dc.description.abstract |
The intervention of local elites is often cited as an impediment to policy
implementation in many developing countries. In this paper, we present initial
results from an original primary household dataset from eight tehsils of rural Punjab,
Pakistan. We examine descriptive statistics on patron–client interaction and
correlations between household characteristics and that relationship. The study raises
some key findings. First, households report connections with a range of officials; they
interact most heavily with local officials, but a large number of households also report
interacting with their provincial and national politicians. Second, many households
report receiving active assistance both from local officials and from provincial and
national politicians in accessing certain state services, in particular in applying for
national identity cards. Third, households report links with many patrons outside
their own biraderi or clan. Fourth, vulnerable households, such as landless and
female-headed households, appear less likely to interact with and less likely to receive
assistance from patrons, suggesting that patronage activity could increase the
inequality of outcomes. Fifth, better-off households appear more likely to assist
patrons in a range of areas. Finally, local officials and politicians had tended to
recommend candidates in the last election, and rural households were strongly
convinced that their vote was not secret from their patrons or officials. This is
possibly consistent with patronage-based politics and bloc voting. |
en_US |