Foreign Aid, Political Institutions and Economic Freedom: Empirical Evidence from Selected Developing Countries

Abstract

This article empirically examines the effects of foreign aid on economic freedom while considering the mediating role of political institutions. We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we provide an empirical analysis of how different types of foreign aid affect the economic freedom of the receiving country. Second, we provide evidence regarding how political institutions mediate the foreign aid/economic freedom relationship. We use IV and GMM techniques to test a model using data from 40 developing countries covering the time period 1985 to 2016. Our analysis yields three main findings. First, democratic and politically stable countries enjoy more economic freedom. Second, foreign aid’s net effect is to reduce economic freedom, whether we consider official development assistance (ODA) or net official assistance (NOA). Finally, economic freedom increases with both types of foreign aid if the receiving country’s political institutions are more democratic and/or durable.