Abstract:
Research suggests that politics plays a pivotal role in public service provision in
contexts of scarce resources. However, there is limited evidence available on how dynastic
politicians influence public service delivery. We examine this question in the context of the
health sector in Punjab, Pakistan. By employing a representative sample of rural health
clinics, we develop measures to capture doctors’ outcomes at the clinic level. These data are
then matched with provincial constituency-level data to study the impact of having a
dynastic member of the parliament (MP) on doctors’ assignment, attendance, and tenure in
their respective constituencies. Our findings show that having a dynastic MP has no
discernible impact on the assignment and attendance of doctors. However, clinics in
constituencies with a dynastic MP have relatively experienced doctors. Furthermore, our
suggestive evidence from the Pakistan Household and Living Measurement Survey (PSLM)
shows that individuals living in districts with a higher proportion of dynastic MPs report
lower improvements in clinic services and are less satisfied with those services. Our main
findings remain robust to various alternative explanations.
