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Pakistan’s Power Crisis: How Did We Get Here?

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dc.contributor.author Kamal A. Munir
dc.contributor.author Salman Khalid
dc.date.accessioned 2014-08-19T04:48:44Z
dc.date.available 2014-08-19T04:48:44Z
dc.date.issued 2012-09
dc.identifier.citation The Lahore School of Economics, Vol.17 : SE en_US
dc.identifier.issn ISSN 1811-5446
dc.identifier.uri http://121.52.153.179/Volume.html
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/6033
dc.description PP.10, ill. en_US
dc.description.abstract This article has a rather modest aim. In contrast to most analyses that abound, it submits that Pakistan’s energy crisis stems primarily from a suboptimal policy and only secondarily from governance issues. This does not mean that governance is not an important issue. With around 20 different organizations involved in the power sector—e.g., WAPDA, PEPCO, PPIB, AEDB, GENCOs, and IPPs—there is much scope for governance failures. In addition, there is much malfeasance perpetrated by political and other interests. Still, since governance mechanisms are significantly shaped by incentive systems and operating policy regimes, we will argue that the problem lies primarily in policy choices made earlier, and focus in particular on two elements of the policy that need to be revisited. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher © Lahore School of Economics en_US
dc.subject Power crisis en_US
dc.subject Policy en_US
dc.subject Governance en_US
dc.subject Pakistan en_US
dc.title Pakistan’s Power Crisis: How Did We Get Here? en_US
dc.type Article en_US


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