of the Government House, Aitchison College, and the Government offices residence in between. This meant connections across these spaces were utilitarian and instrumental—reflecting an ordered colonial city façade. The exception was Anarkali, which retained elements of local color, spatially emptied into the walled city and was connected to it.

however unpredictable—enabled men of the “middling classes” to rise to prominent positions within the railroads, that were closed to them elsewhere in the colonial occupational schema. Racially, however, despite changes *within* the colonial administration and its ranks, Europeans continued to dominate in the upper echelons of the railway occupational hierarchy, both at work and in housing schema. As Kerr points out, the use of the term “railway *colony*” [my emphasis] to reference Mayo Garden was an attempt to maintain and underscore racial hierarchies, which were of considerable import to Europeans who served in the upper echelons of the railroad establishment, frequently for a finite and limited period.

While maintaining the racial and class hierarchies of colonial India, the railroads nonetheless enabled the production of a more layered and complex socio-spatial racial hierarchy in Lahore that stood out from the official bureaucratic-military complex.<sup>237</sup> In a classic colonial maneuver, the British in Lahore sought to create buffers between themselves and Indians. Anglo-Indians were employed in the railways as middle-tier employees in numbers that exceeded their proportionate representation overall.<sup>238</sup> Other minorities such as Parsis also tended to be over-represented relative to their numbers.<sup>239</sup> Many scholars have tended to take this hierarchy as a given and attributed to each of these groups the status of “collaborators” with the colonial order. As with my prior discussion of ordinary British military soldiers and their will to resist the colonial order, it might be worth re-examining interracial relations in colonial-railway Lahore instead of an a priori reading of cooptation by/of such publics. One way to do this is to turn to an examination of the

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<sup>237</sup> In this regard, railroads bore a greater resemblance to the educational establishment, especially in the later years of colonial rule in Lahore.

<sup>238</sup> There is statistical evidence that despite their disproportionately representation in relation to their actual numbers in the population, Anglo-Indian overall received low wages, and were discriminated against. I hope to add more detail on this in the finished monograph version of this study.

<sup>239</sup> Ilyas Chattha, “Economic Change and Community Relations in Lahore before Partition,” (Journal of Punjab Studies, (Vol. 19, No. 1: 2012) provides statistics regarding the economic status of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, thereby congealing the communal divisions that were a product of colonial enumeration. As a result, nuances and ambiguities within each community came to be erased: e.g., he makes no mention of the Anglo-Indian community, which if not sizeable, was of considerable import to the railway complex in Lahore.

relation between railways and the texture of everyday, individual lives—something the colonial archive seldom explicitly permits.<sup>240</sup>

Arnold, whose works I discussed earlier, speaks to additional implications of assuming a homogeneous white community, arguing that historiography making such claims is based on records largely confined to colonial ruling classes. In critiquing such scholarship, Arnold points out that

there was a glaring incongruity between the imperialist ideal of an ethnically discrete ruling class and the presence of large numbers of poor whites... Nearly half the European population could be called (as they often were at the time) poor whites. [He continues]: The principal section consisted of semi-skilled workers, intermediaries in government departments and private European enterprises, and those employed in some special service relationship with the dominant white strata of colonial society... it was, at least until the 1920s, poor Europeans who served as the link between European officers and low grade Indian subordinates in the Police, on the railways and public works, and in some jails, factories, and engineering works, or as domestic servants, nurses, midwives, clerks, teachers and shop assistants for European employers. ... below this stratum was the colonial bottom drawer of orphans, vagrants, prostitutes, convicts and lunatics.<sup>241</sup>

He further argues that, in the long nineteenth century (something that would marginally change in the twentieth), the middle ground was relatively small, as upward mobility for poor whites was severely restricted. Europeans who held wealth and power—despite looking down on less fortunate members of their own community, including the latter’s “liaisons with equally lowly European or Anglo-Indian (i.e. Eurasian) women”—at moments “valued the poor whites” services as intermediaries in the maintenance of colonial control, when ties of race were of greater

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<sup>240</sup> Ritika Prasad’s recent work is a concerted attempt in this direction. She stresses that “everyday life is indispensable to retrieving as historical and political subjects those who have been deemed anonymous, silent, and subordinate.” (*Tracks of Change: Railways and Everyday Life in Colonial India*, Cambridge University Press, 2015: 10.) She further argues that consumption is “simultaneously productive and transgressive, encompassing a range of tactics through which people actively inhabit (or consume) the abstractions that they are confronted with, whether technology or infrastructure”, *Ibid.*: 10.

<sup>241</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.*, 1979: 104-105

significance than divisions of class."<sup>242</sup> Arnold subsequently further complicates race and class relations as they played themselves out at multiple scales in the Lahore railway colony.<sup>243</sup>

Laura Bear devotes a chapter entitled "Traces of an Archive: Documents, Bodies, and Nations in Anglo-Indian Family Histories,"<sup>244</sup> to the Anglo-Indian community. Her work registers a concern for the epistemic violence wrought on those of mixed parentage and suggests that a re-reading and historicizing of archives is essential if we are to go beyond simplistic racial binaries.<sup>245</sup> I rely on both Arnold and Bear's insights to help frame and complicate my discussion of social hierarchies within the railroad complex of Lahore.<sup>246</sup>

Arnold's text speaks to vagrancy among poor whites as a response to intolerable conditions of work within the military,<sup>247</sup> and follows this up by examining lingering prejudices even at a time when the colonial state

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<sup>242</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.*, 1979: 105.

<sup>243</sup> Unlike members of the British colonial establishment, it was the missionaries who most directly attempted to "improve" the lot especially of the Anglo-Indian community, and of members of poorer communities. In the latter regard, Catholics in Lahore showed greater concern, while the American Presbyterians in Lahore were most concerned with those of the "middling" classes, both Indian and of mixed parentage. Missionary archives then add to our understanding of race, class and coloniality. Arnold, *Op. Cit.* writes that one important source of European vagrancy (despised by those at the apex of the colonial hierarchy) was the army, including desertion—which he cites as surprisingly common—"despite the severe penalties and the difficulties of evading detection in India": 117.

<sup>244</sup> Laura Bear, *Lines of the Nation: Indian Railway Workers, Bureaucracy, and the Intimate Historical Self*, Columbia University Press, 2007. See also her article, "Miscegenations of Modernity: Constructing European Respectability and Race in the Indian Railway Colony, 1857-1931," *Women's History Review*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1994: 531-548.

<sup>245</sup> See also Ann Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense*, Princeton University Press, 2009, for a close reading of a few cases of the historical constitution of race and racialized difference, and its reflection(s) in the colonial—and I would suggest also postcolonial—archive.

<sup>246</sup> Neither the archives nor railway archives enable a solid examination of figures with respect to the racial breakdown. This is partly, of course, due to the very undecidability of categorization of those of mixed parentage; the denial of "poor" whites was seen as a blight on the colonial establishment and its claims of superiority.

<sup>247</sup> This reaffirms my point in the first part of this paper that the military itself was fissured internally with respect to its European recruits, such that an assumption of unanimity and collective gain cannot be assumed. Moreover, when some discharged soldiers chose to remain in India rather than be sent home (D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.* 1979: 117), scholars read this as a result of their privileged position in India relative to home, while it could be read alternatively to indicate their growing affinity with Indians and Indian society. In other words, affect cannot be simply read as if existing apart from race, since race itself is a slippery socio-historical construct.

used race to further shore up its support. Kerr cites the Lahore Chronicle from the mid 1960s, which asked: “Can nothing be done to relieve the flood of European destitution which sweeps over and eddies about in Lahore?”<sup>248</sup> In more recent scholarship, this recognition of heterogeneity within the colonizing community crops up more frequently, especially in studies where race is foregrounded. Bear argues that domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians (for whom she interchangeably uses the term “Eurasian”) were separated from whites temporarily resident in India:

Miscegenation operated both literally and metaphorically to characterize the dangers that the Indian environment held for the European identity of the railways’ modernizing project and the railway employees who supervised it. The close attention paid by railway companies to their employees’ domestic habits and the behavior of women in the railway colonies reflected both an attempt to construct modernity as European and an anxiety about the possibility of European modernity “going native” in the hand of Indianized domiciled Europeans and Eurasians.<sup>249</sup>

As pointed out earlier, since laws establishing racial boundaries fluctuated across time and space, an unambiguous and ahistorical construction of racial difference flattens lived experience, especially for those in the domiciled European and Anglo-Indian community who did not fit into preconceived, everyday notions of what those differences meant. (Valerie Anderson’s work cited previously is relevant here.)<sup>250</sup> Since race as a category was itself fluid and in flux, actual practices of race at times were buttressed by the law; at others, they exceeded and/or escaped it, disrupting any sedimentation of self and other, especially among those who inhabited liminal racialized spaces. In my reading, racial anxiety—unlike other panics described earlier, for example, with respect to Russia’s claimed ambitions—was reflective of emergent norms that had not yet achieved hegemonic status. In fact, it was the *closeness* of the supposed

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<sup>248</sup> Ian J. Kerr, *The Punjab Province and the Lahore District, 1849-1872: A Case Study of British Colonial Rule and Social Change in India*, Volume I, University of Minnesota, PhD dissertation, 1975: 162-163.

<sup>249</sup> L. Bear, *Op. Cit.* 1994: 538. This was not unique to colonial India: The Spaniards adopted exactly the same attitude towards locally born “colons” [whites] who always carried the “taint” of miscegenation. Unlike domiciled British in India, however, it was these “colons” and their counterparts in North America who led their respective struggles for independence, which Benedict Anderson labels “creole” nationalism.

<sup>250</sup> V. Anderson, *Op. Cit.*, 2011.

racess—the Indian and the Anglo-Indian—that precipitated changes in nomenclature and the law that earlier constituted both those designated as “Eurasians” and domiciled British designated as “Anglo-Indian” as separate from (and by implication, not the equals of) “white” British (this latter category being limited to Europeans resident in India for temporary and limited periods). Particularly as the nationalist movement gathered steam, the official position shifted regarding the Anglo-Indian community in particular, a rubric now used to designate those who were born of British and Indian parentage. To whit: racial fault lines were neither constant nor pre-given.

The privileged position of Lahore’s European railway employees was made visible not only at work but also in the realm of spatial reproduction. A separate railway *colony*, Mayo Gardens, housed European officials of Lahore’s North Western State Railway, a space set apart from housing for both Indians and in the early years of the railway establishment, lower-echelon British and Anglo-Indian employees. Kerr argues that railways colonies such as Mayo Gardens, especially in the early years of British colonial rule, were “the only sustained example of colonization” in terms of a near virtual segregation except for domestic labor.<sup>251</sup> The fact that Mayo Gardens was restricted to European railroad officials reflects continued colonial anxieties over socio-sexual reproduction, the maintenance of racial boundaries, as well as class segregation. The railway colony served to establish not only class and racial separation, but also served as a sexual and physical threshold, barring racial “others” from European domestic space(s) while simultaneously keeping European women in their place, as cultural carriers of “home.” Drawing on Chatterjee’s analysis distinguishing public and private space as gendered difference, Bear emphasizes structural difference based in race and gendered domestic hierarchies. However, in so doing she understates class difference within the European community, which Kerr by contrast examines at greater length.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 2007: 85.

<sup>252</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1985; elsewhere Kerr writes, “The shortage of decent, low cost housing for those with smaller incomes was a specific issue upon which the resentment of the poorer Europeans often focused. The resentment... was shared by the rank-and-file of the British soldiery whose deplorable living conditions were criticized.” I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1975, 164. Kerr writes of the Anglo-Indians in Lahore: “The majority... were petty government employees although some were employed by the railway. In terms of hierarchy of status this group ranked almost at the bottom with only the destitute Europeans being lower.” *Op. Cit.*, 1975: 171.

Lower-echelon employees of the railroads in Lahore were housed closer to the railway workshops in Mughalpura, in a very different setting from their occupational “superiors”.<sup>253</sup> Anis ur Rahman affirms that

in railway colonies in Lahore, housing for different categories of employees was highly stratified and segregated. Officers were accommodated in “Mayo Gardens, which were comprised of big bungalows with spacious lawns around them. And they also established an officers’ club with flowing golf courses. Whereas residential accommodation for the foremen, chargemen, junior officials, and the labor force working in the railway workshops, was located in close proximity of railway workshops in Mughalpura, Lahore, and was comprised of a hierarchy of residential clusters ranging from smaller bungalows to row housing.<sup>254</sup>

Together, these two disparate housing arrangements are emblematic of the production of class and racial hierarchies—which remained an ongoing colonial preoccupation. Physical space both produced and reflected these concerns, and constituted an indelible fault-line marked not merely through naming and/or in representation, but also materially and spatially. Infrastructural objects, such as dwellings within the spaces of the railroad complex, similar to railroad gauges, assumed an agentic social and symbolic meaning, with consequential implications for the life worlds of those inhabiting these bifurcated physical spaces.

Anglo-Indians, employed at scales below European officers and alongside poorer whites, were—at one scale—privileged relative to other Indians. Yet, space served as a crucial feature in maintaining a *tripartite* rule of race, since the former’s loyalty as a liminal group was never considered assured. To prove their loyalty, *both* working-class Europeans and Anglo-Indians employed by the railways were required to enlist in “a militia force known as the ‘Railway Volunteers’—a military force from which Indians were deliberately excluded.”<sup>255</sup> Spatial segregation then went beyond the domestic sphere, and extended into areas *beyond* both home and work.

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<sup>253</sup> These included those in supervisory capacities such as foremen but also chargemen, and other lower tier officials, as well as laborers working in the railway workshops.

<sup>254</sup> Anis ur Rahmaan, *Evolution of Town Planning in Pakistan: With a Specific Reference to Punjab Province*, Bloomington: Xlibris, 2017. Accessed online through Google Books, page numbers not available.

<sup>255</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 2007: 89.

Part of the problem of colonial racial construction in Lahore was the vexed question of identity construction and that of identification, addressed earlier: who was *recognized* as white, Anglo-Indian, and “native”—and by whom? These were questions that remained unsettled and resembled religious identity and identifications, which operated in a similar vexed manner. Like the latter, despite the privileges accorded to those racialized as (even part) white, the threshold position was neither always comfortable nor secure. Later, as nationalist sentiment grew and fears of racial contamination grew more pronounced, Indians began to become competitors for middle-tier positions that were previously the exclusive reserve of some Anglo-Indians, even as subsequent colonial administrations began to express concern about the latter’s Indianization.<sup>256</sup>

This tripartite hierarchical schema within the railway establishment—both at work and in dwelling—resembled hierarchies in the colonial city overall, albeit in a more disorderly and potentially disruptive manner. And, as with the cantonments, this attempt at separation was never complete. This inability to successfully and fully alienate the middle and lower tiers of the colonial order from each other was structural, grounded in irresolvable contradictions. Within the colonial racial order, miscegenation as the product of labor in the form of domestic and social reproduction served to call into question the disciplinary project of colonial modernity and its race-class-gender schema—even if it did not always successfully undermine it.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> Laura Bears states that Anglo-Indians resisted attempts at their Europeanization especially when it meant sending their children to schools at hill stations where they would learn to develop British “habits.” Indian employees’ children were excluded from admission to these schools. In her text, Bears uses the term “Eurasian” throughout; I prefer the term “Anglo-Indian” instead, albeit mindful of both Bear and Anderson’s insistence and reasons for using the former. I recognize that these terms historically had different meanings and applied to different publics, something that itself needs to be attended to and understood: (L. Bear. Op. Cit.: 542–543.) She goes on to talk about how Indian nationalists, including Gandhi used Anglo-Indian-ness as a foil against which to define what it meant to be “authentically” Indian.

<sup>257</sup> Bears argues that “Domiciled Europeans and Eurasians occupied a space between the boundary lines that marked Europe and Indian; a marginal sphere formed by the construction of the boundaries themselves. ... In the heterotopia of the railway colony domestic practices could simultaneously secure and subvert the public boundaries between national and racial identities...Indian political organizations’ challenges to the employment of domiciled Europeans and Eurasians adopted the colonial rhetoric of race, tradition, and respectability and therefore did not move beyond the cartographies of identity produced in the railway colony.” (Op. Cit., 1994: 544.)



The underpinnings of this race-class-gender schema ultimately resided in labor and power differentiations, with the railways as productive contributors to both. Power, in turn, rested on a foundation of coercive power combined with material and symbolic means: being forced to join the Railway “Volunteer” Army allowed for recognition of one’s privileged status, but at the same time it confirmed one’s difference from those whites of whom such conscription was neither demanded nor expected. Race privilege for (some) Europeans and the Anglo-Indians, then, was never entirely positive.

The labor question, crucial to the colonial hierarchical schema, is the element to which I now (re)turn as one of the pivotal nodes underpinning British power in Lahore. I will conclude this discussion on railroads by turning away from workers for a moment to briefly address the passengers who, along with the railway workers, made the railroads viable and profitable.

### *viii. The Labor Question*

Workers in Lahore’s railway complex came from all over India. While within the city itself, migration was frequently undertaken by men alone, numerous sources report that those who worked for the railways outside Lahore came to work as families, i.e., men, women, and children all worked on the railroads.<sup>258</sup> Payment, however, was made to male heads of households. Furthermore, heavier work was done by men rather than women. Much of this work was manual in nature.<sup>259</sup> What is striking about the railway workers is that the railways brought together workers from diverse parts of the country, thus adding to the sense of a collective space that both incited nationalist sentiment, but also produced class solidarity. European workers—albeit in far smaller numbers—also labored on the railroads as drivers, or engine men, or other supposedly less “heavy” and less dangerous tasks. The very nature of the labor process and its organization produced contradictory tendencies within railway labor, and came to be reflected in a diversity of political practices.

At the lower echelons, Lahore’s railway workshop workers were mostly Indian. While the officials were all Europeans (until close to

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<sup>258</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1995.

<sup>259</sup> The gendered aspect of labor migration by those who worked on the railways requires further examination with respect to labor within Lahore itself.

decolonization), supervisory positions such as those of foremen were frequently filled either by Europeans of less privileged status or by Anglo-Indians—and as noted previously—to create a wedge between the latter and the Indian workers whom they supervised. However, not only were questions of European-ness not always resolved, but old prejudices against poor whites also resurfaced. While initially it was taken for granted that skilled railway labor would either be imported or recruited from among British soldiers, as recognition dawned that such labor cost significantly more than Indians, lower-echelon British workers became an object of “major complaint[s].”<sup>260</sup> While the government referred to climatic conditions as problems for European railroad labor unused to heat, more often,

the argument was less that European subordinates were ill suited to the climate than that they were unreliable and irresponsible. ... Railway companies received many complaints about drivers and guards being drunk on duty, ignoring signals, failing to make scheduled stops, causing accidents through carelessness, pilfering goods... and assaulting or abusing Indian passengers and railwaymen. The companies found that legal proceedings... foundered on the reluctance of European juries to find their fellow countrymen guilty of such offences... in early 1860s... [one] company’s managing agent lamented the lack of “proper order and discipline” among European subordinates.<sup>261</sup>

Such rhetoric demonstrates both a bias against a particular class of European workers, unwilling to cede to bourgeois norms of respectability and docility, while at the same time exhibiting a reluctance to legally discipline one’s racial and national compatriots. Nor were colonial aspirations to separate non-Europeans from Europeans necessarily coherent or successful in ways detailed out previously.

The contradictory impulses at work in (re)producing the colonial order; the accidents and bad faith of companies whereby workers went unpaid for extended periods; the engineering failures and management scandals that rocked the corridors of railway administration, together underscore technology transfer as a complex process, with a lived reality at odds with

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<sup>260</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.* January 1983: 149–150 discusses this at some length.

<sup>261</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.* 1983: 149. Emphasis mine.

its representation.<sup>262</sup> Above all, the railroads functioned as Lahore's premier industrial space and fostered labor struggles different from those that occurred in white-collar government offices. The industrial and collective nature of their employment, as well as the mobility of railroad workers meant their grievances traveled, unconfined to a specific locale. Taken together, these conditions of work contributed to protests, strikes and acts of resistance by railroad workers both European and Indian, and remained a constant concern for the railroad authorities and the GOI.<sup>263</sup>

In an article entitled "Working Class Protest in 19th Century India: Example of Railway Workers,"<sup>264</sup> Kerr argues for both an expansive view of unionization as well as labor resistance, in effect re-envisioning labor and organizing as historically dynamic processes, rather than a predefined "object." In Lahore, the grounds for railway workers' protest and activism lay in the density of labor in the railways, unlike other work sites in Lahore at the time. From 1850 to 1940—a period that essentially overlaps with most of the British period in Lahore—the railroads employed double the labor than all other single branches of modern Indian industry. The magnitude of labor employed in Lahore's workshops and overall railroad sector rose exponentially:

Permanent railroad employees numbered 69,233 in 1870; 437,535 in 1905. Among the latter, 6,320 were Europeans [almost all British] and 8,565 (2 percent) were Anglo-Indians. The overwhelming majority, 422,650 or 96.6 percent, were Indian.<sup>265</sup>

Through their physical proximity to each other, railway workers in Lahore, by virtue of laboring in large workshops in one compound, achieved a density of labor that was unlike employment in most other sectors of the city's economy.<sup>266</sup> Equally as significant, as Kerr points out,

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<sup>262</sup> Report of the Royal Commission on Labor in India, Lahore: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1931; Railway Accidents. Reports by the Government Inspectors of Railways of Inquiries into Accidents. Frequent yearly reports. Gazetteers of the Lahore District also provide relevant information, albeit in a more standardized format.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*; See also L. Bear, *Op. Cit.*, 1994; I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 2007; I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1995.

<sup>264</sup> Ian J. Kerr, "Working Class Protest in 19th Century India: Example of Railway Workers," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Jan. 26, 1985: PE34-PE40.

<sup>265</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 2007: 81–82. He goes on to state that the two percent figure for Anglo-Indian labor in the railways was double their number in the population as a whole.

<sup>266</sup> Railways also hinged on labor employment to construct the railroad lines, build bridges, and tunnels. Together the amount of labor employed in this one sector of the economy was

roughly 50 percent of all Anglo-Indians either depended directly on railroad employment or were dependents of a railway employee. Furthermore, while Indians constituted the bulk of railway employees,

well paid managerial level positions—were held disproportionately by Europeans and Anglo-Indians, a disproportionate presence deeply evident in the period 1870–1905 and directly attributable to the fact that India’s railroads were colonial railroads serving colonial purposes.<sup>267</sup>

Traffic and telegraph employees combined with the shops were close to 50 percent of all railroad employees, and unsurprisingly “Europeans and Anglo-Indians were over-represented...: 6.4 percent of traffic and telegraph; 6.7 percent of workshops.”<sup>268</sup> Arnold points out that, despite their preferential recruitment in higher-salaried positions, “in the first six months of 1870 alone, the railways lost 21 percent of their European employees many of them drivers, guards, and mechanics.”<sup>269</sup> Those dismissed joined the wandering proletariat, which led the colonial government to intervene, sending them home at official expense. The latter policy Arnold asserts was meant “to serve the same ends of keeping European “loafers” out of India and freeing the elite from the embarrassment of their presence.”<sup>270</sup> Despite such misgivings, while “criticism of European laxity and irresponsibility might persist... it was more than outweighed by doubts about the ability of Indians to replace white workers.”<sup>271</sup> This racial prejudice was reflected in a February 1890 resolution, which merely asked that “drivers should be supplemented by ‘carefully’ selected and trained Indians, not altogether replaced by them.”<sup>272</sup>

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unmatched anywhere else, even in the plantations of the Northeast and Bengal. Protests, strikes and even riots were not unheard of in this regard.

<sup>267</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.* 2007: 82. See also Table 4.1, page 83, for figures on the railroad workforce by category and parentage. The break down in categories he provides is as follows: General Administration, Traffic and Telegraph, Engineering, Locomotive and Carriage shops. Engineering employed relatively small numbers of Europeans, and was the sector with the roughest manual labor. The parentage categories used are European, Anglo-Indian and Indian, and give us no basis for assignment of individuals to the first two categories. Kerr got this data from the 1890–91 Parliamentary Papers.

<sup>268</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 2007: 84.

<sup>269</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.*, 1983: 150.

<sup>270</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.*, 1983: 150.

<sup>271</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.*, 1983: 150.

<sup>272</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.*, 1983: 151.

Even as racially mixed and European employees declined proportionately between 1881 and 1939, their “actual number... increase(d) slightly until the First World War” and then fell “gradually at first, more rapidly from the late 1930s.”<sup>273</sup> However, Europeans and Anglo-Indians (“Eurasians” in Arnold’s designation) earned between Rs140 and 220 per month, whereas Indians with the same jobs and training were paid between Rs34 to 62. Privileges accorded to both groups relative to Indians went beyond salary and extended to “promotion prospects, housing, recreation facilities, and education for their children.”<sup>274</sup> Europeans and Anglo-Indians were not the only ones who received preferential treatment: Kerr points out that some “castes and communities turned particular railroad occupations into special preserves” and came to Curzon’s attention after a serious strike by one such group of Brahmans in the late 1890s.<sup>275</sup> This turn to caste organizing as a form of solidarity to strike a better bargain at work, can be read as a hardening of religious lines through occupational patronage—a sign of corporate, caste-based, closed-shop organizing—while at the same time operating as a form of resistance to subvert preferential treatment for European employees within the railroad system.

Railway workshops were set up in Lahore in the early 1860s, and grew with the expansion of the railroad system in Lahore and with the city’s increased railway connectivity regionally.<sup>276</sup> However, the Lahore workshops alone did not encompass the totality of railway workers in the city: the two railway stations, the technical lower-echelon employees and those who serviced the offices and railway company homes, together added up to a sizeable community. Insofar as the bulk of these employees lived in closely proximate spaces—set apart from their bosses—this added to the potential for a heightened sense of camaraderie beyond the spaces of work. Kerr quotes an account of Lahore shops from the 1870s:

The tourist or stranger who has only seen the natives in passing through the bazaars may here see them under a new aspect, busily employed in the care of huge machines which require constant vigilance and intelligent adjustment, *working with an accuracy*

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<sup>273</sup> D. Arnold, Op. Cit., 1983: 151.

<sup>274</sup> D. Arnold, Op. Cit., 1983: 151.

<sup>275</sup> I. J. Kerr, Op. Cit., 2007: 83.

<sup>276</sup> I. J. Kerr, Op. Cit., 2007: 84–85.

*formerly undreamed of, and handling heavy weights with something approaching the muscular vigour of the Englishman.*<sup>277</sup>

As with other ideologically driven claims, this congratulatory vision is negated by various forms of protests and resistance by railroad workers in response to the treatment meted out to them. Such activity took a variety of forms, ranging from direct action, protests, riots, destruction of machines, and petitions, to unionization and organized strikes. In his article on “Working Class Protest,” Kerr argues that European railway workers were the vanguard of the drive towards unionization:

[T]he British railway workers, the managerial levels excluded, provided the cutting edge of union-type activity on the railways and that it was partially emulation of their often successful efforts that led to subsequent action among the Indian workers.<sup>278</sup>

He ascribes such actions on the part of these British workers to their “alien” status in India, and their subsequent alienation from the upper echelons of European society and from Indians; secondly, he suggests that among the steady stream of fresh recruits from Britain were those who had often cut their teeth on union activity prior to their arrival in India. He lists the conditions of work in India as a secondary factor. Arnold, however, argues to the contrary:

The European and Eurasian railwaymen were able to retain their superior position not through any militancy and organization of their own... A brief flirtation with the Indian National Congress in the late 1880s, the formation of an Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants formed in 1897 or 1898, which was probably never much more than a friendly society, a few work stoppages and petitions—these appeared as the sum of the organizational attainment of the European and Eurasian subordinated.<sup>279</sup>

Despite this fundamental difference between Arnold and Kerr on the diffusion of union activity from British workers to Indians, the fact that lower-echelon British and Anglo-Indian railway workers occupied racially ambivalent positions with respect to their treatment by those in charge,

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<sup>277</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 2007: 85. My emphasis.

<sup>278</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1985: PE-37.

<sup>279</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.* 1983: 151.

makes believable Kerr's contention that "large scale protest by Indian workers was not supported by their European and Eurasian co-workers."<sup>280</sup> This assertion is further supported by records indicating that the policy to privilege European and workers of mixed parentage as a labor aristocracy did thwart greater solidarity among railway workers across the color line.<sup>281</sup> Kerr tells us that, while the bulk of cases of collective action before the "late 1890s involved Europeans and Eurasians with whom, on occasion, Indians joined,"<sup>282</sup> the inverse was seldom the case.<sup>283</sup>

Causes of labor unrest in Lahore, as elsewhere, both secondary and colonial sources suggest were varied—from low wages to issues concerning abuse of authority and grievances regarding the labor process. Nor were any of these specific issues exclusive to one side of the racial divide, given that lower-class Europeans, Anglo-Indian, and Indian workers were all impacted by their employers' notion of their own bottom line. Examples of worker unrest among each group varied depending on the historical moment and their particular grievances. Thus, in March 1895, workers in Lahore employed in

the iron moulders shop of the Northwestern railway struck when they were put on piece work. When the strikers were dismissed the workers on most of the other shops also went out on strike. At the height of the strike 1800 men were off work and violence ensued as the strikers assaulted those who continued to go to work.<sup>284</sup>

Evidence bears out that both cooptation and resistance to the colonial order marked the railway workers' reactions to their labor conditions and

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<sup>280</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1985: 37.

<sup>281</sup> D. Arnold, *Op. Cit.*, 151. Despite the cooptation of a segment of the European and Anglo Indian workers, they nevertheless resisted their own labor conditions by resorting to a variety of strategies, some organized and others more in the form of everyday resistance. The militancy of Lahore's railway workshop workers caused such grave concern to their British employers such that they created a counter-union to serve as a foil to the more militant workers, both European, Anglo Indian and Indians. This company union, as I would label it, was formally named *North Western Railway Recognised Union*, and sought to align worker and management interests in a manner that would benefit the company over the workers, and depoliticize the latter. While it did succeed in dividing the workers, it did not form an effective counter force despite management handouts and benefits.

<sup>282</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1985: 37.

<sup>283</sup> More primary research on labor unrest is needed to resolve some of the ambiguities and contradictions contained in the sources cited in this section.

<sup>284</sup> I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1985: 38.

work relations. Undoubtedly not only race but also communal differences came into play, but nonetheless railway workers in Lahore were important to carving out a form of politics of dissent that went beyond caste, kin, and place identification. Worth noting is one such incident reported in *The Labor Monthly* of August 1925.<sup>285</sup> While its proximate cause was the firing of a member of the Railway Union at the railway sheds in Rawalpindi, the unrest spread to Lahore. The Railway Agent's refusal to entertain the workers' objections that were presented to him by the North Western Railway Union, led line workers outside Rawalpindi to come out in support of the striking workers in that city. The anonymous writer of this piece tells us that, when "offers by the Union to open negotiations with the Railway Management were repulsed, orders for a general strike were issued."<sup>286</sup> The appeal by the striking workers (who included a European engine driver) to European and Anglo-Indian workers to support their efforts was, however, rejected in the main by these two groups. One particular case to the contrary is cited where a European worker was dismissed for getting involved. This incident is evidence of striking workers' attempts to cross racial lines, reminding us that crossing of "Imperial Fault Lines" internal to the British in India<sup>287</sup> was attempted, even as it reaffirms its opposite, i.e., the inability of the numerous British railway workers to align themselves with their Indian counterparts. It was with the deepening of the nationalist movement, then, that more members of the Anglo-Indian community in particular shifted their allegiances. But that is a story that remains to be told another time.

#### ix. *Railroad Passengers: Choice, Necessity, Modernity*

That Indians took to the railroads in large numbers is beyond doubt. That this mode of transportation radically impacted their lives and world view at multiple scales is similarly indisputable. Earlier, I critiqued Sharma's evocation of the Indian public's "choice" as a defining component of railroad travel. I did so in the context of the larger changes animating long-distance migration in search of work. While in that earlier section I refused marketized choice as a key determinant of railroad travel, here, I situate

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<sup>285</sup> Anonymous, "India: North West Railway Strike" *The Labour Monthly*, Vol. 7, August 1925, No.8: 504-505. Available online at: [https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sections/britain/periodicals/labour\\_monthly/1925/08/india.htm](https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sections/britain/periodicals/labour_monthly/1925/08/india.htm). Last accessed on July 11, 2018.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>287</sup> Jeffrey Cox, *Imperial Fault Lines: Christianity and Colonial Power in India, 1818-1940*, Stanford University Press, 2002.



railroad travel as a *sign* of modernity but locating this within a larger matrix of structural transformation.

Historical accounts of the relation between Indians and their ridership have tended to focus on their mesmerization with this new mode of transportation and its production of modern bodies, whereby Indians are presented as awed by the wonders of colonial technology and the world it helped produce. But such interpretations construct modernity as an object rather than a relation. While there can be no question that the arrival of these new machines displaced prior mobilities at a speed that was breathtaking, for those employed by the railroads, this mystique was undercut by the conditions of labor and laboring on the railroads. That is, railroads, for the workers employed to work there, did not exude “magic”: they were the product of their sweat and toil, not an abstraction. Detaching railroad technology from the context and relations within which it acquired meaning, is to ascribe it an aura that resembles commodity fetishism writ large. While undoubtedly—as was acknowledged much earlier—the railroads altered human perception and relations, they did so for particular ‘publics’, in particular contexts. This recognition allows me to emphasize once again the relevance of technoscapes, i.e., that objects and forms matter—but also to acknowledge that they do so in specific socio-historical contexts. Seen thus, the choice of railroad travel was historically contingent and not freely made, nor was the perceptual shift it produced managed or orchestrated intentionally by those responsible for the technology’s diffusion. To properly situate the “choice” to travel by the railway system, it is essential to situate it within a social history of the railways and its “split” publics. Devoid of such understanding, we are left reaffirming what McClintock labels “panoptic time and anachronistic space,” a world constituted in and through a linear notion of time/space. In emphasizing the materiality of railway travel, it is also important to acknowledge that the railroads came to both constitute and represent modernity for segments of the British and Indian publics. I have addressed divergence and multiplicity in our “ways of seeing” throughout this piece, arguing that these ways are never settled nor homogeneous, and need to be viewed as an ongoing enterprise. In the next and final section, I place matters of representation at the very core of my analysis.

## (Re)Turn to Representation

### I. *Representation, Memory, and History*

I have argued in this text that our modes of apprehension determine what we see and that which remains invisible. Nor can our ways of seeing and knowing be dissociated from the conditions of their emergence, or be read off mechanically from predetermined ascriptions of class, race, gender, national origin. I have argued further that space and history together produce our “structures of feeling,” which are neither idiosyncratic nor determined in advance. In the latter respect, I demonstrate that colonial production(s) and relations have erroneously been ascribed a clarity and homogeneity that *never existed* at the moment of their coming-into-being. In this context, I have emphasized the significance of representation(s)—by colonial actors and their interlocutors, historical and contemporary, and provided examples, drawing on primary *and* secondary sources—subjecting them to a rereading against, along, and through my archive’s grain.<sup>288</sup>

I have also demonstrated that colonial representations were directed at different publics at different moments in the history of the British in Lahore and India.<sup>289</sup> For example, when, during the hearings on the 1919 Martial Law in Lahore, Lt Col. Johnson pointedly referred to the need to protect the Gymkhana Club where British women were present, he was relying on a shared fear regarding potential violation of colonial women by “savage” Indians. Such representations were designed not for Indians, but for the colonial public, and by extension for those back in Britain. Such sentiments were further inflamed by the local colonial newspaper, The Civil and Military Gazette, in a 13 April 1919 notice:

It is very desirable that all European *women and children* should, without delay, leave Lahore and go to the Hills. If sufficient passengers desire to travel by special trains, these will be run. Special protection will be provided for these trains.<sup>290</sup>

In contrast to such representations—both public in nature *and* directed at a British public—Henry Hardinge, writing *privately* to his stepson Walter,

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<sup>288</sup> With thanks to A. Stoler, Op. Cit., 2009.

<sup>289</sup> This applies to primary and secondary sources, as well as those public or private.

<sup>290</sup> My emphasis. This gendered protectiveness remains an alibi for patriarchy and violence.

provides a critical and distinct sensibility regarding British presence and authority in India:

I do not anticipate milty. operations in the Punjaab altho' in India no man can say what a month may produce. ...

The opinion of the Peel govt. & that of the British legislature in coming to a judgement will, I have no doubt, be a just one. I am in my conscience satisfied *I have acted right & I care little for Indian opinions* because they are to a certain degree influenced by personal considerations—that is a constant desire to annex territory & increase offices.<sup>291</sup>

The first Hardinge quote suggests a lack of certainty about where things are headed and what fate awaits the British, a sentiment that took on a very different representation after the annexation had actually occurred. In the second, Hardinge (as someone close to Peel) sets up a clear distinction between the government at home and those in charge in India, one that is unfavorable to the latter. Together, these passages illustrate colonial fissures, difference in representations, its concerns and emphases, which cannot be understand without attentiveness to periodization and forms of address. Throughout this text, I have therefore sought to problematize our modes of apprehension and their relation to given investments in particular projects, colonial, anti-colonial, and postcolonial.

At the outset, I demarcated three distinct moments appertaining to colonial Lahore: the military-strategic, the economic, and the representational. This, I argued, was an artefact highlighting dominant hegemonies at distinct moments in Lahore's colonial history. I also demonstrated how concerns of/with representation accompanied both the military/geostrategic and economic moments with respect to the colonial state formation in/of Lahore. It is only at a much later moment in the colonial period—the timing of which itself was also unpredictable at *the time* since it was dependent on past practices and attendant changes both in India and Britain—that representations of colonial Lahore assume hegemony and a distinctive tenor. It is at this late(r) date in Lahore's colonization that legacy concerns, constant as a latent concern of empire, come to dominate over other representational forms. Such later

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<sup>291</sup> B. W. Singh, ed., *Op. Cit.*, 1986: 36; Letter to Walter, n.d.; B. W. Singh, *Op. Cit.*, Letter to Walter, March 4, 1846: 157. My emphasis.

representations veer off from earlier civilizational claims based on cultural, economic, and institutional grounds, and were invariably materially grounded even when asserting moral and other ideational claims. Increasingly, representational practices in Lahore at the end of empire were neither designed for, nor do they address, a specific public/audience in order to produce, or nudge it towards, a particular affect. Instead, they made their claims, and came to rest solely on the surface, *on the appearance of things*, i.e., their legibility. Their concern increasingly was to make claims for posterity, thus were no longer mired in any particular, concrete material objective. I suggest that such disinterested representations, directed at legacy building, mirror the anxiety of empire, expressive of its combined confidence *and* increasing sense of fragility about colonial futures. It is only at the end of empire then, that we witness a heightened preoccupation in colonial Lahore with the production of memory and history in a new and distinctive register.

To tease out this shift in representation(s), I draw on two archives: Reports of the Punjab Horticultural Society, and a close reading of a text by an ostensible critic of empire, William Digby, writing in the early 1900s whom I drew upon even earlier.<sup>292</sup> The Horticultural Society Reports document the shift to the surface of space.<sup>293</sup> In so doing, they reveal the increasing preoccupation with recognition and remembrance by inchoate, indecipherable, unidentified beings. In contrast, Digby's text, which has a distinct address and relies on material considerations/facts to make its claims, is nonetheless equally preoccupied with legacy questions, and how the British (empire) in India will be remembered. While Digby's text comes prior to the shift in the Agri-Horticultural Society representations, it is nonetheless prescient regarding longer-term meanings ascribed to the colonial order, even though its immediate objective is a political one—engaged in debates within the metropole and/in its relation to India. Unlike the Agri-Horticultural Society representations, Digby raises issues that address the British political-institutional apparatus and its internal conflicts. Nonetheless, his

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<sup>292</sup> W. Digby, *Op. Cit.* 1901.

<sup>293</sup> While urban policy can also be seen as grounded on the surface, on appearance, it has institutional implications that resonate far beyond the surface of its related objects (architecture, infrastructure, technologies etc.), since each of these is tied to concrete projects that have extractive significance in terms of institutionalizing colonial order. The same can be said for education, the law, and other features of the colonial order and their representation(s).

criticisms are designed to secure a positive image for Britain vis-à-vis its legacy in India.

## **II. Reading the Agri-Horticultural Reports**

Established in 1851 in Lahore, very soon after the city's annexation in 1849, the Agri-Horticultural Society of Punjab serves as a forerunner of two transformations in colonial Lahore: first, a shift from the military to economic moment in the city; and second, a later shift from the economic to representational concerns above all. These shifts and concerns are evident from a reading of the reports of this society that, alongside several secondary sources, inform this discussion.<sup>294</sup>

Colonial military campaigns in Punjab and the northern areas were seen to have depleted the colonial state's economic reserves. Even with the annexation of Lahore, military concerns lingered until the end of the Afghan wars. At the same time, precisely because of the wars of annexation as well as continued border militarization, economic resources were at a premium and an urgent concern in Lahore. One of the early initiatives taken to ameliorate the situation without further burdening Punjab government post-annexation, was the formation of the Punjab Agri-Horticultural Society in Lahore. In this association, the British welded together public and private interests in a manner similar to that adopted for constructing the railroads, albeit with little cost to the Punjab government.<sup>295</sup> And not unlike the railroads, at a later date the Punjab government adopted a more central role in the running of the Society, which subsequently provoked shifts in its mandate.

The Punjab Agri-Horticultural Society was made up almost entirely of British members. Initially, their efforts focused on experiments designed to engineer agri-species that could generate profits and be of commercial

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<sup>294</sup> These sources are: Jagjeet Lally, "Trial, Error and Economic Development in Colonial Punjab: the Agri-Horticultural Society, the State and Sericulture Experiments, c. 1840-70," *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 52, 1, 2015: 1-27; Ian J. Kerr, "The Agri-Horticultural Society of the Punjab, 1851-1871" in Harbans Singh and N. Gerald Barrier, eds., *Punjab Past and Present: Essays in Honor of Dr. Ganda Singh*, New Delhi: 1976: 252-273; Nida Rehman, "Description, Display and Distribution: Cultivating a Garden Identity in Late Nineteenth-century Lahore," *Studies in the History of Gardens & Designed Landscapes: An International Quarterly*, Published online 27 Jan. 2014; Jyoti Pandey Sharma, "Spatialising Leisure: Colonial Punjab's Public Parks as a Paradigm of Modernity," in *Tekton*, Vol. 1, Issue 1, September 2014: 14-30.

<sup>295</sup> For details on this welding together see I. J. Kerr, *Op. Cit.*, 1976; and J. Lally, *Op. Cit.*, 2015.

value. Jagjeet Lally argues the Society's public-private partnership, accompanied by a policy emphasis on *sericulture* experiments in the Punjab, was the product of post-annexation, economic necessity.<sup>296</sup> Like Lally, I too find the early period of Lahore's colonial history, and its expression in and through the Punjab Agri-Horticultural Society, to be exceedingly instructive in terms of colonial undecidability about its economic objectives in Lahore and the Punjab region, expressed in non-linear, contingent, and heterogeneous developmental strategy. Furthermore, the Society and the gardens it spawned in Lahore are instructive in that they made visible—much earlier than elsewhere—concerns regarding legacy and colonial memory production.

As mentioned above, the impulse behind the Agri-Horticultural Society was to experiment with plants, trees, and *sericulture*, all in order to produce commercial varieties that could generate revenues for the economically strapped colonial Punjab state. To undertake this mission, eventually a new space was allotted to the Society, which came to be known as the "Lawrence Gardens."<sup>297</sup> It is instructive that the secondary sources listed in the note at the onset of this sub-section emphasize distinct aspects of both the Society and the space(s) it occupied, and reflect the disciplinary biases of their different authors as well as the multiple objectives attached to the Gardens themselves.

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<sup>296</sup> Citing Tan Tai Yong and Imran Ali, Lally argues that assuming a seamless perspective on the colonial path to development in Lahore and the Punjab, "it is easy to trace the origins of the garrison state and the hydraulic society to the first few decades of colonial rule in the province and to thus treat these decades as a sort of prelude or incubating period before the 1880 watershed. In spite of the lure of this interpretation, there was neither a single, unbroken, unerring course of actions taken by agents, nor were policy decisions taken as part of a well-developed vision of Punjab's role within British India and the British empire from the time of annexation. To argue [thus] would be to ignore the role that trial and error, as well as existing precedents, played in the early years of colonial rule in the making of modern Punjab." Jagjeet Lally, *Op. Cit.*, 2015: 2. Lally states further, "... the 1840s to 19870s are the "lost decades" in the history of Punjab so that alternative, aborted paths of development remain obscured from view. ... This article examines the role of economic policy failure in altering the future envisioned for the province and, more broadly, how the colonial state's parsimony and poor judgement of schemes worth of subsidy or support—as much as its non-interventionism, on the one hand, or its interventionist, social and economic engineering projects such as the construction of the canal colonies, on the other—contributed to the sluggish pace of development in British India." (J. Lally, *Op. Cit.*, 2015: 2–3.

<sup>297</sup> It is noteworthy that the Horticultural Society was set up prior to the building of either Lawrence Hall (1861) or Montgomery Hall (1866)

A perusal of both the Society's reports and published accounts in the Lahore Chronicle makes clear that, while its initial and primary mission was economic, this was a concern wedded to the remaking of Lahore as a colonial city.<sup>298</sup> Nida Rehman writes:

The AHSP [her acronym for the Society] gardens reflect an ambivalence of members and commentators towards the relationship between utility, on the one hand, and aesthetics, on the other. In the early days of the society's formation, a regard for aesthetic value was not considered a distraction from its technical function... However, in the annual meeting of the society in 1864, the AHSP membership agreed that the "propriety of maintaining an ornamental garden for the recreation of the residents of Lahore," would contradict, in "principle," the "legitimate business" of the society.<sup>299</sup>

The building of the Lawrence and Montgomery Halls certainly impacted the economic-aesthetic dynamic, as the proximity of these two buildings meant traffic into and through the Gardens by individuals other than the Society's members and employees. However, their proximity and traffic allowed for heightened publicity and awareness of new forms of arboriculture. To the extent that both halls had strictures disallowing membership to Indians, aesthetics were marked as a racialized spatiality. Struggles over access rather than aesthetics dominated, leading eventually to the formation of the Cosmopolitan Club, a social space for Indians of the emergent middling classes otherwise barred from the segregated British clubs within the Lawrence Gardens area.

Disciplinary readings of the spaces of the Society aside,<sup>300</sup> a close reading of its reports is revealing, not in terms of its successes and failures, but in terms of its own shift in emphasis. The 1881–82 report states:

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<sup>298</sup> The Lawrence Gardens were center-stage in "modern" Lahore, located close to the Government House on the Mall. As mentioned in the previous note, the gardens occupied a space adjacent to the two halls mentioned above. For a more detailed discussion of the space see N. Rehman, *Op. Cit.*, 2014.

<sup>299</sup> N. Rehman, *Op. Cit.*, 2014: 6–8.

<sup>300</sup> I am not in any deep disagreement with the writers cited but make a different point, which is possible from vantage point that is neither aesthetic nor economic but socio-historical.

Many of the low-lying areas of the gardens were completely inundated for several days after the first heavy rain on 9<sup>th</sup> July 1881. ...

In 1976 the gardens suffered in a similar manner from being inundated, and the same is likely to occur again at any time after a more than usually heavy fall of rain... after which... besides a great loss of plants, the gardens were for several days *in a deplorable state*, necessitating employment of extra *labour for clearing and repairing the roads*.<sup>301</sup>

The Annual Report for the year ending 1892–93 also foregrounds economic factors, commenting on the rise in income from the sale of produce and reporting on official concerns:

The Lt. Governor approves the intention... to enlarge the scope of the agricultural work of the Garden. He considers that in carrying out this work as much space as possible should be given to species as appear likely to be adopted by peasant farmers of the Punjab. Of the crops to which you refer, Palestine wheat, huskless barleys, and some varieties of maize, seem to fulfill that condition best.<sup>302</sup>

It is not until the Report of 1896 that renovations designed for purposes that are non-agricultural are first emphasized. These include mention not only of roads, but specifically recreational facilities, including the extension of the cricket field, lawn tennis grounds and the bandstand.<sup>303</sup> While these constitute a departure from the earlier emphasis on agricultural innovation and related commercial concerns, these changes nonetheless fit within a larger colonial sensibility and anxiety over healthy bodies. Subsequent years show a continued concern with upkeep of current buildings, designed to serve the Garden's agri-business objectives.

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<sup>301</sup> Report on the Working and Condition of the Punjab Agri-Horticultural Society Garden in Lahore, for the Year 1881–1882: 1. My emphasis, noting cost as a primary concern.

<sup>302</sup> Annual Report for the Government Agri-Horticultural Garden Lahore for the Year Ending 1892–93.

<sup>303</sup> Annual Report for the Government Agri-Horticultural Garden Lahore for the Year Ending 1896. Sports were a major colonial pre-occupation with respect to disciplining bodies and reflected the preoccupation with physique, masculinity and power. It is not a coincidence that Lord Baden-Powell, one of the architects of the Boy Scouts, was also at one point the Honorary Secretary of the Society.



However, by 1907, an increasing preoccupation with Lawrence Garden's appearance rather than its utility becomes increasingly apparent:

Those plots skirting the new circular drive, which in 1905–6 were given over to vegetables and roughly planted orchards, have been converted into one extended series of laws, with ornamental trees suitably placed. Numerous convenient paths which lead more directly from the gardens to surrounding public roads have been opened out. Ornamental arches have been erected at these minor entrances. The eight main entrances for the gardens have been named on marble... as follows: Victoria Gate, Government House Gate, Lawrence Gate, Club gate, Golf gate, Montgomery gate, Rivaz gate, West gate.<sup>304</sup>

Interestingly this explicit attentiveness to the appearance of things is followed in the subsequent year by a new facelift for the Annual Report itself. This is accompanied by an acknowledgement that "the gardens are becoming a more popular resort for students..."<sup>305</sup>

By 1914–15, the concern with beautification becomes even more explicit. In the preamble to the report, the Revenue Secretary states:

The Lieutenant-Governor trusts that the clearing out of undesirable varieties. ... and the opening up of vistas through the gardens will be proceeded with. He would also like to see the various approaches from the Mall, some of which now become quagmires in the rains, slightly raised and remetalled. He understands that the question of moving the green house from its present site in front of Montgomery Hall is under consideration. It is quite out of keeping with the present surroundings. The alterations carried out in recent years have *done much to improve and beautify the gardens*, and it has been to the great satisfaction of the Lieutenant-Governor to hear from many visitors to Lahore... that they consider the Lahore Agri-Horticultural Gardens second to none in India.

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<sup>304</sup> Annual Report for the Government Agri-Horticultural Garden Lahore for the Year Ending 1907.

<sup>305</sup> Annual Report for the Government Agri-Horticultural Garden Lahore for the Year Ending, 1912–13.

It is hoped that the committee will without delay take up the question of providing more benches and seats for the use not only of members of the Gymkhana, but of the public generally. ... More attention might also be given to the prompt removal of fragments of paper, sugarcane-ends, &c, left by the public.<sup>306</sup>

In a similar vein, the 1915–16 records state:

His Honour... trusts that the greenhouse which is an eyesore in its present site will have been removed to a less prominent position before the cold weather. He is glad to see that the beautification of the mounds is receiving the attention of the Committee and would suggest that the paths which lead to the summit be more easily graded and metaled, and that something more be done to open up the views by cutting lanes through the dense vegetation that now shuts off the landscape at so many points.<sup>307</sup>

Later reports similarly continue, at times acknowledging the cost of beautification, but nonetheless positing it as an important consideration, commenting favorably on the removal of “less desirable” plants and their replacement by more “interesting varieties.” This selection also emphasizes appearance over economic considerations. The reader will recall that despite the shift from the military/geostrategic to the economic moment, we saw the recurrence of violence and the use of force in 1919. Similarly, in this moment when representational legacy concerns assume hegemony, economic considerations still matter, but no longer occupy primacy. Instead, a preoccupation with how the gardens look becomes a dominant value within the Society’s reports: materiality and representation increasing achieve correspondence and come to coincide. Even as martial law is imposed in Lahore, the 1919 report emphasizes the city’s gardens as a mark of colonial achievement. The Secretary of the Society describes the impetus behind further renovations:

The scheme will involve a considerable expenditure of money, but when it is remembered that “the capital of the Punjab,” by universal consent, “would not be what it is but for its Lawrence

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<sup>306</sup> Annual Report for the Government Agri-Horticultural Garden Lahore for the Year Ending, 1914–15. My emphasis.

<sup>307</sup> Annual Report for the Government Agri-Horticultural Garden Lahore for the Year 1915–16.

Gardens," any expenditure incurred in doing away with the existing blemishes will not be incurred in vain.<sup>308</sup>

Beauty is now as an overriding concern. The Gardens are a site/sight to be consumed, a landscape of power and desire. For a contrast between this and other debates over representation within the space of Britain itself, I now (re)turn to Digby and his critique of Britain's colonial legacy—this time in England, not in India, representations that are substantively distinct from latter-day preoccupations of the Horticultural Society.<sup>309</sup>

### III. *Legacy Concerns and Empire's Critic(s)*

The cover page of Digby's thick volume is revealing.<sup>310</sup> The use of "C.I.E." as a marker, following the author's name is not without meaning. It establishes him as an authoritative source, as a member of the British establishment.<sup>311</sup> His credentials are further underscored by the long list of publications included below his name, and mark him as an authoritative source. In case the reader is still confused about where the author stands despite quotations around the word "Prosperous" in the title, a box immediately below the title makes it clear: he is a critic of empire set on answering one question: whether the colonial government has *improved* India or not, a question Digby ascribes to "Sir" H. H. Fowler, the prefix serving as a marker of credibility. The book is deliberately dedicated to various noteworthy figures in the British Indian colonial establishment and to all those British "who are desirous that our rule should become... a Blessing to the People of India."<sup>312</sup> Unlike these dedications, a handwritten preamble to the printed text, dated November

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<sup>308</sup> Annual Report for the Government Agri-Horticultural Garden Lahore for the Year 1919–20. That these "blemishes" were the product of British planning and oversight is nowhere given serious acknowledgement. It is also worth reminding the reader that this is the same year when the Jallianwala Bagh massacre happened in Amritsar, *hartals* took place in Lahore, and martial law was declared in the city. 1919 remains a pivotal moment, when the military and representational concerns overshadow those of the economy.

<sup>309</sup> This indicates that legacy concerns take different forms in different spaces/times. Within England, appeals to 'beauty' would be of little consequence. Instead, civilizational claims remain salient in the argument Digby makes regarding Britain's legacy vis-à-vis colonial India.

<sup>310</sup> W. Digby, Op. Cit. 1901.

<sup>311</sup> Biographical information on Digby taken from recent article by Mira Matikkala, "William Digby and the Indian Question," *Journal of Liberal History*, 58, Spring 2008. Available online at: [https://liberalhistory.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/58\\_Matikkala\\_William\\_Digby\\_and\\_Indian\\_Question.pdf](https://liberalhistory.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/58_Matikkala_William_Digby_and_Indian_Question.pdf). Accessed December 21, 2018.

<sup>312</sup> W. Digby, Op. Cit. 1901, handwritten preface.

15, 1901, is addressed to Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India. It takes him to task for saying there are no “facts, figures, or evidence” available that could prove that India has regressed since the inception of British rule.<sup>313</sup> Digby bares his task: to prove the *lack of improvement* in India, using the GOI’s own reports and statistics.

Digby’s biographer, Dr Matikkala, portrays him as a humanist and supporter of Indian independence and self-rule. For my purposes here, I am less interested in his political stance vis-à-vis Indian independence but more so with his representation of British rule in India. Digby’s criticism of British rule in India is directed at those who criticized Lord Ripon, whose administration Digby had served in India. Two things stand out in Digby’s tome. First, Digby is not an opponent of empire but an *ardent reformer*. He is a believer that empire and reform can coexist and together produce a better union for both the British and Indians. Towards this end, he uses the statistics of the India Office to argue that, on all accounts, the British had failed India. Digby’s primary charge is that the British are draining India’s resources. Second, and more significantly for my reading here, as a supporter of liberalism and empire, Digby is peddling colonial reform by raising awareness that colonial rule is *potentially good* for India, given the appropriate political context (meaning if liberals rather than conservatives were to be in charge). In other words, his biographer’s claims notwithstanding, Digby’s critique was directed primarily against the political opposition in Britain, and the India office in London—the Secretary of State for India then being Lord George Hamilton, a Conservative. “Prosperous” British India, then, is a polemic that is directed at political adversaries in London and India, an attempt to further liberalism and its reformist project, one that ostensibly relies on statistics and “facts” to make its case, drawing its evidence from official sources. The Indian self-determination Digby supports is both paternalistic and guided.

A key distinction between Digby’s work versus the Reports of the Agri-Horticultural Society is the latter’s focus (in later years) on appearance, literally, on the surface of things, where matter and representations achieve identity and unity. Digby supposedly relies on material “fact” to make his case: these facts are primarily designed to impress on the reader the draining of Indian wealth and the subsequent impoverishment

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<sup>313</sup> W. Digby, Op. Cit. 1901, handwritten preface.

of its people, but are marshalled for moral and civilizational claims. I quote at some length from his Preface:

[T]he book has been written... to bring to a definite issue two contrary views regarding India. Two schools exist. One is always referring to the increasing prosperity of the country and people, and claiming unstinted praise for England as the creator of this prosperity; the other is incessantly dilating upon the rapidly-growing... impoverishment of both country and people...Both cannot be right. Nor is there... any middle course which would reconcile the views held by both protagonists... One is right; the other is wrong.

Which of them is right? I... say, "That... which declares the country is in a bad way and the people in a worse way]. I endeavor to prove... from evidence furnished to me... by the authorities themselves in India and in England. It is they who tell the story I try to unravel. ... I am not responsible for the facts I cite. All I do is to use the material which the GI and the Secretary of State supply. If what I put forward seems... far too terrible to be true, let... it be... borne in mind... that I do no more than put before the reader the evidence, impartially dealt with, scheduled by the authorities themselves... If a true statement be given concerning an existing disaster... he who makes the statement and utters the announcement does not cause the disaster or create the catastrophe. Always, in this book, the evidence is given... and the reader is put in a position to judge for himself or herself whether any given deduction is fair or unfair.

...

I have simply to add that, in the invidious and most disagreeable and painful duty which the writing of a book of such conclusions must, necessarily, be to one whose faith in England's good work, in England's destiny, has been passionately cherished, I have striven to hold

"I that shall stand for England till I die."

England? Yes, –

"... the England that rejoiced to see  
 Hellas unbound, Italy one and free;  
 The England that had tears for Poland's doom,  
 And in her heart for all this world made room;  
 . . . . .  
 Accounting her all living lands above,  
 In justice, and in mercy, and in love."<sup>314</sup>

Chapter I bears the title, "India Ruled by Preconceived Ideas not in accordance with facts," followed by "Where Does India Stand?". The third chapter in a similar vein asks, "Whose is the agricultural and industrial wealth of India?" Subsequent chapters trace the draining of Indian wealth and tribute paid by the Indian people. In essence, the text is a narration of all the wrongs Britain has done in/to India. While a severe indictment of the colonial record in India, including in Lahore and its environs, the poem recuperates British empire based on its (reformed) worthiness and subsequent right to rule. In other words, the liberal agenda espoused by Digby is not one of divorce but rather of a negotiated settlement. The fact that this critique is put forward by an individual at the heart of empire is itself held up as a sign of its British meritorious-ness. It holds the possibility of salvaging British rule despite the wrong doings of the conservatives, and with the latter's overthrow. The problem is not empire per se: it is its mal-administration given the "wrong" party that is in power.

To recapitulate: there are two features that distinguish Digby's text from the Agri-Horticultural Reports. Digby's account fits squarely into a form of representation that claims to be based in evidence and "fact," even as the author relies on liberal moral worthiness. The latter's righteousness stems from concrete reality—one side has the truth and speaks in the name of equity and justice, the other is extractive, dishonest and dishonorable. The debate is joined on concrete grounds and liberal representations are disguised by being cloaked in a socioeconomic, humanistic garb. Furthermore, Digby's audience is primarily British politicians and voting

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<sup>314</sup> W. Digby, *Op. Cit.*, 1901, Preface: xx–xxii.

publics, but is also designed to appeal to Indians fired up by ideas of freedom and liberty, albeit in a liberal vein.

Unlike Digby's mode of representation that stakes its claims on economic, moral and civilizational grounds, representations emanating from the Reports on the Lawrence Gardens rely on an aesthetic claim, eschewing the necessity of any other form of proof. Grounded in an urban aesthetic, looks dominate and are given salience. The Punjab government (and by extension the colonial order) are to be remembered for the beauty of Lahore's urban-scape(s). No other evidence or justification is necessary.

Despite these differences, both texts are concerned with posterity, memory, and history i.e., with the legacy of colonial rule. In the case of the Agri-Horticultural Society, we pass from the economic to the visual-as-natural—a marker of both the passage of time but also of a radical shift in representational forms that rely on nature itself.<sup>315</sup>

The shift in the Agri-Horticultural Society's emphasis is also a sign of the failure of its economic experiment, which opens up the Gardens to (an)other usage. Just as the famines in India provoked awareness of empire's economic shortfalls and necessitated its re-presentation to British and Indian publics, so too beautification of the Lawrence Gardens effaced memory of its own earlier emphases and missteps. Both sets of representations—while sutured quite differently—are designed to build up a memory of colonial rule that is positive and, in the case of the Lawrence Gardens, makes its case visually; it does not even need to be verbalized. Regardless of form, Lahore, coming into coloniality late, emerges as a site where representation looms large in the second trimester of its occupation—and exceeds its residents and publics to make a larger claim that extends beyond the city's borders and boundaries. Unlike Digby's text, the Lawrence Gardens Report sees no need to speak to/about Britain's legacy: instead it is mapped onto space in a manner that directly and without identifiable human intermediaries establishes its veracity without any necessity for, or reliance on words. Stones, mortar, and landscape speak its truth in the present and into the future.

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<sup>315</sup> Earlier in this manuscript I wrote about the synthesis in Lahore's colonial architecture between European and Indian aesthetics. In the instance of the Lawrence Gardens, it is nature not culture that is valorized as the site of beauty, even as landscaping is based entirely on a European aesthetic; however, an aesthetic that masks itself as "natural".

## Epilogue

### ***Hauntings: Ghosts of Times Past***

In colonial Lahore, the British built a number of graveyards to bury their dead. These are segregated sites containing primarily British bodies and bones and those of some notable converts and/or Anglo-Indians; the bulk of bodies in three of the four I visited are European, largely British. The cemeteries themselves demarcate the shifting spatial contours of the city and the specializations and hierarchies that came to define the colonial order, with some exceptions. Each is known as “*goron ka kabristan*,” “the graveyard of whites” or “the white cemetery.” Their designation, by which they are remembered by locals is noteworthy, since all of them are identically named, refuses them any individuality: their naming homogenizes these spaces, spaces that are abstracted, made singular yet lacking individuality.

Of the four, the first which is also the oldest, sits in the vicinity of the walled city—adjacent to the earliest settlement by the British in Lahore. The second is next to the Cantonment, on its far end, in an area popularly known as “R. A. Bazaar,” which, as I only came to know during the course of conducting this research, stands for “Royal Artillery” Bazaar. Of the two others, one is next to the Mayo Gardens, which housed European railway officers, and the fourth one sits along the open sewerage canal that today connects the Mall with the street that led to the mental asylum and jail. The latter cemetery is in close proximity to the Civil Lines where members of the upper echelon of the colonial establishment lived. These graveyards are specialized spaces, producing colonial separation even after/into death.

Not surprisingly, of the four sites, the last one which lies between the Mall and today’s Gulberg not only remains an active graveyard where mostly the upper crust of Pakistan’s Christian community is buried, but it is also the only one that is well maintained. It is clean, with graves and grounds well kempt. The graveyard abutting the inner city also contains graves of Europeans connected to the colonial establishment, but on my first visit, it showed no signs of being an active burial ground. Instead, it was a forlorn sight: desolate with not even a caretaker in sight. The headstones were visible but overall it showed signs of acute neglect. On a more recent visit in 2017 (at which time ownership had been restored to the Church), it showed signs of activity: new graves had cropped up all over. But the



presence of broken headstones since my last visit suggests that the change in hands—from the government back into the hands of Lahore’s Christian community—has not been entirely salutary. The graveyard near the Mayo Gardens remains locked and was inaccessible on my first and subsequent attempts to visit it. The graveyard adjacent to the cantonment and the R. A. Bazaar showed the most dramatic difference between my first and most recent visits. This graveyard has only military personnel buried in it, largely those who fought in Lahore, were stationed there, and/or died in its close proximity. On my initial visit, it too showed signs of neglect but not as acute as the graveyard close to the inner city. On my 2017 visit, the R. A. Bazaar graveyard was dramatically different from the time I visited it previously: skulls dotted the graveyard, too small to be human. The caretaker claimed they had been thrown over the wall into the graveyard by anti-Christian members of the public, but his explanation was unpersuasive, given the height of the wall and the distance at which the skulls lay from it.

I could not help but be struck on each visit by the pathos of two of these burial grounds, the oldest one and the one near the cantonment. Here lie the remains of individuals, both young and old, buried far away from what many of them called “home” with no one to remember or mourn them, no one to care for or tend to them. The concerns of empire seem so meaningless in the light of these colonial remains and the status and condition of these grave(yard)s. These spaces more than any representations of coloniality exude a haunting sense of the futility of power, and the meaningless of its self-representations. While this rumination here is on Lahore and its colonial order(ing), this applies just as much today to those in power as it did to those in times gone by.

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